

**Paper Abstracts for the 27th annual joint meeting of SAGP/SSIPS
Fordham University, October 16-18, 2009**

A

“Does the Zhuangzi Provide an Ethics?” (Saturday 9:00, Room 9)

Michael Adams, *New School*, madams_6@hotmail.com

The argument that Aristotle believes humans exist as societal creatures does not need to be recapitulated. That this belief strongly informs his ethical system is obvious from *The Nicomachean Ethics*. In this work, he uses the language that his culture uses to talk about the excellence of the human being in order to discover the excellence of that same human on his own interpretations of ancient texts to build a foundation for his theories on how the individual should conduct himself in society. Neither of these arguments is any longer valid. Today, humanity exists in a constant state of being. By appealing to the lives of mytho-historic rulers, Confucius uses comparable arguments based cultural clash between ethical systems wherein no single society can authentically lay claim to the “proper” foundations of those ethical systems. With no shared culture, we can no longer look towards culturally specific mytho-historic systems for a shared set of values. Enter: Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi’s critique of Chinese thought as existent during his time (circa 375-300 BCE) resonates with our current ethical crisis. The question is: Does Zhuangzi provide humanity with an ethics applicable to a deconstructed “post”-modern world? And if he does, how does he avoid the trap of his own societal “history”? In order to answer these questions, we must begin with an analysis of “the hinge of the way” as it is introduced in Chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi. What we will discover is that this “hinge” opens up a reading of Zhuangzi that will eventually lead us to the possibility of a different type of ethical criteria. Our (shared) difficulty then becomes determining whether or not Zhuangzi’s criteria is applicable to any system beyond the individual. This would be the ultimate inception of a “Zhuangzian” ethics; for, there would be no ethics (in the Aristotelian sense) if there would be no way of determining the proper “place” for the multitude of individuals within society.

“Aristotle’s (Non-)Denial of Self-motion in *Physics* VIII” (Sunday 11:15, Room 5)

Simona Aimar, *University of Oxford*, simona.aimar@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

In *Physics* VIII, while arguing for the prime mover, Aristotle says twice that animals are not really self-movers (253a10-11; 259b7-8). This is at odds with his often repeated claim that animals are self-movers. David Furley suggests that Aristotle is focusing on intentionality (intentional-view). The idea is that an animal goes somewhere because of the intention to pursue an external object. By contrast, Ben Morison contends that Aristotle recalls the division between agent and patient of *Physics* VIII.5 (parthood-view). Animals are not really self-movers because only one part of them, the agent, is a mover; the other part, the patient, is merely moved thereby. This essay suggests a third way-out. In *Physics* VIII, Aristotle (i) uses self-motion in the sense of self-started motion and (ii) suggests that life-keeping processes like sleep, started, or triggered, by the

environment, are necessary in order to enhance the exercise of self-motion -- in a way that I shall explain. Aristotle claims that animals are not really self-movers for they are not the only starting cause of self-motion.

“Avicenna’s theory of Mental Language” (Saturday 9:00, Room 10)

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The purpose of this paper is to present Avicenna’s theory of mental language. By not subjecting the mental language to word-order or any other syntactical constraint, Avicenna frees the mental language from being one-dimensional and allows its terms to be used in a non-restrictive way. By assuming that the intellect combines a set of terms to produce thoughts, we need not suppose that the intellect uses a one-dimensional structure of word order to represent different ways of composing these terms. The intellect needs to use a multidimensional structure to produce different notions or thoughts.

“Gnothi Seauton: Plato’s *Alcibiades I* and the Beginnings of Philosophical Knowledge” (Sunday 11:15, Room 2)

James Ambury, *SUNY Stony Brook*, jamesmambury@gmail.com

Scholarship for the past 150 years has largely come to question the authenticity of Plato’s *Alcibiades I*. However, none of the Neo-Platonist commentators doubted that Plato was the author. This paper does not explicitly engage in philological debates about authenticity but considers the philosophical significance accorded the dialogue by the commentators insofar as this is itself a clue about the Platonic conception of the self and its role in the pursuit of philosophical truth.

Both Proclus and Olympiodorus emphasize that the *Alcibiades* itself mirrors the function that Socrates plays in the dialogue proper: that is, of introducing the reader to the pursuit of philosophical truth by turning him towards himself. This is accomplished by means of eliciting from him his own opinions, refuting them, and exhorting him to come to know himself and care for himself. Iamblicus places the dialogue at the beginning of the “Decalogue” alleged to encompass all of Plato’s philosophy on the grounds that an interrogation into the self, the very topic of the *Alcibiades*, is the beginning of all philosophical investigation. Proclus claims, “In outline in this dialogue the one, common and complete plan of all philosophy may be comprised, being revealed through our actually first turning towards ourselves”. And Olympiodorus directs our attention to the *Phaedrus*, where Socrates argues he cannot claim to know anything else before he knows himself. This should not surprise us if we recall the dialogue’s ancient subtitle: ‘on the nature of the human being’.

The *Alcibiades* shows us that for Plato, philosophical inquiry must begin with a very particular kind of education that starts with an inquiry into our own being. Socrates spends the entire first half of the dialogue demonstrating to Alcibiades that he doesn’t know the very thing about which he intends to advise the Athenian Assembly (116d). He thinks he needs no help from anyone because he already has knowledge (104a, 106d) and therefore attempts to evade questioning (109d, 112d, 113e). Socrates elicits wonder from

Alcibiades (103a, 104c) by making him feel out of place (116e), and demonstrates that before we can know anything, we must seek to learn it (109e), and before learning anything, we must first inquire into what, precisely, we are. What the Neo-Platonist commentators saw in the Alcibiades is that the dialogue itself performs the same function with the reader that Socrates plays with Alcibiades. In the end, we should not be surprised that Socrates has seduced Alcibiades into caring for himself in preparation for the pursuit of a philosophical life, because Plato, in this very dialogue, has done the same thing to us.

“The Essence of Thinking and Questioning and the Need of Alterity: Socrates’ Alter Ego in Plato’s *Hippias Major*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 6)

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In this paper I offer an interpretation of Plato’s *Hippias Major* through the following question: What is the meaning of the relation Hippias-Socrates-Socrates’ alter ego in relation to the activities of questioning and thinking, within the context of a dialogue about beauty?

The paper distinguishes the discussion of beauty in the *Hippias Major* in three levels. The first one is that of the explicit discussion about beauty between Socrates and Hippias. In a second level, Plato says things about beauty in indirect ways, as in the structure of the dialogue as a whole, in the behavior of the characters, and in the inferences that can be made about related statements, circumstances, and situations throughout the text. However, it can be argued that there is a third level in the dialogue in which the activities of thinking and questioning is analyzed.

The topic of beauty operates here as the context in which the activities of thinking and questioning are placed. On the one hand, it is salient the continuous use of the adjective ‘beautiful’ and the adverb ‘beautifully’ in ways that are not direct statements about beauty: situations, answers, or persons are referred to as beautiful, but it is not clear in what sense those things could be really beautiful. Hence, I claim that the discussion about beauty is dependent on the presence of Socrates’ alter ego, which should be understood as the chief feature of the work.

The paper takes a glance at the way in which Socrates’ alter ego is introduced in the dialogue. Then, I make use of the platonic topic appearance/being as a clue to understand the significance of the relation between Hippias, Socrates, and Socrates’ alter ego. The paper will argue for the presence of an internal dialectic between Hippias-Socrates-Socrates’ alter ego in the dialogue: the function that Hippias performs is that of incarnating Socrates, so that Socrates’ alter ego can be incarnated in Socrates. This transfer purports to show that in a sense relevant for the activity of questioning and thought, alterity is necessary. In other words, in a sense fundamental for thinking Socrates is as different from his alter ego, as Socrates is from Hippias.

This interpretation endorses the idea that every question needs difference, alterity: there are no questions from sameness. From a hermeneutical point of view, the emphasis is made on questions and the activity of questioning, which is the same as thinking, as a door to understanding: comprehension is only possible when something alien questions

us. This is precisely the role that Socrates' alter ego plays in the dialogue: being an exemplar of the idea of alterity in relation to the activities of questioning and thinking.

“The Anatomy of Three Thought Experiments in Plato’s *Republic*, *Apology* and in *Alcibiades Minor*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 1)

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My paper argues that Plato’s use of thought experiments anticipate many of the themes discussed by Thomas S. Kuhn’s classic essay, “A Function for Thought Experiments.” Kuhn’s concern is that thought experiments satisfy the condition of verisimilitude. That is, thought experiments must not be conducted merely to alter the conceptual apparatus of the scientist regarding the phenomenon explored, but rather to alter the scientist’s conceptual apparatus for the sake of altering his actions (i.e. practical rationality). Plato, too, is quite concerned with getting interlocutors to appreciate that theory not be separated from practice, and that theory is necessary for the process of effective decision making. Each of the interlocutors presented in the *Republic*, *Apology* and *Alcibiades Minor* are confronted with a thought experiment that is designed to effect how they choose to live. Although the three dialogues I discuss illustrate the Kuhnian admonishment against separating theory from practice, many other dialogues in the Platonic corpus echo Kuhn’s concerns.

“Erotic and Servile Pleasures in Plato’s *Phaedrus*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 2)

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The *Phaedrus* is not high on the list of dialogues to which most scholars turn in elucidating Plato’s thoughts on pleasure. In this work, he doesn’t appear to be articulating any recognizable theory of pleasure, and pleasure rarely comes up in the conversation. In this paper I argue that even though pleasure is only a minor concept in the *Phaedrus*, Plato’s few remarks on its role in erotic love and madness deserve our attention.

We can construct descriptions of various types of pleasures by piecing together a few ideas expressed in the conversations between Socrates and Phaedrus. We find that there are pleasures enjoyed by the vicious, who blindly pursue sexual fulfillment in the manner of four-legged beasts (250d). Another kind of erotic pleasure is enjoyed by the reverent lover who recognizes divine beauty in the face of his beloved (251d-e). We encounter what appears to be a third way of describing pleasure at the end of the myth of the charioteer, before the ensuing discussion of writing and rhetoric: there Phaedrus asserts that some pleasures are preceded by pain—most bodily pleasures, he claims—and these belong to slaves [hēdonai andrapodōdeis], while some pleasures are free of their opposite, such as the pleasure of discussing with a speechwriter the elements of a good speech (258e). The upshot of this last classification of pleasures is that the other two types—irreverent and reverent erotic pleasures, let’s call them—are both servile, since they are preceded by pain. This conclusion is unsurprising in the case of irreverent erotic

pleasure, but is disconcerting with regard to the reverent, for Plato is thought to be showing in the *Phaedrus* the positive value of erotic elements to the philosophical life, not condemning erotic pleasure as servile.

I address this problem in the *Phaedrus* by showing first that we should take as a serious Platonic view Phaedrus' remarks about the servile nature of pleasures that are mixed with pain. I argue that the same classification of pleasures into mixed and unmixed types appears in the *Philebus*, where we also find Plato maintaining his negative attitude toward the former. The *Phaedrus*, then, can be seen as a precursor (if it is, as is generally thought, the earlier dialogue) of the more extensive theory of pleasure Plato articulates in the *Philebus*.

I argue that in the *Phaedrus* Plato has another method of appraising pleasures—in addition to considering any admixture with pain—that allows him to reject irreverent erotic pleasures as servile while confirming the merit of the reverent. This method consists in evaluating a pleasure's relation to the desires of the soul: the overly-lustful soul is enslaved to the desires of the appetitive part—the dark horse in the charioteer analogy—and has no goal for itself other than immediate sexual fulfillment. In being subject to its worst part, this soul is a slave according to the sense of slavery found in the *Republic*. In contrast, the reverent soul's desire for sex, although still present, is restrained by reason (i.e., the charioteer), and thus its pleasures, although preceded by pain, are not servile.

“Abelard's Realism” (Saturday 9:00, Room 8)

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Peter Abelard is often described as a “nominalist”, an “anti-realist”, or a “non-realist”. But according to some common ways to distinguish between realism and anti-realism, Abelard comes out on the side of the realists. In this paper, I first canvas several ways to construe the division between realism and anti-realism. I then consider some key ideas drawn from Abelard's writings on universals, material constitution, and the philosophical foundations of logical inference. In particular, I focus upon his important concepts of status, which underwrites our use of universal words, and of habitudo, which licenses many of our logical inferences. I argue that even though Abelard has a relatively restrictive notion of what it is to be a “thing” (res), he has a much more generous understanding of what is real. In sharp contrast to many forms of anti-realism, Abelard is a firm believer that reality has a determinate, mind-independent structure, and that this structure can be captured to some extent by an appropriately refined language.

“Gods and Goods” (Saturday 4:15, Room 2)

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An account of Plato's analysis of the names of the gods in the *Cratylus* with a view to understanding the role that the gods' names play in the analysis of the terms referring to human goodness that conclude the etymological portion of the dialogue. Thus, in my

reading the analysis of language will incorporate considerations of how the gods affect the fashioning of the good life so important to Platonic philosophy.

B

“Insights of Avicenna” (Saturday 9:00, Room 10)

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I propose here to investigate how Avicenna, following Aristotle, accounts for our ability to grasp real definitions and other fundamental principles. I shall focus on the account given in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* and Avicenna’s comments upon it, contained in *Al-Burhān*. My solution depends upon having, first, a certain interpretation of Aristotle’s position. Given that Aristotle does indeed proceed along its lines, we can see Avicenna following out its implications—and neither being silly: at any rate, not any sillier than us today.

“Piety and Skepticism in 20th Century Phenomenological Thought” (Saturday 4:15, Room 7)

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The question of piety, though central to the Presocratics and to Platonic philosophy, becomes philosophically marginal in much of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy. Alongside explicit calls for philosophy to become a “rigorous science,” philosophy turns away from religious, soteriological and transformative themes. This paper argues that the theme of piety cannot be separated from skepticism, where skepticism is understood as a desire for self-knowledge. It examines the consequences of phenomenology’s own ambiguous relationship to piety and faith, focusing especially on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s later writings where a latent piety comes once more to the fore.

“Heraclitus of Ephesus and the Problem of Reference” (Saturday 4:15, Room 10)

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In contemporary analytic philosophy, there is a semantic dilemma that still persists: the problem of reference. The recognition of the problem of reference in philosophy of language is popularly attributed to Gottlob Frege. Yet, recently there has been a movement to relocate the recognition of the problem of reference even earlier in the history of philosophy—that is, the problem of reference, arguably, was first brought into light by G.W.F. Hegel; or at least this is what Robert Brandom suggests.¹ In this paper I will demonstrate that this quibble can be rendered superfluous by stationing the problem hundreds of years earlier, namely, in the thought of Heraclitus of Ephesus. In regard to the various interpretations of Heraclitus, Charles Kahn wrote in *The Art and Thought of*

¹ Robert Brandom, “A Spirit of Trust: a Semantic Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology” (lecture, University of Pittsburgh, PA, September 10, 2008).

Heraclitus “by induction we may be sure that the next generation, even the next perspective reader of Heraclitus, will be able to see something new and different.”² In this paper, I will do just that. However, I do not intend to undermine the numerous other interpretations of the fragments. On the contrary, as Kahn suggested, I assert that I see something new and different in Heraclitus: the problem of reference. In this paper, I demonstrate that Heraclitus was fully aware of the same semantic dilemma that has plagued modern philosophy and philosophy of language. In this paper, I assert that the problem of reference can be found in the Heraclitean logos, his writing style, and even explicitly in particular fragments. Thus, I position the first recognition of the problem of reference in the thought of Heraclitus of Ephesus.

“Understanding Natural Rights in the Aristotelian Tradition” (Saturday 9:00 am, Room 5)
Michael Baur, *Fordham University*, mbaur@fordham.edu

One of the great contemporary representatives of the Aristotelian tradition in ethics and politics – Alasdair MacIntyre – holds that the notion of “natural rights” or “human rights” is entirely alien to the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas (see *After Virtue*, pp. 64-67). By contrast, many other thinkers working within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition have held that belief in human nature and human dignity entails belief in the existence of “natural rights” or “human rights.” In this paper, I argue that the two opposing sides in this debate about “natural rights” in the Aristotelian tradition are largely talking past one another, since neither side has given sufficient consideration to the very meaning and conditions of “right.”

More specifically, I argue that the notion of rights in the Aristotelian tradition – including the notion of “natural rights” or “human rights” – has no defensible meaning apart from the notion of justice; and in turn, that the notion of justice has no defensible meaning apart from the notion of a community of two or more members whose acts or works can be regarded as adjusted or commensurated to one another in some relevant respect (i.e., whose acts or works can be regarded as instantiating a kind of equality in some relevant respect and in accordance with some common measure). As Aquinas observes (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, Q. 57, aa. 1-3), the proper object of justice is *ius*, or right, which is a kind of ordering or adjustment according to which the acts and/or works of separate agents are made commensurate or equal with respect to one another. One implication of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of “right” that I wish to defend is that “rights” are relational. To “possess a right,” on the account I wish to defend, is not to possess a power or liberty or natural property (something on par with the property of having earlobes or kneecaps) that one would possess apart from any relation to others. Rather, to “possess a right” is to occupy a place within an order of justice. But while rights are relational, it does not follow that “respect for rights” is reducible to respect for values or goods that are “merely relative” or “merely convention-based.” For both Aristotle and Aquinas, it is possible to regard human acts and works as commensurable to

² Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979), 87.

one another, only because such acts and works are expressions of a common human nature (and this human nature, in itself, entails a species-specific capacity for rationality and worthiness of respect). If the proper commensuration between human individuals and their acts is observed, then (natural or positive) rights are respected; if the proper commensuration is not observed, then (natural or positive) rights are violated. But note: to say that a certain kind of goodness or worthiness exists wherever human nature exists, is not to say that “natural rights” or “human rights” exist wherever some human being exists.

A crucial element in this account of “natural rights” might be illustrated through an analogy drawn from the physical sciences: the notion of “natural rights” stands to the notion of “human nature” as the notion of “weight” stands to the notion of “mass.” According to the modern scientific understanding, a body does not have weight if there is no other body present to exert the gravitational force of attraction upon it; but while a body has weight only insofar as it stands in relation to some other body, a body is capable of having such weight only because it has mass as an intrinsic property of itself, and would continue to have mass (as well as other intrinsic properties belonging to it on account of its mass) even if it did not stand in relation to any other body. By the same token, a human being does not possess “natural rights” if his or her acts or works cannot be regarded as adjustable or commensurable to the acts or works of other human beings; but while a human being has “natural rights” only insofar as he or she stands in some relevant relation to one or more other human beings, a human being is capable of having such rights only because he or she has a human nature and would continue to have this human nature (as well as other intrinsic properties belonging to him or her on account of this nature) even if he or she had no relation at all to other human beings.

“Paideia: Educating for Wisdom in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy” (Saturday 9:00 am, Room 11)

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This paper applies Aristotle’s model of the person of practical wisdom to the way of life of the members of the Chorus in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* and Socrates in Plato’s dialogues. All of these characters exhibit the personal virtues of rational courage, rational temperance, liberality, rational anger, and truthfulness about themselves. They exhibit the political virtue of justice in decisions about how to distribute of wealth and power, how to punish wrongdoing, and how to criticize the particular rulers of their city-states according to an accurate understanding of what is just by nature. Although they are accused by corrupt rulers of undermining social order, their lives show an overall respect for the rule of law, an unwillingness to challenge authority unless it is egregiously abused, and the courage to speak out against corrupt leaders for the sake of preserving social order in the long run.

These characters are high-minded, serious people. The purpose of an education in the liberal arts is to encourage young people to understand these virtues and to begin developing them through the power of their own choices rather than by listening to authority figures as they have done in the past.

Throughout the play, the Chorus speaks to all of the major characters and to characters about their choices in critical situations. In their analysis of the choices and reasons given by the Herald, Clytaemestra, Agamemnon, and Aegisthus, they demonstrate excellence in deliberation, excellence in understanding, and good sense as Aristotle defines them. They believe Zeus gave humans the power of thought and we should reflect upon the overall patterns in human behavior and human history in order to understand what Zeus truly wants, or what is truly just.

Throughout the Platonic dialogues set in Athens during the Golden Age, Socrates speaks to members of the powerful elite about the “serious,” philosophical questions in life. The literary characters make mistakes in their arguments. The historical counterparts to these characters make the same mistake in their lives and come to a disastrous end. Socrates believes it is his God-given mission to live an examined life and to examine others.

Both tragedies and Greek philosophy seek to cultivate the powers of practical wisdom and critical thinking about the serious questions in life. In order to preserve political and intellectual freedom in any city, as many citizens as possible have to develop their natural powers of wisdom to the greatest extent possible. The goal of Greek paideia is to create and sustain a self-sufficient society in which citizens rule and are ruled in turn.

“Accounts of Living and Dying in Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia*” (Saturday 2:00, Room 4)

Keith Bemer, *University of Pittsburgh*, keb57@pitt.edu

In *On the Soul* Aristotle maintains that the soul is the source or principle (archê) of life in living things. However the soul is largely absent from the discussions of the causes of life and death in the collection of “little” works on nature handed down in the *Parva Naturalia*. The subject matter of the collection as a whole is announced, in the opening lines of *On Sense and Sensible Objects*, as those characteristics of living things that are “common to body and soul.” However the final two works in the collection, *On the Length and Shortness of Life* and *On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration* discuss the causes of life and death in surprisingly materialistic terms. In this paper I present the doctrines discussed in these last two little-studied works and demonstrate that the materialistic accounts of life and death provided there are consistent with the discussions in *On the Soul*, which focus more on the role soul plays as the form of living things. In addition, I discuss why these two little works present conspicuous differences in the sorts of explanations they provide, and why they are divided into two separate treatises in the first place, given that their subject matter is so similar. I characterize their differences in terms of what one might call their different levels of explanation, thereby showing that their separation is both sensible and methodologically sound.

“Aristotle on Mathematics and Natural Science: an Example from the *Meteorology*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 5)

Keith Bemer, *University of Pittsburgh*, keb57@pitt.edu

Aristotle's natural science is often characterized as un-mathematical, and indeed his discussion of scientific demonstration in the *Posterior Analytics* prohibits using demonstrations from one science to prove conclusions in another. Since for Aristotle the study of nature and mathematics are different forms of theoretical inquiry, treating different kinds of being, mathematical demonstrations cannot be used to prove conclusions in natural science. However, there are exceptions. In *Physics* II.2 Aristotle discusses the "more natural of the mathematical sciences," such as astronomy, optics and harmonics, which are often referred to in the tradition as the "subalternate" or "mixed" sciences. In these sciences, which Aristotle describes as being related "one under the other," mathematical demonstrations are permitted to "cross kinds." The conditions according to which such kind-crossing is permitted are discussed primarily in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, and although Aristotle's comments there have received significant attention from commentators, a satisfactory consensus regarding their interpretation has failed to emerge. Interestingly, an often overlooked example of a mixed science at work appears in book III of the *Meteorology*, where Aristotle discusses certain optical phenomena of reflection, including halos and rainbows. In this paper I compare the discussion of the mixed sciences and the prohibition against "kind crossing" in the *Posterior Analytics* with Aristotle's discussion of the rainbow in the *Meteorology*. I believe a close, comparative reading of the relevant passages in the two works aids in their elucidation and interpretation. In particular, I argue that Aristotle's specification that the principles (archai) of the sciences related one under the other must share a common feature is the key to understanding how the demonstrations from one science can cross to another.

"Dirâr b. 'Amr: Acts and Accidents" (Saturday 11:15, Room 10)

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NOTE: In order to conform with most word processing software, all diacritic marks have been removed from this Abstract. Arabic transliterations have been adjusted to fit Roman script.

Some study has been dedicated to the physical theory of Dirâr b. 'Amr (c. 728-815 CE), according to whom bodies are composed of "accident parts." (E.g. this page is composed of whiteness, such-and-such inky markéddness, such-and-such length, width, etc.) Other scholars have demonstrated that Dirâr was the first to have posited iktisâb as a workable theory of action (and culpability). Yet, although the impact of Dirâr's innovations has been discussed in the context of Mu'tazilite natural philosophy and in the development of the Ash'arite compromise on free will, little effort has been expended to consider how Dirâr's ethical and physical theories may have been coordinated. In this paper I argue that Dirâr's analysis of human action is necessarily linked to his physical theory. The capacity-to-act is an accident inherent in man; the capacity to perform each specific act is apparently an acquisition (kasb) created in man by God. By Dirâr's physical calculus, such accidental parts may be transformed into bodies, thereby allowing the fruition of a certain act, or the actualization of certain accidents. Thus, the series of accidents involved, for example, in the throwing of a stone requires a conversion of agency into

property. This is a natural conversion, insofar as the capacity-to-throw, the assent-to-throwing, the motion of the stone, and any other accidental characteristics as may be eventuated by the overall action, are all accident-parts related to one or another body. The accidental nature of human action is a subject of further analysis by Abû al-Hudhayl and later, doctrinaire Mu'tazilites. In each of the major speculative streams—Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, Falsafah—accidents become idealized, and acts psychologized; yet in the fragments preserved from the era of Dirâr, the act and the accident are cohabitants, even mutually exchangeable components, of a materialistic complex of doctrines. Careful study of the available source material will lead to a revised account of the original concerns of Mu'tazilism in the late 8th Century CE.

“Elemental Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s *Meteorology IV*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 5)

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There’s a long-running debate about how to conceive of Aristotle’s *prôtē hulē*. In the paper, I weigh in on one aspect of it, temporarily setting aside the traditional but now waning view according to which *prôtē hulē* is best construed as an intrinsically unqualified material substrate. In particular, I begin by focusing on the debate between those who take the elements (i.e., fire, air, earth, and water) to be *prôtē hulē* and those who instead identify it with the primary contraries (i.e., the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry). To that end, I turn to the fourth book of Aristotle’s *Meteorology* and defend Eric Lewis’ (1996) reading of text to show that instances of the elements are hylomorphically structured and, having matter themselves, can’t be construed as *prôtē hulē*. I argue that any instance of an element is materially composed of a pair of the primary contraries and conclude with some speculations as to the content of elemental form, which Aristotle commits himself to in the *Meteorology* but does not specify.

“Unity and Partition in Plato’s Souls” (Saturday 2:00, Room 2)

Kristina Biniek, *University of Western Ontario*, kbiniiek@uwo.ca

In this paper I argue that the tripartite model of the soul in *Republic IV* and the *Timaeus* is not a departure from the psychology of the *Phaedo* (or from *Republic X*). The differences in these accounts are a result not of different models of soul, but of the distinct explanatory goals of these works and their focus on the soul at different stages of its existence.

The *Phaedo* opens with Echecrates learning that Socrates had faced death “nobly and without fear”, for he thought the soul survived the death of the body. Here we come to the focus of the dialogue: examining why we should think the soul survives and what sort of existence it has without the body. Given that Socrates is in his final hours, these are the compelling questions, not the young man’s questions of how to live or whether it is worthwhile to be just.

By contrast, the *Republic* begins with Socrates questioning Cephalus about how he finds old age, and Cephalus responding that it is not too onerous for one who has lived justly. However, Cephalus quickly relinquishes his role in the conversation to his heir

Polemarchus, and with this, the conversation turns to the concerns of young men: whether it is really worthwhile for them to strive to be virtuous and just.

Due to the nature of the inquiry in the *Phaedo*, its focus is on characterizing the disincarnate soul, which consists only of reason, whereas the *Republic's* focus requires a fuller characterization of the components of the embodied soul. Thus the *Phaedo* directs numerous arguments at showing that the soul that endures death must be simple, and examines what kind of identity this soul maintains. It does not really consider how reason can come to govern in such a soul, for reason either has or has not done so in the case of the man facing death, and what is important is how the soul that persists will fare after it departs the body.

Given the *Republic's* animating question of whether one should be just, and that justice, like all virtue, is a certain state of the soul, this work requires a richer account of the nature of the embodied soul. In the *Republic*, Plato needs to say more about virtue – and thus, about soul – to convince young men that it truly is worthwhile to strive to be virtuous.

This account of the continuity in Plato's psychological views is consistent with the distinct steps of moral development detailed in the *Republic*, and it helps make sense of the seemingly disparate pictures of soul in *Republic IV* and *X*. It also casts light on the short shrift Plato gives to the productive class in the city and the analogous appetitive part of the soul.

“Aristotle, Liberalism, and the Common Advantage” (Saturday 9:00, Room 5)
Irfan Khawaja, *Felician College*, khawajai@felician.edu
Carrie-Ann Biondi, *Marymount Manhattan College*, cbiondi@mmm.edu

Contemporary Aristotelian theorists are locked in a debate over whether Aristotle's work can contribute to rather than compete with or replace liberal political theory. Fred Miller argues yes; Alasdair MacIntyre argues no. MacIntyre famously draws on Aristotle in *After Virtue* as part of his project of providing an alternative to what he rightfully sees as the bankrupt moral pluralism and confusion of liberalism. However, we maintain—as does Miller in *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics*—that MacIntyre is mistaken to think that Aristotelianism and liberalism are at odds with one another. Rather, liberalism can gain much from Aristotle's thought, especially about the common advantage.

It is crucial to understand what Aristotle means by the common advantage and the private advantage and how he conceives of the proper relationship between the individual and political society before knowing whether or not his thought is compatible with liberalism. We shall thus examine Aristotle's discussions of both the common advantage in the context of correct versus incorrect constitutions in *Politics* and the nature of the individual's good in *Nicomachean Ethics*. This will be done in the context of explaining, assessing, and revising Miller's taxonomy for characterizing the debate over Aristotle on the common advantage. We argue that although Miller's taxonomy is a useful initial heuristic, it has two significant difficulties that impede further progress in this debate: (1) the basic organizing principle rests on a blurring of the egoism-altruism distinction that

Aristotle in fact maintains, and (2) there are an insufficient number and type of subcategories to capture adequately and keep distinct the possible positions in this debate. Refining Miller's insights will clear the way for challenging MacIntyre's thesis that Aristotelianism and liberalism are incompatible.

There are three interrelated components of MacIntyre's understanding of an Aristotelian common advantage which lead him to think that it is incompatible with liberalism. These components are: (1) the self is socially constituted, (2) the private is pleonectic, and (3) the concept of rights is illegitimate in pursuit of the human good. We maintain that all of these claims are in some way mistaken and that Aristotelianism is both compatible with (and necessary for) a defensible version of liberalism. Ultimately, we suggest that a rationally grounded view of the good life along Aristotelian lines supports a liberal individualist conception of the common advantage as the maintenance of liberty, properly understood.

"Plato's Depiction of the Socratic Turn"? (Saturday 11:15, Room 3)
Martin Black, *Boston University*, mablack@bu.edu

Recently, more studies of Plato have paid attention to the dialogue form as an aspect of his comprehensive intention. This procedure has drawn attention away from the focus upon Plato's ostensible development, for which there is little and controversial evidence, and brought attention to the philosophical drama within which he places Socrates. We need to account for Plato's depiction of Socrates' development or the "Socratic turn." This term denotes Socrates' criticism of "the inquiry into nature" and turn to an inquiry orientated by dialogue, the forms, and *erōs*. The "Socratic turn" is shown in three stages through three substantial passages where Socrates or others relate aspects of his earliest attempts at philosophizing: the Socratic "intellectual autobiography" in the *Phaedo*; Socrates' encounter with *Parmenides* in the "first part" of the *Parmenides*; and Socrates' instruction in *erōs* in the *Symposium*.

The *Phaedo* passage shows Socrates' criticism of versions of materialism and teleology for abstracting from our incorrigible experience of the unity of things and from our experience that it is our opinions of what it is better to do that are "the true cause" of our actions. Socrates' hypothesis of the forms is intended to furnish the ground for his return of philosophy to its origins in the comprehensive horizon of opinion. *Parmenides* criticizes this hypothesis for effectively turning the unity or form of things into a thing, but also asserts that some such hypothesis is necessary for philosophy. Socrates' instruction in *erōs* in the *Symposium* is intended to vindicate the philosophical life against its poetic and political alternatives, by demonstrating that the forms are inherent in human experience, which experience we normally misunderstand.

The interpretation of the stages of the Socratic turn provides a plausible basis for the mix of wisdom and ignorance Socrates claims generally in the dialogues. It also shows Plato's concentration upon the problem of theory and practice: the broadest perspective on practical concerns is motivated by theoretical and not ethical demands.

“Heraclitus on Sensible Things” (Saturday 4:15, Room 10)

Laurence Bloom, *University of Georgia*, loom@uga.edu

In his discussion of the principle of non-contradiction in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle makes the assertion that those who deny the principle do away with ousia (*Meta.* 1007a21). The primary perpetrator here is certainly Heraclitus. In the same text Aristotle (twice) makes the claim that Plato was persuaded by his exposure to the teachings of Heraclitus and Cratylus that sensible things are always in flux and not knowable (*Meta.* 987a32-b1, 1078a13-16). The second time Aristotle makes this claim he connects it to Plato’s distinguishing of the forms as separate and enduring natures.

In my paper I will argue that the conception of sensible things that is handed down by Heraclitus is both influential and philosophically interesting. For Heraclitus, as Aristotle suggests, sensible things violate the principle of non-contradiction and are unknowable. This violation is more fundamental than most of the literature on Heraclitus has taken it to be. Heraclitus does not merely conclude that the flux of sensible things leads to a constant change in their properties. This alone does not lead to the sort of fundamental unknowability and contradictoriness that Heraclitus, and in a limited sense Plato, is interested in pointing to. I argue that, for Heraclitus, the sensible thing itself that we attempt to identify does not actually exist as a thing at all. This is what Aristotle refers to as doing away with ousia. In Heraclitus’s own terms it is a lack of sameness within the sensible thing. When we refer to a “thing” as being in flux, we are undermining the existence of the thing to which we are referring even as we are referring to it. Thus, for example, the famous claim that you cannot step into the same river twice is more than a claim about a river that is always changing its water. The very substance of the river is continually disappearing. The claim is a riddle that both asserts and denies the existence of the river itself to which it is supposedly referring. The “it” that is supposed to be changing is not ever actually there to be undergoing the change. (We might wish to say that Heraclitus has done away with identity.) The impossibility of identifying stable and abiding natures, not just in the world but in general, leads Heraclitus to the logos. Logos, I argue, entails a thinking that does not attempt to arrive at any determinate conclusions, but rather to move the mind towards a certain process of thinking as an activity for its own sake, much in the way of riddles.

Both Plato and Aristotle take up Heraclitus’s challenge concerning the possibility of determinate unchanging entities. For Plato the response results in separate forms and the life of inquiry. For Aristotle it results in the idea of *energeia*.

“Heloise and Feminism, Again” (Saturday 9:00, Room 8)

Kathleen Blumreich, *Grand Valley State University*, blumreik@gvsu.edu

A crucial characteristic of Heloise, yet underdeveloped in scholarship about her, is her feminism. Consider Bonnie Wheeler’s *Listening to Heloise: The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman*, where the author aptly observes in her introduction to the anthology that “[t]here are many ‘stories’ of Heloise: the literary prodigy, passionate lover, reluctant bride, submissive wife, and adept abbess . . . Unlike most women for millennia before

(and for nearly a millennium after), she claimed an identity of her own in addition to that provided by her familial and social networks” (2000: xvii-xviii). Anyone familiar with Heloise’s life and work would be hard-pressed to argue the contrary. However, there is an important epithet omitted here, the descriptor similarly absent in scholarship on Heloise, generally: “feminist.” While critics routinely present Heloise as extraordinary — or even radical — in nearly every respect, they balk at the idea that Heloise might also have been “before her time” in her attitude toward gender, gender roles, and equality between the sexes. In this paper, I provide a brief overview of the ways in which Heloise has been regarded as simultaneously (yet paradoxically) modern and thoroughly conventional. I then argue that her rejection of sexage versus her continued longing for Abelard, and her so-called abandonment of Astrolabe versus her devotion to the nuns at the Paraclete, are not so much contradictory behaviors as they are manifestations of Heloise’s own feminist impulses and views.

“Plato’s challenge to enlightenment philosophy in *Sophist* and *Theaetetus*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 1)

George Boger, *Canisius College*, boger@canisius.edu

Among the outstanding humanist achievements of the ancient Greek Enlightenment are establishing political technê, prominently by Protagoras, and a medical technê represented by the Hippocratic School. A principle underlying the progressive campaign of enlightenment thinking is an optimistic affirmation that human beings can understand themselves and nature sufficiently to govern their own destinies. This is a profound principle underlying democratic institutions. Plato was not equivocal in his condemnation of democracy and the Sophists, principal among its proponents, and he took special pains to criticize Protagoras in at least three dialogues, *Protagoras*, *Theaetetus*, and *Sophist*. Indeed, in *Sophist* he cites a gigantomachia between formidable antagonists about defining reality — he characterizes the one side as uncivilized and violent in defending materialism and the other side as civilized and rational in defense of idealism. There is no mystery about his motivation to challenge the materialist, democratic philosophy of the Ancient Enlightenment and the Sophists, particularly that of Protagoras. Complementing the enlightenment philosophy of Protagoras are the early treatises in the Corpus Hippocraticum that reveal the decidedly materialist character of ancient medical science. *On Ancient Medicine*, *On Science*, and *On the Sacred Disease* reveal the Hippocratic physician as partisan in an ancient philosophical conflict over the ontic and epistemic status of principles with a special proclivity to resist the reification of principles — that is, to criticize a special practice to hypostatize hupotheseis — a practice familiar in Plato’s philosophy of forms. The Hippocratic author of *On Ancient Medicine* criticizes a kind of philosophy that aims to obviate science and this places him in the camp of sophistic philosophy — his complaint against philosophy places him in the context of ancient conflicting ideologies and siding with the materialists. Our discussion takes (1) the object of the Hippocratic physician’s complaint to be remarkably similar to Plato’s philosophy, (2) the object of Plato’s complaint to be the *Sophist* and particularly Protagoras’ measure principle, which Plato especially desired to demolish in *Theaetetus*,

and that (3) Protagoras' principle exactly represents the materialism of ancient medical practice. In this way, we see that Plato's challenge to Protagorean philosophy in connection with Hippocratic thought aimed to undermine the liberating forces of the practical sciences, which were important underpinnings of the ancient Greek Enlightenment and its highest expression, the ancient Athenian democracy.

“Science and Structure in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 5)
Robert Bolton, *Rutgers University*, rbolton@philosophy.rutgers.edu

In this discussion I investigate Aristotle's conceptions of science and of scientific knowledge in the ANALYTICS chiefly by trying to determine the respects in which he does, and does not, follow Plato.

“Levels of Reason: The City Soul Analogy and the Divided Line in Plato’s *Republic*” (Saturday 2:00, Room 2)
Geoffrey S. Bowe, *Thompson Rivers University*, geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com

It is well known that in the *Republic*, Plato's tripartite class division is based on the dominance of one or another psychic element in the tripartite soul. One implication of this that often receives less attention, is that the dominance of one element of the soul results in a diminished capacity of the other elements of the soul; a craftsman will have less reason, because of a dominance of appetite, an average *fulax* will have a middling amount of reason because of a dominance of *thumos* in his or her soul. I argue that the diminished reasoning capacities in the two non-philosophic classes, due to the dominance of one element or another, should not be taken to mean that the craftsman is *ruled* by appetite or that the *fulax* is ruled by the spirited psychic element. If we allow this, and allow a definition of psychic justice where reason rules spirit and appetite, then we have to accept that only the philosopher, who has a dominance of reason, is just. Instead, I suggest that we need to draw a distinction between the *dominance* of an element in the soul, and the *ruling* of a particular element in the soul. By so doing we not only allow for the justice/happiness of all citizens of the *Republic*, we can also grade varying levels of reason, in accordance with the levels of reason articulated in the analogy of the divided line, as well as the levels of reason displayed by the interlocutors with whom Socrates speaks in *Republic* I. We can also see, in the varying accounts of the class division – the myth of the metals, the ship of state, and the deep metaphysics/epistemology of the analogies of line, sun and cave, different explanations of psychological and class division tuned so as to be accessible to different levels of reason. The intent then is to produce an account of the city/soul tripartition that integrates Plato's employment of character with his class distinctions, and the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that ground them.

“Alfarabi and Averroes on Plato’s *Republic*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 10)
Geoffrey S. Bowe, *Thompson Rivers University*, geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com

Perhaps the thing for which Alfarabi is most famous in his treatment of Plato's *Republic* in the Ideal State is his identification of the philosopher-king, lawgiver-imam with the prophet. Farabi is equally famous for his explanation of prophesy employing Neoplatonic emanative theory. Averroes, on the other hand expresses doubt over whether the philosopher-king-lawgiver-imam must also be a prophet. As Averroes is a philosopher who is much more well versed in Aristotelian theories of intellect than Farabi, he may very well have rejected the Neoplatonic emanative theory of understanding in favor of Aristotle's. Moreover, as someone much more in a position to be concerned with the practical side of Plato's philosophy, and as someone much more pronounced in his expression of the differences, as well as the similarities between the Sharia and Plato's nomos and nomothetes, Averroes is far more likely than Alfarabi to pass over such differences. Taking its cue from early work by Rosenthal, this paper examines Farabi's exposition of prophesy in relation to emanation and traces the essence of the emanative idea back to Plato's *Republic* itself, as well as countering this approach to prophesy with Averroes' more Aristotelian approach to intellect, going back to passages in *De Anima* and *Metaphysics*, as well as considering afresh the relationship of prophesy and Sharia in Averroes.

“Self-Mastery, Harmony, and Socratic Intellectualism: Exploring Socrates' Narrative Commentary in Plato's *Republic*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 2)
Anne-Marie Bowery, *Baylor University*, Anne_Marie_Bowery@baylor.edu

Elsewhere, I have argued that Socrates presents his interlocutors with two models of how to regard the proper relationship between the parts of the soul: the self-mastery model and the harmony model. In this presentation, I briefly define the self-mastery model and the harmony model. In bulk of this presentation, I analyze Socrates' narrative commentary in Books I, II, and V in light of these two models. Generally speaking, Socrates' narrative commentary draws attention to how Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus allow their emotions to govern their behavior in undesirable ways. In this sense, the narrative descriptions that Socrates makes about these characters supports the standard view of Socratic intellectualism, which holds that the emotions are best regarded as obstacles that we must overcome through the self-mastery model as we pursue the philosophic life of reason. However, these finely drawn character portraits also manifest several of the practical and conceptual limitations of the self-mastery model and allude to aspects of the harmony model as well.

As a means of illustrating the benefits of the harmony model, I then turn to Socrates' self-reflective narrative commentary that occurs throughout the *Republic*. Socrates, in contrast to the other characters in the dialogue, exhibits a balanced model of how to integrate the emotional dimensions of human experience. Socrates' emotions contribute to his philosophic practice on the internal level as he searches for self-knowledge and influence his narrative on the external level as he seeks to draw others to the philosophical life. In this way, Socrates' narrative commentary provides compelling reasons to reassess the standard intellectualist view of Socrates' philosophic practice.

“Freedom and Necessity: An Analysis of Athens, Sparta, and Persia as Revealed in Herodotus’ Description of the Battles of the Persian War” (Sat 11:15, Room 11)

Lou Bradizza, *Salve Regina University*, lou.bradizza@gmail.com

This paper compares the Persians and Greeks (in the latter case focusing especially on the Spartans and Athenians) in Herodotus’ presentation of five battles of the Persian War: those at Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale. The comparison helps us to identify three main reasons for the differences between the two sides: their approaches to the problem of necessity; their differing political structures; and their views of the divine. The Persians feel the constraint of necessity to a much greater degree than the Greeks. This is a result of their un-free political order. Greek freedom contributes to their war effort and individual virtues. The Greek--and especially the Athenian--view of the divine has a larger role for man than does the Persian view, and so it too contributes to Greek success in the war. The difference in political arrangements best explains the differences between the Greeks and Persians, and ultimately it best explains the outcome of the Persian War.

“‘Like Piling Leaves or Sand’: Collective Action in the *Iliad*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 8)

Sara Brill, *Fairfield University*, sbrill@fairfield.edu

The various contexts for collective decision making, the verbal means of expressing assent and dissent, and the rhetorical tools for persuasion presented in the *Iliad* have been well documented and commented upon. Less attention has been given to the characterizations of collective action of Achaeans and Trojans alike. In this paper I will highlight the variety of tropes used to characterize the action of the Achaeans as a whole—from the imagery of natural forces (fire, wind, waves, leaves and sand) to animal packs and insect swarms—with an eye to the tense interaction between three poetic dimensions: the actions of the collective, the segmentation of the Achaeans into smaller groups characterized by shared fighting habits, and the individual heroes who lead them. I will argue that, much like the landscape of Ilium itself, the Homeric presentation of the collective army provides a human geography necessary in order to measure the actions of various individuals. A careful study of this geography will contribute to our understanding of the political milieu in which these various groups are composed and within which they act.

“What Is and What Will Be: A Semantic Reading of *De Interpretatione* 9” (Saturday 9:00, Room 4)

Jeremy Byrd, *Tarrant County College*, jeremy.byrd@gmail.com

In chapter 9 of *De Interpretatione*, Aristotle offers a defense of free will against the threat of fatalism. According to the traditional interpretation of this chapter, Aristotle concedes

the validity of the fatalist's argument and then proceeds to reject the Principle of Bivalence in order to avoid the fatalist's conclusion. Assuming that the traditional interpretation is right on this point, it remains to be seen why Aristotle felt compelled to reject such an intuitive semantic principle rather than challenge the fatalistic inference from truth to necessity.

According to many defenders of the traditional interpretation, Aristotle is willing to concede the fatalistic inference because he accepts that we cannot change the past. According to this standard reading, Aristotle reasons that, just as we cannot change what has happened in the past, we likewise cannot change the truth value of statements made long ago, even if these statements concern what we will do tomorrow. As a consequence, the standard reading saddles Aristotle with the fatalistic fallacy which results from confusing what we will do with what we can do.

In this paper, I defend a traditional reading of the chapter which is both more charitable and more plausible. According to this reading, Aristotle's acceptance of the fatalistic inference is a consequence of his commitment to another semantic principle, according to which truths require truthmakers. While I am not the first to note the importance of his commitment to such a principle in this context, others have done so only to argue that Aristotle's real concern in the chapter is the threat that causal determinism might pose to free will. According to such a causal reading, the truthmakers for future truths would be causally sufficient conditions. Thus, if it is true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, this must be because there are already causally sufficient conditions today which preclude any other possibility.

Given the fact that Aristotle does not mention causality in the chapter, I regard this reading as questionable on its face. Nevertheless, I conclude that a semantic reading of the chapter can make sense of Aristotle's explicit concern with the fatalistic inference from truth to necessity. The problem is not that our future actions may already be causally determined. Rather, I contend, it is the mere fact that future truths would require existing truthmakers, regardless of how we understand this relationship.

“A New Problem with Plato's City/Soul Analogy” (Saturday 2:00, Room 2)

Miriam Byrd, *University of Texas at Arlington*, mbyrd@uta.edu

Though Socrates' analogy between the city and the human soul in the *Republic* has been the topic of much discussion, one problem has escaped critical attention. Plato seems to have presented us with an odd puzzle. At 435a-b, on the basis of the similarity of all just things, Socrates assumes that justice in the soul is isomorphic, or has the same structure, as justice in the city. Though Socrates appears to espouse this principle, he introduces rival structures of just cities and just souls in the course of the dialogue. If the Assumption of Isomorphism were correct, all just cities and just souls would have the same structure. Since the structures of just cities and souls seems to differ in the *Republic*, Socrates appears to overturn the assumption, leaving the reader to wonder whether Plato simply erred through inconsistency or if he had some other purpose in creating this tension in the text.

I posit that Plato uses the disparity between examples of just cities and just souls to prompt philosophical reflection. Anticipating that the reader, reluctant to move beyond Socrates' investigation via the "shorter road" of images and unexamined hypotheses, will fasten upon images of Justice rather than pursue its Form, Plato presents us with this puzzle in order to grab our attention and engage our thought. In the process of trying to figure out how these cities and souls manifest justice, we discover for ourselves that Justice transcends all particular persons, places, and images. Rather than assuming that we know what justice is and putting our effort into implementing an image, such as that of the Kallipolis, we instead realize that we have not yet grasped Justice itself and seek knowledge of the Form. By putting aside images and working directly with the Form, we embark on the "longer road" of inquiry applauded at 435d3, 504b-d, and 532a-d.

My argument is divided into two parts. First, I argue that there are multiple just cities and just souls of diverse structure in the *Republic*. Second, I argue that the problem of non-isomorphic cities and souls conforms to Plato's description of what provokes us to thought.

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"Parmenides, the Basic Argument, and Aristotle's *Physics* book I" (Saturday 9:00, Room 6)

Rich Cameron, *DePauw University*, rcameron@depauw.edu

My goal in this paper is to suggest an Aristotelian response to Galen Strawson's formulation of "The Basic Argument" for the impossibility of moral responsibility. The essay's motivating idea derives from similarities in form between the argument against the possibility of moral responsibility articulated by Strawson and the argument against the possibility of generation or coming to be suggested by Parmenides. Strawson argues that at birth we are not responsible for our initial genetic and environmental makeup, and that we cannot "accede to true moral responsibility" (1994, 7) later since to do so would require that we were already responsible for the principles of choice we had in choosing to do what we later do and this we cannot be (E.g., in Strawson, G. (1994). "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." *Philosophical Studies* 75: 5-24. See pp. 6-7.). Simplifying: since we are not responsible for who or what we are at birth we cannot gain responsibility for our actions or character since it is impossible to generate responsibility (for either behavior or character) from non-responsibility (for the state from which we first attempt to gain responsibility). This form of argument bears a striking resemblance to that which Aristotle reports deriving from Parmenides and Melissus, "from what is not [responsible?] nothing could have come to be [responsible?]" (*Physics* i.8 191a30). Given this striking resemblance my goal in the paper is twofold. First, I offer a sketch of Aristotle's response to the problem of generation. And second, I attempt to modify that reply so it applies directly to one of Strawson's formal versions of his argument against the possibility of moral responsibility. If Aristotle's response to Parmenides is sound

then perhaps an Aristotelian response to the Basic Argument can show the way toward understanding the possibility of moral responsibility.

Aristotle's solution to the problem of generation involves distinguishing between coming to be from something in accidental and unqualified senses. It is true (but not informative) to say that puppies come to be from nothing so long as we are clear that we mean it only in the accidental sense — in the sense in which cakes come to be from doctors. For in the proper or unqualified sense the only thing that can come from nothing is, well, nothing. Extended to the issue of moral responsibility the idea would be to articulate accidental and unqualified senses in which we could truly say that a person comes to be responsible for her behavior or character. Given such a distinction, we could truly say we come to be responsible from not being responsible (speaking in the accidental sense), but that possibility would need to be grounded in an understanding of how we could come to be responsible in an unqualified sense. The real challenge both in understanding Aristotle's response to the problem of generation and applying that response to the case of moral responsibility lies in giving a rich positive characterization of the relevant unqualified sense of one thing's coming to be from another. The heart of the essay attempts this very task.

“Knowledge and Limits in Aristotle” (Sunday 9:00, Room 6)

Silvia Carli, *Xavier University*, carlis@xavier.edu

At the heart of Aristotle's anthropology is the idea that human beings are animals that desire to know and are able to satisfy this desire through an impressive variety of cognitive activities, which range from simple observation to the comprehension of the intelligible order of the cosmos. These modes of cognition apprehend their objects in significantly different ways and are hierarchically organized (*Met.* I. 1; *Post. An.* II. 19). What then unifies them and enables us to regard all of them as forms of knowledge? This paper attempts to provide an answer to these questions.

Aristotle's texts do not provide univocal indications on this matter. He holds that two characteristics define the highest or unqualified form of knowledge: it is universal and illuminates the *archai* and *aitiai* of things. These criteria, however, are not unproblematic. On the one hand, if we applied them strictly, we would have to deny epistemic relevance to “lesser” forms of knowledge. On the other, and perhaps even more importantly, they are in need of clarification and interpretation. For the philosopher's fundamental epistemic concepts, including *katholou* and *aitia*, are polysemic. For instance, universality is not only the distinguishing mark of *techne* and *episteme*. At times the Stagirite writes that even *empeiria*, which is ordinarily classified as knowledge of particulars, exhibit some form of universality (e.g., *Post. An.* II. 19, 100a8-10). Likewise, he maintains that the mimetic representation of the world, which portrays individuals acting out particular life-events, “speaks [more] of universals [than] history” (*Poet.* 9, 1451b5-7). We therefore need other conceptual distinctions to understand the precise meaning of Aristotle's epistemic concepts in different contexts, as well as their relations.

I suggest using a basic pair of determinations to discriminate between knowledge, in all its forms, and lack of it, namely limit (peras, horos) and unlimited (apeiron). To put the point concisely, I propose that the discovery of intelligibility is the discovery of limits, which in turn coincides with the identification of form, permanence (and thus universality of some sort) and order. All modes of apprehending an object can be qualified as forms of knowledge to the extent that, in various ways, they identify limits and boundaries in their content.

I test the validity of this proposal by offering a reading of Aristotle's genetic account of knowledge, from sensation to episteme (*Met.* I. 1; *Post. An.* II. 19), as a gradual progression from in-determination to perfect de-limitation or de-termination. In the conclusion I argue that not only does the proposed interpretation bring to light the kinship among all form of cognition without blurring their differences. It also puts us in the position to add a stage to the Aristotelian hierarchy of forms of knowledge. As the activity that imposes limits on experience and exhibits the causes of particular chains of events, mimesis provides the missing link between empeiria—understood as knowledge of facts (the “that”)—and philosophy or knowledge of the “why” of things.

“Yi Jing, the Poetic Science for the Future” (Saturday 9:00 am, Room 9)

Chung-yue Chang, *Montclair State University*, c88yc@yahoo.com

If one has to identify just ONE Chinese Classic from high antiquity that provides a “systemic” framework for Chinese culture as a whole, that Classic would be the Yi Jing. This paper aims to bring out the structure and the philosophical meaning of such a “systemic framework” for Chinese culture generally, and for Chinese philosophy specifically. The implication of such a “system” for Western philosophy will also be noted.

“On Aristotelian Metaphysics as Search for Unity: Interpreting *Metaphysics Zeta*”

(Saturday 4:15, Room 4)

Daniel Chatman, *Loyola Marymount University*, danielchatman@gmail.com

This paper offers an interpretation of *Metaphysics Zeta* in which the main thrust of Aristotle's inquiry is aimed at the clarification of the meaning of ‘unity’. I address primarily the work of three scholars. Mary Louise Gill's *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity*, Miles Burnyeat's *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*, and Charlotta Weigelt's article, “The Relation Between Logic and Ontology in the Metaphysics.” In order to explain the importance of ‘unity’ for Aristotle's thought, the bulk of the paper will focus on clarifying the relation of the logical and ontological in Aristotle. First, I will show that Burnyeat's suggestion that there are distinct levels of logical and metaphysical discourse in the *Metaphysics* is a useful beginning, but is fundamentally mistaken.

My criticism of Burnyeat is echoed by Gill, but ultimately we part ways as well. Gill is correct in pointing out that both the *Metaphysics* and *Categories* are concerned with Being—that both works contribute to the same project, the goal of which is to

understand reality. Gill is mistaken, however, in privileging ‘subjecthood’ as fundamental to this project, for in doing so she overlooks a key difference between the texts of the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. Against Gill, who places ‘subjecthood’ at the center of much of Aristotle’s inquiry, I suggest that the notion of subjecthood is itself derivative, and is relevant to Aristotle’s thought only in terms of its role in Aristotle’s search for prior unity. I will draw from the *Metaphysics* and the *Categories* in order to show that Gill’s reading of the *Metaphysics* cannot be supported by reference to her own view of *Categories*, since privileging subjecthood is a mistake for reading either work.

In order to show why unity holds such a privileged position in Aristotle, I will offer my own account of the relation of the logical and ontological in his work. In doing so, I reference Weigelt, but primarily to distinguish her project, which seems to contain Kantian-like assumptions, from my own. Weigelt suggests that the principle of non-contradiction is ‘logical’, and as such is a merely normative, non-ontological principle for Aristotle’s thought. Against this, I argue that the principle functions as the ontological linchpin of Aristotle’s metaphysical inquiry. Moreover, it is with this principle that one finds not only the relation of the logical and ontological in Aristotle, but the importance of unity for his quest to understand reality. I suggest instead that ‘unity’ is shot through the entire inquiry in reality—it is present at the beginning of metaphysical inquiry, which is the affirmation of the principle of non-contradiction, and it is at the ‘end’, so to speak, insofar as the understanding itself seeks the unity of an intelligible whole.

“Krinai de logoi: Divine and human speech in *Parmenides*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 9)
Rose Cherubin, *George Mason University*, rcherubi@gmu.edu

This paper asks how we might best understand the place and role of the goddess’s speech in the fragments of *Parmenides*. How if at all is her speech different from human speech, as regards its aims and capabilities? What is the importance of that relationship in the extant fragments? In what sense can the poem be considered as reflecting divine inspiration, as that is usually understood?

The goddess’s speech poses several problems for our attempts to understand the fragments. She says some things that fit well with the kinds of things divinities said to humans in other poetry of the period, such as exhorting her hearer to carry away or preserve or attend to (*komisai*) her account, and forbidding him from pursuing some roads. However, she also does some things that do not fit well at all: she provides arguments, and admonishes the *kouros* to *krinai de logoi poluderin elenchon/ ex emethen rhethenta*, “judge by means of [a] *logos* a much-contesting challenge/ out of what I have said,” B7.5-6. That is, she suggests that the human should not accept what she says at face value, that he must reason for himself. Instead of retailing the *aletheia* to him, she provides an account of a road of inquiry that is oriented by *aletheia*. This account seems paradoxical, not least because the goddess speaks in several ways that she proscribes for the human inquirer.

Two common modes of interpreting the fragments miss some or all of these features. Some readings treat the journey to the goddess, and the references to divinities generally, as “window dressing” (as Taran suggests we should), and ignore them in favor of

examining the arguments and statements about eon. Others take the opposite tack and read the fragments as a report of an encounter with a goddess, perhaps after a shamanic journey, and suggest that the goddess's words be read as a revelation whose meaning will be understood not by reasoning or argumentation but by some other process of enlightenment. Brague, Dixsaut, Mourelatos, and Miller, by contrast, have taken some or all of the difficulties mentioned into account, and my discussion will reflect on their work.

“Aristotle on Death” (Saturday 2:00, Room 4)

Antonis Coumoundouros, *Adrian College*, acoumoundouros@adrian.edu

In this paper I explore Aristotle's intriguing account of the death of mortal living beings in the *Parva Naturalia*. Aristotle has a general account for why perishable things perish: the elemental bodies of earth, air, fire and water that compose them tend to go apart. This general account underlies his account of the death of mortal living beings but such beings have a more specific cause of dying: heat and moisture are required for life and they die when they become cold and dry. I argue that even though for Aristotle there may be several sorts of life (nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual) all death is strictly the cessation of nutritive life due to coldness and dryness. Moreover, what leads to death may be old age, disease, or injury. Old age is a losing of heat and moisture but the aged need not be sick. For Aristotle health is a relational being rather than a quality, a relation to the hot, cold etc., so health will differ in different times in life. As animals age the healthy state will be cooler and drier. Environmental factors may also contribute to drying and cooling.

“The Environmental Implications of Aristotle's *De Anima*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 7)

Craig Condella, *Salve Regina University*, craig.condella@salve.edu

At the core of our present environmental crisis lies the distinctly modern separation of human beings from the rest of the natural world. No more is this apparent than in Descartes' fundamental distinction between thinking things and extended things, a distinction which takes human beings alone to be in possession of a soul. That such a metaphysical divide would become part of the modern mindset is evident in the moral writings of Immanuel Kant, for whom only rational beings are to be treated as ends in themselves, all other beings – living and non-living alike – having nothing more than an instrumental value. Though many who advocate for the moral standing of non-human beings have rightfully attacked the Western philosophical tradition on this front, I believe that a possible solution may be identified within this same tradition, albeit in its ancient rather than modern instantiation. In reading Aristotle's *De Anima*, we do not find the perhaps overly simplistic division between rational and non-rational beings, but a more nuanced consideration of nature which holds all living things to be in possession of a soul. This, of course, is not to say that Aristotle does not take human beings to be unique, but that he distinguishes human beings within a more fundamental distinction between

the living and the non-living, the animate and the inanimate. Indeed, even in his *Ethics* and *Politics*, references are made to animal behavior, suggesting that the divide between humans and animals – and perhaps even plants – is not as wide as many modern philosophers seem to think. In this light, I believe that Aristotle has much to contribute to contemporary discussions regarding the moral standing of animals in particular and living things in general. Aristotle, in short, allows us to ascribe value to living things and yet do so in a way that determines this value in relation to the different types of soul. We thereby maintain a middle course between the objectification of plant and animal life, on the one hand, and the placement of all living things on the same moral footing, on the other.

“Aristotle on Strength of Will” (Sunday 11:15, Room 3)

Tim Connolly, *East Stroudsburg University*, timoconnolly@hotmail.com

Recent work on weakness of will by Richard Holton and Alison McIntyre has cast doubt on the standard definition of the phenomenon as action contrary to one’s judgment.³ Holton and McIntyre argue instead that there is a more prevalent sense in which a person can be said to have exhibited weakness of will, namely, when he breaks his resolutions. Since a person’s resolutions need not be in line with his all-things-considered judgments, he can act in accordance with the one while at the same time going against the other. “Weakness of will” or breaking resolutions as such deserves to be treated separately from “akrasia” or action contrary to judgment.

Holton holds Aristotle largely responsible for the standard action-contrary-to-judgment account of weakness of will. And indeed, at the outset of his discussion in *NE* VII, Aristotle defines the incontinent person (*akratēs*) as one who, “knowing what he does is bad, does it as the result of passion” (*NE* 1145b12). However, as I argue in the first part of this paper, this is only one aspect of Aristotle’s account. For he also defines incontinence in terms of *prohairesis* (“choice,” “purpose,” or “intention”)—a term that refers to a process beginning with prior deliberation and ending with action. While the strong-willed man acts in accordance with *prohairesis*, the weak-willed one acts in opposition to it (*NE* 1111b14-16, 1148a5-11, 1151a7-9, 1151a31-33). Thus Aristotle additionally characterizes weakness of will as a failure to remain steadfast over time, saying that “the continent man abides by his resolutions (*emmenei*) more and the incontinent man less than most men can” (*NE* 1152a26-27). The latter phenomenon appears to correspond to what Holton and McIntyre call “weakness of will”—failure to persist in one’s resolutions over time.

The discussion by Holton and McIntyre raises an entirely different question from the traditional one about whether and how *akrasia* is possible: how is a person able to keep his resolutions over time? How, in other words, is *strength of will* possible? In the

³ R. Holton, “Intention and Weakness of Will,” *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (1999): 241-262, and “How is Strength of Will Possible?”, in S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, eds., *Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 39-67; A. McIntyre, “What is wrong with Weakness of Will?”, *Journal of Philosophy* 103 (2006), 284-311.

second half of the paper, I develop an Aristotelian account of strength of will based on his theory of motivation in *De Anima* and *De Motu Animalium*. Since the strong-willed person is distinguished by his prohairesis, I examine Aristotle's view of how it is possible to abide by this faculty. In short, good prohairesis has the three qualifications: (1) true reasoning, (2) correct desire (*orexis*), and (3) desire ultimately pursuing what reason determines to be good. Since both the strong-willed and weak-willed have (1) but experience a conflict at (2), the central focus in my reconstruction is on how the former are able to achieve (3). I argue that it is by training the rationally directed impulse (*hormē*) which connects the results of one's deliberation with subsequent action. This prohairetic account offers a viable alternative to that given by Holton and McIntyre in their recent work.

“Forms of Socratic Divination in the First Tetralogy” (Saturday 4:15, Room 2)
Clint Corcoran, *High Point University*, ccorcora@highpoint.edu

This paper explores the different ways in which Socrates appeals to, and interprets, divination in four dialogues. The paper will explore the different vehicles of, and the subsequent interpretation of, divination. At several points in the first tetralogy (*Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito* and *Phaedo*) Socrates not only appeals to divination, but he allows that he, himself, is a prophetic medium. The clearest Socratic use of divination comes in the incubatory divination in the *Crito* (43d-44b), where Socrates reports that a goddess appears and speaks to him in a dream. While his other appeals to divination, the Delphic pronouncement (*Apology* 20e-21e), his famous daimonic voice of conscience (*Euthyphro* 3b, *Apology* 31d), and his prophetic malediction against his persecutors (*Apology*, 39c) are subjected by Socrates to such elaborate reinterpretations that they could all be explained as irony; or in simple rational terms, the paper will examine whether the example from the *Crito* can be taken at face value. Even a parallel appeal to incubatory divination in the *Phaedo* at 59c-61e, where Socrates is instructed to ‘practice and cultivate the arts’, is subjected by Socrates himself to several lines of interpretation. But it is hard to see how traditional interpretive moves (argument, irony, maeutic, ignorance, or the dramatic context of the passage) can alter the literal meaning of the goddesses’ empirical prediction in the *Crito* that Socrates will “arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day” –a meaning which Socrates avers is ‘clear’ and *Crito* grants is ‘exceedingly so.’ (44b)

“The Soul State Analogy in Aristotle’s *Politics*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 5)
Carlos Cortissoz, *Binghamton University*, carlos.cortissoz@gmail.com

In this paper I preliminarily explore the nature and consequences of what I consider to be an underlying premise in Aristotle's political theory, namely, that there is a fundamental analogy between the constitution and function of the soul and the constitution and function of the state. Although this premise is explicit and operative in many passages (both in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*) its consequences have remained mostly

unexplored in the analysis of Aristotle's moral psychology and politics. I will argue that (1) Aristotle takes for granted the isomorphism and the identity of relation between the constituent parts of the soul and the state, largely agreeing to the platonic principle as presented in *Rep.* II, 368c-d. I will also argue that (2) making the analogy explicit helps understand various aspects of Aristotle's thought that are subject to considerable debate, such as (a) the nature of the moral and political conflict, (b) the relation between intellectual and moral virtue and (c) whether the activity that constitutes happiness is a theoretical or a practical one.

In *Rep.* II, in responding to the challenge of proving that the just life is better than the unjust, Socrates sets up an analogy between the individual psyche and the state. What the nature of the analogy is and why it is a reasonable assumption are two major concerns in interpreting Plato's moral psychology, its relation to politics and---perhaps more importantly---in assessing the logical validity of the whole argument of the *Republic*. Plato argues that if a short-sighted person is asked to read distant letters, and for some reason finds that those same letters are bigger in another place, it would be easier for her, by looking at the big ones first, to read later the small ones. Likewise, we are short-sighted when asked what it is for a human being to be just. Fortunately (this is Plato's assumption), the justice of the human being is written with bigger letters in the state, so that in order to understand the soul-justice we will have to look at the state-justice first.

Clearly, the whole argument runs on the basis that in both places the written letters are exactly the same. This assumption leads Plato to coin a notion of justice as internal harmony that, at first sight at least, does not match to the common notion of justice as a social virtue, a virtue that takes place in the social intercourse and never in the relation between the rational part, the $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ and the crowd of appetites. As we learn in *Rep.* IV, the notion is derived from the strict application of the analogy: the state is just as long as each of its parts, the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians (cf. 434c), are engaged in what corresponds to their nature, working along with the others in mutual harmony. Similarly, the soul is just as long as each of its parts does its own task: the rational part ruling and prescribing the law, the $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ looking after its compliance and the appetites (the money-makers of the soul) causing the soul to pursue the needs.

As Plato states it, the analogy implies that (1) soul and state are isomorphic structures and (2) that in both cases the relation of the parts to each other and to the whole is exactly the same. Otherwise, he would not be entitled to extrapolate the notion of justice from the state to the soul and then, once some conclusions are established for the case of the soul, take them back to the state. This seems a very difficult assumption. However, Plato offers two different arguments to hold it. The first one consists in arguing that the results of its application will confirm its validity. See, for example, 434e: "What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there..." The other one consists in arguing that the structure and function of the state cannot stem from any source other than the individuals who comprise it; thus, for example, the high spirit attributed to some societies, or the desire to learn attributed to others, necessarily comes from the character of their individuals (cf. 435e).

Aristotle does not explicitly argue for such an assumption, at least not as explicitly as Plato does, and yet he seems to endorse it in the same way. This can be seen especially in his treatment of three main issues. The first one is his notion of the political body as an organism whose form is the state or constitution (cf. *Pol.* III, 3); this claim, along with those according to which the man is a political animal and the state is one of the things that exists by nature, constitutes what is known as the Aristotle's political naturalism. The second one is his treatment of *akrasia*. In *EN* VII, 10 Aristotle argues that the *akratic* person resembles a state that sanctions all the required laws, being good laws, and yet fails to put them into effect (1125a20). The vicious person, by his part, resembles the state that sanctions and put into effect bad laws (1152a25). The account of *akrasia* as a moral conflict in which the practical syllogisms are not actualized by virtue of the presence of a physical desire or *θυμός*, once analyzed, is exactly the same as the state that fails to put their laws into effect by virtue of the presence of political factions or *στάσεις* (parts of the political body that, not forming part of the ruling principle, still pursue an apparent good for the whole political body). The third one has to do with the meaning, within Aristotle's ethics and politics, of the strong case Aristotle makes on behalf of the superiority of the theoretical life over the practical one. I will argue that extrapolating the contemplative activity of the state described in *Pol.* VII, 3 to the case of the soul allows us to see how the contemplative life is, at the same time, the most practical.

D

“Unraveling an Outline of the *Statesman*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 1)

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What does it mean to be a statesman? In Plato's writings, it is no surprise that this question quickly becomes: what does it mean to truly be a statesman? Or, more specifically still, what does it mean to truly be an ideal statesman? In answering such a question, if an author of Plato's stature suggests an apparently prolix definition, then that answer, by virtue of exactly that seeming prolixity deserves particular attention because of how careful we know Plato to be with his use of language and choice of words. In the *Statesman*, the Eleatic Stranger presents just such a seemingly overwrought definition of the statesman and, as we learn from his discussion about speeches needing to be of the appropriate length (286b-287a), he too is very conscious of language and choice of words. Thus, any peculiarly worded suggestions on his part similarly deserve particular notice. In Plato's *Statesman*, the Stranger leads an inquiry into the being of a statesman with Young Socrates as his foil while Young Socrates' namesake, the elder Socrates who usually leads discussions of this kind in Plato's dialogues, listens silently. In an ostensible attempt to say what a statesman is, the Stranger asks:

And is it no doubt the case that we are to address [the art of those who rule by force as tyrannical], and as a political (art) the voluntary herd-grooming of voluntary two-footed animals, and declare that he who has this as an art and care is in his being king and statesman? (276e)

The main purpose of this question seems to be to offer a rather simple differentiation between the tyrant and statesman, namely, that the tyrannical art is the knowledge of how to rule by force while the political art is the knowledge of how to rule by consent. The difficult phrasings such as “voluntary herd-grooming” and “voluntary two-footed animals” seem to be just so much gibberish obfuscating this central idea. We must, it seems, look beyond the unnecessary verbiage to understand the contrast at the heart of the Stranger’s question. However, even that central contrast does not in fact portray the statesman. When Young Socrates readily affirms the characterization of the statesman made at 276e saying that the “showing forth” of the statesman is probably thereby “perfectly complete,” the Stranger immediately claims that his description of the statesman was insufficient (277a). The Stranger, though, is not wholly dismissive of his own proposal, for he says that the description offered at 276e renders the statesman’s “external outline adequately” (277c). Later in the dialogue, the Stranger explicitly reexamines the central suggestion that he himself offered at 276e, casting aside the notion that rule by force versus rule by consent constitutes a legitimate distinction for the tyrant and statesman. What, then, can be discovered by considering this early attempt to distinguish the tyrannical and political arts? It is in disentangling the various peculiar phrasings at 276e, as well as considering the reasons why the Stranger might have proposed an idea only to immediately retract it, that we can uncover the “adequate outline” of the statesman against which and with which the final rendering of the statesman as a weaver must be understood.

“Conflict in the Aristotelian City: Desire for Equality and Competition for Power”
(Saturday 4:15, Room 6)

Candice Delmas, *Boston University*, cdelmas@bu.edu

In order to know how to preserve the stability of the polis, Aristotle explains, the political expert must know what causes turbulences in the city. The Aristotelian etiology of political disorder (stasis) is complex. *Politics* V 1-4 enumerates at least eleven general causes of political conflict. Yet beyond this multiplicity, Aristotle identifies one unique source of stasis, namely, the desire for equality.

Against the standard emphasis on citizens’ shared sense of justice, I offer a new reading of this human desire for equality, which is based on the distinction between concept and conception. For Aristotle, I argue, people share a concept of justice insofar as they agree that justice is proportionate equality, that is, consists in giving to each their proper due. Yet they disagree as to the standards by which to determine each person’s due. The competing conceptions of justice they advance are partial and mistaken, ordinarily reflecting particular class interests.

Furthermore, the existence of a base consensus concerning justice-as-equality does not appear especially interesting or important in the *Politics*. On the contrary, people’s disagreements really appear essential for the inquiry – in particular the fact that people strive to get things right about justice but tend to get things wrong. Aristotle, I show, takes the presence of these conflicting, mistaken conceptions of justice as a given of political reality, and as the basic premise of his investigation into the best practicable

regime. The idea is that conflict is a permanent condition of political life in existing regimes, even if it is not present at the moment, because dissident parties are likely to arise and brandish their own opposing but equally partial doctrines.

From this perspective, Aristotle's seemingly inconclusive examination of the various claims to rule in Book III actually yields an unambiguous upshot, as I contend. The rule of the many emerges as the best practicable government against the rule of the best once people's subjective perceptions of political arrangements and emotional responses to the behavior of rulers are taken into account.

“Classical Philosophical Themes in Contemporary Persian Cinema” (Saturday 2:00, Room 10)

Amir Djabini, *GSP*, jabini@gmail.com

Western scholars have been aware of the influence of Zoroastrian religion on Nietzsche's ethics of “will to power.” This study traces the influence of the Zoroastrian themes in the later Islamic period and its literature. Specifically, this presentation depicts the ancient pre-Islamic philosophical themes embedded in later Persian passion play (*ta'zia*) and cinema. Our foci include an examination of the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian pragmatic doctrine of virtue (*Asha*, Greek, *arete*) in the *Avsta* (the sacred Zoroastrian scripture), the transnational notion of persons embedded in the literature of Achaemenid Empire (550-330 BC). In conclusion the paper reflects on the ancient Persian and the later Roman of a universal, transnational state in light of contemporary philosophies of globalization and its major differences with the doctrine of a limited polity in Greek philosophy.

“Aristotle and the Socratic Fallacy” (Saturday 9:00, Room 4)

Marcus Dracos, *SUNY at Stony Brook*, marcusdracos@gmail.com

Over four decades commentators have vigorously debated the “Socratic fallacy”, but little consensus has emerged. No philosopher has detailed what Aristotle says on the matter. According to Aristotle, the priority of definition in Platonic epistemology is correct, but, on the other hand, this criterion makes the possibility for coming to know a definition impossible on the method of inquiry in Platonic dialogues (the what-is X question). This is the case because the semantics of knowledge ascriptions demanded by the priority of definition is incommensurable with the semantics of the question-answer structure employed by Plato's Socrates.

For Aristotle, the Socratic fallacy is no logical fallacy. Rather, it concerns itself with 1) semantics and criterion for knowledge and their relation to existence and examples (*APo* 1.1-3) as well as 2) the semantics of inquiry and its relation to existence and examples (*APo* 2.1-2, 4-7). Aristotle is committed to the formal knowledge criticized by promoters of the Socratic fallacy, for he argues that only through universal knowledge of T will one have a proper criterion for making classificatory distinctions. Next, a condition for the truth of a knowledge ascription is the existence of the subject matter (*APo* 2.7), and if one only has incidental beliefs about the subject matter, then they

do not know whether it exists. In sum, the class of Ts is determined by the definition of T, but the truth of the definition of T presupposes the existence of Ts.

Aristotle discerns that the criterion and semantics of knowledge yields an aporia for inquiry. While one can make qualitative distinctions between various types and instances through ostention, none of Aristotle's predecessors have devised a method that can find unity behind the plurality of types without immediately begging the question. The semantics of question and answer, taking place across temporal stages, is incommensurable with the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. To ask "what is T?" requires that one know that "T is" (*APo* 2.1-2). But according to the above structure, one cannot know "T is", unless "what T is" is known. Moreover, to seek "what T is" without knowing that "T exists" is "to seek nothing" (*APo*. 2.8). At bottom, to ask "what is T", one must be in epistemic scenario in which one grasps that "T exists" without knowing "what T is", and this is impossible on Plato's own knowledge criterion. Aristotle delivers a battery of arguments to solidify his point, showing how previous attempts to solve the problem are fallacious (*APo* 2.7). Aristotle is correct in his reasoning.

This analysis shows Aristotle's engagement with the epistemological problems associated with the Socratic fallacy. It is concluded that Aristotle argues, given the semantics and normative criterion of knowledge ascriptions, that the Platonic search for a definition at best can search for conceptual coherence but can never conclude with security that the beliefs state anything about the actual world. "Definitions do not show that what they describe is possible or that the definitions are of what they say they are" (*APo* 2.7).

"Discursive Economies in the *Protagoras*" (Saturday 9:00, Room 1)

Ryan Drake, *Fairfield University*, rdrake@fairfield.edu

This paper investigates sophistic education in the *Protagoras* in its presentation as a desired commodity, beginning with Plato's characterization of the doxic slippage between an acknowledgment that cultural wisdom – of the sort that sophists claim to purvey – can survive from one generation to the next and the further supposition that such wisdom can be regarded as something subject to acquisition through monetary exchange. Not only does the latter supposition open up the possibility of sophistry as a profession, it furthermore provides a point from which the ontological status of cultural wisdom (referred to in the dialogue as politikē) can be brought forward as a question. While monetary exchange operates through practices of abstraction from our lived perceptual experience in order to function, so too does sophistry in the *Protagoras* rely upon forms of abstraction from one's own experience not merely in order to standardize and package its teachings as objective and impersonal, but also in order to remove itself from the non-standardized, often dangerous practice of individual inquiry. Seen in this way, the cultural practice of purchasing politikē rests upon a mystification of knowledge as such, as well as upon a reification of its respective particular content. Using the notions of economy and exchange as lenses, I investigate several aspects of the dialogue – among them, the themes of Epimethean systematic proportion in Protagoras' creation myth, the supplementary dissemination of aidos and dikē from Zeus via Hermes, and

Socrates' hard-nosed insistence upon brevity of logoi between interlocutors – portending the inevitable breakdown of discursive exchange at its center, as well as that critical exchange itself. I argue that for Socrates, a proper exchange of logoi must take into account the fact that it, like the process of economic exchange itself, occurs on the basis of a conventional – and even to an extent arbitrary – procedure, and is furthermore ineluctably governed by linguistic economy of equivalence and sameness in the attempt at generating philosophical insight.

E

“The Place of Self-Mastery in Plato’s *Republic*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 2)
David T. Echelbarger, *Baylor University*, David_Echelbarger@baylor.edu

Anne-Marie Bowery claims that in the *Republic*, Socrates introduces two ways of viewing the relationship between the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts of the soul.⁴ These models of self-comportment are the harmony model and the self-mastery model. In the harmony model, all three parts of the soul work in cooperation to produce justice and cultivate the good life (443e). The self-mastery model uses the logistikon (rational part) to control and limit the thumetic (spirited) and epithumetic (appetitive) parts (439c). In this paper, I explore the place of self-mastery within the *Republic*. I conclude that while the self-mastery model is useful for bringing about the truly just soul, it has no place in the political arena.

In Section I, I argue that the self-mastery model of self-comportment is inferior to the harmony model. The harmony model represents a true form of justice, while the self-mastery model only achieves an approximation of justice. This also holds when each model is applied to the city. In Section II, I claim that the self-mastery model is not meant to be a permanent model of self-comportment. Rather, its purpose is to assist in the Platonic ascent toward the Beautiful.⁵ Through this journey, the three parts of the soul begin to harmonize. Upon reaching the Beautiful, the soul completes its moral transformation. In Section III, I claim that Socrates does not intend for self-mastery to be used as a political model. This is because, on the political level, self-mastery does not aim toward bringing about a harmonious (and truly just) city. Left as is, self-mastery becomes politically dangerous.⁶ I also claim that philosophers will only desire to participate in harmoniously modeled cities. This may explain why Plato claims philosophers must be “compelled” to rule (500d). They have no desire to rule a city modeled after self-mastery because doing so keeps them from truly imitating the Forms.⁷

⁴ Bowery, Anne-Marie, *A Philosophical Muse: Plato’s Socrates as Narrator* (Forthcoming)

⁵ See, *Republic* 377a-380d, *Symposium* 210-211d and *Phaedo*, 82c-84a.

⁶ See the beginning of the decline of the city-state in *Republic* VIII.

⁷ See, Cooper, John. *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004; Kraut, Richard. “Return to the Cave: Republic 519-521” in *Plato* 2 ed. Gail Fine. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press, 1999: 235-254, & *Republic* 500c; *Symposium* 209a-b & 212a-b.

I conclude by offering some remarks about the place of philosophers within the city. I suggest that philosophers are best suited as educators. By bringing about harmoniously ordered souls, philosophers will successfully fulfill their desire to bring about the harmony of the Forms.

“The *Crito-Phaedo* Problem” (Saturday 4:15, Room 1)

Maureen Eckert, *UMASS at Dartmouth*, meckert@umassd.edu

Recent debate regarding the *Crito* concerns reconciling the speech personifying the Laws of Athens and its “persuade or obey” doctrinal stance, which Socrates makes at the conclusion of the *Crito*, with other Socratic moral commitments expressed in the dialogue—it is never right to intentionally do harm nor right to return a harm for a harm—as well as claims Socrates makes in other dialogues, especially the Apology. Such claims appear to express a commitment to justice that overrides all other (especially political) considerations. Interpreters of the *Crito* have the task of finding a way to explain this apparent conflict, and there are two main strategies. The “Integrationist” strategy is to determine a manner in which to show that there is no real contradiction or conflict—it is only apparent. The “separationist” strategy embraces the contradiction or conflict and then shows there is a justification for it, and that it ultimately does not affect other main features of Plato’s representation of Socrates. A majority of commentators favor the integrationist approach. Roslyn Weiss’ book *Socrates Dissatisfied* (1998) served to reignite controversy over the interpretation of Socrates’ Laws of Athens speech, proposing a strong separationist thesis—that Socrates’ speech of the Laws does not reflect Socrates’ own position but that the speech aims at reconciling Crito (the character) to the situation in a manner that effectively “speaks” to him. Brickhouse and Smith provide an integrationist reply to the separationist position on the speech of the *Laws* (“Socrates and the Laws of Athens,” 2006) presenting both an account of the “persuade and obey” doctrine and brief rebuttal of the character assassination of Crito that seems to support the separationist reading of the dialogue.

In this paper I will present what I term the “*Crito-Phaedo*” Problem. Put very simply: Given the claim Socrates makes in the *Phaedo* that Crito swore to the jury that Socrates would remain in Athens, it appears as though the Crito itself should never have happened—yet it did. In the *Phaedo* we find Socrates’ claim that Crito had pledged to the jury that he would stay in prison (115d): “Swear to me for Crito, he said, the opposite of what he had sworn to the jury: That I would remain.” Weiss devotes several pages to assessing Crito’s role in the *Phaedo* in *Socrates Dissatisfied* (45-48), but does not entertain the whole content of the passage at 115d-e, focusing only on the passage as evidence that Socrates has found it futile to persuade Crito via philosophical argument. Yet, it seems a much stronger case can be generated about Crito’s moral problem in the *Crito*, given what we are told regarding Crito’s pledge. Although some commentators have dismissed the pledge (Michael Stokes), I will argue that the *Crito-Phaedo* Problem is not easily dismissed, and presents a serious challenge with respect to how Plato scholars handle inter-dialogical interpretive issues.

“The Philosopher’s Philosopher: *Theaetetus* 172c-177c” (Saturday 11:15, Room 1)
Chris Edelman, *Emory University*, cjedelm@emory.edu

Generally speaking, the so-called “digression” in Plato’s *Theaetetus* has received scant attention from commentators. To Ryle (1966), the digression appeared “philosophically quite pointless”; McDowell (1973) suggested that the digression essentially plays the role of a footnote to the dialogue. Beginning roughly with Burnyeat (1990), however, commentators have begun to pay increasingly more attention to the digression, recognizing that it poses a number of vexing questions: Why does the “philosopher” described by Socrates seem so un-Socratic? Why does the “Theory of the Forms”, absent from the rest of the *Theaetetus*, seem to make an appearance in the digression? And finally, how does the digression relate to the rest of the dialogue?

Most recently, Sedley (2004) and Stern (2008) have advanced interpretations that take the digression to make an essential contribution to the meaning of the dialogue as a whole. Thus Sedley finds intimations of Platonic metaphysics in the digression, while Stern takes the digression to point to the necessity for philosophers to direct their attention to political matters. However, neither Sedley nor Stern have, in my view, paid sufficient attention to the epistemological implications of the problematic character of the “philosopher” that Socrates describes in the digression. Framed by a discussion of relativism, Socrates’ account of the philosopher’s attempt to pursue knowledge of universals without condescending to pay attention to particulars raises questions concerning the relation between knowledge and self-knowledge. This paper argues that we consider these questions in connection with fact that the digression repeatedly calls us to reflect upon what is important in life, it begins to appear that Plato’s fundamental concern in the digression is with the nature and value of the question that animates the dialogue as a whole.

“The Concept of *Philia* in the Thought of the Stoic Seneca: Bridging the Gap between Individualities” (Saturday 2:00, Room 6)

Panos Eliopoulos, *Olympic Center of Philosophy and Culture*, ksatriya@tri.forthnet.gr

For the Stoics man is a social being who can be perfected only within the society of other human beings. Individual morality is ipso facto social morality since man cannot be thought of outside the context of the ample human community. Thus the stoic terminology expands the Greek philosophical vocabulary by innovatively adding *cosmopolis* to the term of the Greek *polis*.

In the advancement that Seneca’s theory achieves things are quite more complicated than this. Starting from the point where mental pathology becomes a very important aspect in the senecan thought and having diagnosed the fundamental problems that man’s integration to the social corpus entails, the roman philosopher encounters a strong theoretical dilemma: how can stoic moral theory, as he and the previous stoic thinkers elaborate it, evolve to a social theory of morality? How can man, without abolishing his interiority, be rendered beneficial to others, since a benefit is a moral

action, it is practically the result of a moral decision? The obstacles in this problematic area are manifold. The noetic faults or sins that characterize the human being are not only tainted as individual mishaps but also as social mishaps as they belong to all people. Moreover, they tend to be multiplied and proliferated through the dynamics which are developed within a society.

Thus the “vulgus”, the crowd (including the common people as well as those nobles or aristocrats who are given to passions), is a catalyst of negative influence for the individual who wishes to acquire wisdom and eudaimonia. The ground where the Greek notion of “φιλία” or friendship can be rooted in is in another form of sociality, one that is based on solid and firm criteria. Instead of being narrowed, Seneca’s philanthropy and sociality broaden up including everyone and forming a new philanthropic ideal, the ideal of the roman “humanitas”. The brotherhood of men is not based simply on mere theoretical ideas but is mostly grounded on the indubitable axiom that the human soul is the source of every good, actually of the unique good which is virtue. Therefore, senecan friendship canalizes the stoic theory of friendship to the parameter of equality and “nobilitas” which can be reached solely by means of a noble and unwavering soul but also focuses practically on the mutual care between the members of a circle of sages.

“Socratic Apologies and Socratic Wisdom” (Saturday 2:00 pm, Room 7)

Christos Evangeliou, *Towson University*, cevangeliou@towson.edu

The *Apology* is one of the most widely read of Plato’s works. The Platonic art of words has painted here a moving picture of Socrates in the most critical moment of his life, and has thus contributed greatly to immortalizing this strange Athenian teacher of philosophy who paid with his life for the love of wisdom.

As presented by Plato, the self-defense of Socrates at court was threefold and addressed three different sets of accusations. Besides the official charges as stated by Meletus, Anytus and Lycon, there are the un-official charges that are addressed first, and then there are the so-called un-expressed charges that are addressed last and more extensively than the other two. It will be argued in this paper that it is here, at the third and most Socratic “apology,” that we find some glimpses into the Socratic wisdom in action.

It will be further argued that similar Socratic “apologies” or defenses full of gems of Socratic practical wisdom can be found respectively in the dialogues *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. When all these precious pieces of Socratic wisdom are collected and compared with similar findings in the works of Xenophon, especially the *Apology*, the *Symposium*, and the *Memorabilia*, a clear and coherent picture of Socrates emerges as an ethical teacher of Hellenic arete that can inspire others to excellence by following the example of Socrates. This Socratic ethical philosophy is relevant and needed today more than ever before, as it provides an antidote to moral relativism and other sorts of sophistry.

“Revisiting the Feminist Interpretation of Plato’s *Chora*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 4)

Daniel Everett, *Loyola Marymount University*, danieleverett77@yahoo.com

Within this paper I will revisit the feminist interpretation of Plato's Receptacle/Chora as put forward by Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. I will argue that this seemingly standard feminist interpretation of the Receptacle/Chora is wrong in drawing the conclusion that because of Plato's association of the Chora with the female in his familial analogy found in the *Timaeus*, he, therefore, one, views women as empty receptacles used only to store the seed of a man and, two, uses the Chora as an empty feminine figure with the purpose of producing a solely masculine ontological system. I will then strive to make the point that, by using a passage from the *Laws* Book VIII, we can come to see that, on the contrary, Plato does in fact appear to see women as contributing something to the generation of a child as opposed to merely storing the seed of the man, and, therefore, we can further conclude that this standard feminist interpretation of the Chora as putting forth an empty feminine figure used only to offer a completely masculine ontological system is mis-founded. I will conclude by offering an alternate feminist interpretation of Plato's Chora in light of the passage found in *Laws* Book VIII.

F

“Rumi's Philosophical Vocabulary” (Sunday 9:00, Room 8)

Ravan Farhadi, *U. of California, Berkeley*, ravanfarhadi@yahoo.com

Our focus is on philosophical themes in Rumi's poetry. For decades the English translations of the poetry of Jallal ad-Din Rumi (Mawlānā Jalāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī (1207–1273), the celebrated Persian poet, jurist and theologian) has been the top seller in both England and the United States; it has been more popular than the works of any other poet including Shakespeare. This presentation summarizes the salient features of a new bilingual text-translation of Rumi's mystical philosophical poetry. It proffers syntactical analyses of Rumi's technical vocabulary in Arabic and Farsi with attention to the underlying monistic mystical interpretation of Qur'anic verses. In conclusion, this investigation reflects on the differences between the uses of mystical/allegorical/symbolic theology with the semantics of formal theology. Also a clarification of Rumi's doctrines are proffered by a comparison between his notion of the Divine Unity of the Ground of Being, with Plotinus' doctrine of “the One,” and Rumi's theory of self realization with the intentional hermeneutic process of self-realization on Plato's allegory of the cave. The paper evaluates the influences of both Qur'anic orthodoxy and the Platonic tradition in formulation of Islamic nature-secular mysticism.

“Classical Mystical Themes in Persian Poetry” (Saturday 2:00, Room 10)

Mehdi Faridzadeh, *International Society for Iranian Culture*, fmehdi@isicweb.org

This investigation focuses on the philosophical notion of the “world-self,” in classical Persian poetry. In addition it examines the prima facie conflict between theological

doctrine of “Divine Simplicity (tawhid) “ and the pantheistic feature of nature monistic mysticism that denies existence of any transcendent entity. The study include new translations and analyses of selected medieval Persian philosophical poetry, especially the poems of Hafiz and Jami.

“‘Unlike-to-like’ in *De Anima*.” (Saturday 2:00, Room 4)

Margarita Fenn, *Boston College*, fennm@bc.edu

Though I am in large part sympathetic to Myles Burnyeat and Thomas Johansen’s readings of Aristotle’s texts on sensing, that Aristotle understood sensing as primarily a non-physical process, I would maintain that in *De Anima*, the explanatory model Aristotle uses to account for sensing is in fact adopted from his account of nutrition, a physical process. How can a model that explains a physical process also explain a non-physical process?

I will refer to Aristotle’s explanatory model as unlike-to-like (τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ). With it, Aristotle breaks new ground because his predecessors had relied on two other models: like-to-like and unlike-to-unlike. He criticized these two models as insufficient for describing activities that involve alteration, something he convincingly argues in his account of nutrition. There, Aristotle uses the unlike-to-like model to describe a physical process while in that of sensing, physicality is much less evident. A progression away from a materialist account of sensing can also be found in two of his predecessors’ accounts for sensing, Democritus’ and Plato’s, for example. In *De Anima* however, Aristotle separates himself even further from a material explanation of sensing. While the relationship between the nutritive and sensible objects and their respective faculties of soul differs within each activity, I suggest that the unlike-to-like model is operative in each, only in different iterations. Part of understanding these differing relationships requires a closer look at the special role of the medium in his accounts of nutrition and sensing.

“The Poetic Rhythms Correlated with the Five Constitutions in Plato’s *Republic*” (Sat 11:15, Room 11)

Kirk Fitzpatrick, *Southern Utah University*, fitzpatrick@suu.edu

In the *Republic*, Socrates holds that there are correlations among the poetic rhythms and the constitutions of state and soul. He does not explicitly tell us what the correlations are. So it is challenging to determine which rhythms correlate with which constitutions. The goal of the paper is to determine, as best the evidence allows, which poetic rhythms correlate with which constitutions. To help achieve the goal, I divide the discussion of poetic rhythm (399e–400d) in three sections. In Sections A (399e8–400a3) and C (400b1–400c6) Socrates leads. Glaucon leads in Section B (400a4–400a7). Though these sections are brief, I argue that they are pregnant with implications. Socrates names certain rhythms and metric feet. Socrates implies which rhythms and poetic feet he thinks are good. Glaucon implies a complete taxonomy of the feet. Putting the pieces together

shows that Socrates implies certain preferences among the rhythms and feet. The preferences imply a ranking from best to worst. Socrates refers to each of the five constitutions during his discussion of rhythm. He explicitly ranks the constitutions from best to worst elsewhere in the *Republic* (Bk., IX, 580a–b). I fit the preferences among the rhythms and feet with the preferences among the five constitutions.

“Predicative Hypothesis in Plato’s Divided Line” (Sunday 11:15, Room 1)

Lee Franklin, *Franklin and Marshall College*, lee.franklin@fandm.edu

In the Divided Line, Plato appeals to the use of hypothesis in geometry to explain *dianoia* and its objects (510b–511a). Although Socrates’ wording suggests that the objects of hypothesis are properties, interpreters typically conclude that the geometer’s hypotheses are propositional in nature. This view is supported by two assumptions: that *hupothesthai* always takes a propositional object in Platonic methodological contexts; and that the geometry of the *Republic* closely resembles that of Euclid’s *Elements*, where definitions and postulates were offered prior to proofs.⁸ Against this consensus, I offer a new reading on which properties, or Forms, are hypothesized when they are invoked predicatively to designate the figures of a geometric construction.

I begin with evidence from the *Parmenides* that a property may be hypothesized when it is invoked as a predicate (*Parmenides*, 135e–136c). Returning to the *Republic*, I show that Socrates likens the geometers’ use of hypothesis to the way properties are invoked, unreflectively, in ordinary, pre-philosophical discourse. Most speakers are unaware that their general terms are the names of properties, distinct from the items of our ordinary experience. Accordingly, they invoke properties predicatively, without knowing it, to speak about their sensible bearers. The geometers’ hypotheses exhibit the same manner of speech, and the orientation associated with it, towards the bearers of properties as the exclusive objects of speech and thought.

I then locate this way of invoking properties in the geometrical practice of the *Republic*. On my view, geometers hypothesize when they assign properties to the figures of their constructions, as in the *ekthesis* of a geometrical proposition. Since the hypotheses of *Republic* VI are given without any account (*oudena logon*, 510c6–7), we must imagine a geometrical practice that bears only partial resemblance to the Euclidean model, involving construction-based proofs but lacking the definitions and postulates of that work. Such a practice yields proofs of geometric theorems in isolation, or small clusters, but fails to integrate them into a comprehensive system, anchored in definitions of the properties at issue. And, although Plato recognizes that geometry is developing systematicity in his day, he associates the synoptic theorizing by which it is achieved with the dialectical pursuit of definitions (*Republic* 533c, 534b–d, cf. *Theaetetus* 147c–148b). Hypothesis can discover necessary truths severally, but insofar as it cannot order and explain them in a comprehensive theory, it cannot arrive at knowledge.

⁸ See C.C.W. Taylor, “Plato and the Mathematicians: An Examination of Professor Hare’s Views,” *Philosophical Quarterly*, 17 (1968), 193–203.

This view resolves the apparent fragmentation in Plato's account. Interpreters have struggled to explain the relationship between the geometrical use of hypothesis and that of construction, taking them to be at best loosely related practices⁹. On my view, by contrast, they are interdependent aspects of one and the same method. Their unity, moreover, reveals that the deficiency of geometry is based not in the reliance on sensible figures, as is often claimed, but in the more basic metaphysical orientation – manifested in the predicative hypotheses by which geometers designate their constructions – towards particulars, the bearers of properties, as the exclusive objects of speech, thought and investigation.

“The Dynamics of Collection and Division” (Sunday 9:00, Room 1)

Lee Franklin, *Franklin and Marshall College*, lee.franklin@fandm.edu

Collection and Division, the dialectical method prominent in Plato's late dialogues, is a method for “inquiring, learning, and teaching” (*Philebus*, 16c). This characterization suggests that should consider the method dynamically, with attention to the factors that shape theoretical progress, and the way Collection and Division engenders it. Recent interpreters, however, have focused only on the endpoint of the method, and specifically on the way a completed account reflects the structure of knowledge, or what is known. On my view, by contrast, before we can understand how an account signifies a Kind, we must understand the process by which it has been developed.

For this, I propose to look anew at the opening discussion of the *Sophist*, where the Eleatic Guest employs a definition of the Angler to illustrate the method by which he and Theaetetus will define the Sophist. Importantly, the account of the Angler introduces the taxonomic framework within which subsequent accounts of the Sophist are given. Consequently, the account of the Sophist depict him as being similar to, and different from, the Angler some specific way. From this, the following points emerge. A kind is defined through its relations of similarity and difference to other kinds. However, as the plural accounts of the Sophist show, such relations may be construed in indefinitely many ways. This is owing to: our ignorance as inquirers (*Sophist*, 216c), the difficulty in discerning likeness (*Sophist*, 231a) and, consequently, the error that may exist in the categories provided by our ordinary way of speaking (*Statesman* 262b).

Consequently, the process of inquiry modeled in Collection and Division may be considered at two levels. At one level, in seeking to say what a given kind F is, the inquirer seeks to identify the other kinds which it is most fundamentally associated, and by reference to which it is properly accounted. At another less explicit level, the inquirer is relying on, and refining, the notions of sameness and difference that mediate these associations. Through his growing awareness of the vagaries of ordinary language, which of necessity serves as the origin and instrument of dialectical inquiry, Plato identifies norms of inquiry – kinds such as Being, the Same, and the Different – which

⁹ E.g., see I. Mueller, “Mathematical Method, Philosophical Truth,” in R. Kraut, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 170-199, esp. 185 ff..

comprise the character of the categories and relations ideally tracked by our theoretical accounts

These two levels correspond to the two parts of the “dialectical science” described later in the *Sophist*: the ability to discern, on a case by case basis, which kinds harmonize; and knowledge of the “vowel” kinds, i.e those responsible for linking any two kinds together, or dividing them from each other (*Sophist*, 253b-d). The second comprehension represents knowledge of the norms of inquiry – e.g., what a natural kind is, or what it is for to Kinds to belong to the same genus – that govern dialectical inquiry in general. The progress of Collection and Division consists in the increasing conformity of our speech about a property to these norms.

“Making Do with Nothing: An Investigation of Buddhist Ideas on Truth” (Saturday 2:00, Room 9)

Marie Friquegnon, *William Paterson University*, FriquegnonM@wpunj.edu

How are we to make sense of Buddhist ideas on truth? I will investigate this question from the point of view of the three main Western ideas of truth as correspondence, coherence or pragmatic. I will also try to discover what the various Buddhist philosophical theories assert about the nature of truth. I will conclude with an examination of the role of perspectives in attaining a veridical experience of reality.

G

“Stairway to Heaven as Tunnel of Love: Theoreia as erotic praxis” (Saturday 4:15, Room 11)

Samuel Galloway, *University of Chicago*, sgalloway@uchicago.edu

In Book VII of the *Republic* Plato’s Socrates recounts the allegory of the cave to dramatize an ascent out of the world of semblance to a knowledge of the “things themselves” in the light of day. A similar allegory is deployed in *Symposium* when Socrates, speaking in the drag persona Diotima, describes how *eros* moves the lover up and away from the opacity of particularity to a vision of the Good and the Beautiful itself. Both these accounts share a seeming insistence on the philosopher’s withdrawal from the socio-political sphere as a prerequisite for grasping the truth of the forms, to engage in *theoreia*. This paper argues that, in fact, Plato subverts this schism between the philosopher’s theoretical endeavors and the practice of living the good life established in both *Republic* and *Symposium*. The necessary experience for this repair, however, is erotic friendship. This is, perhaps, counter-intuitive since in *Republic* erotic love is figured as a poisonous “sting” that leads to the cultivation of the mad and deranged tyrant. Similarly, Alcibiades’ confession in *Symposium* relies upon the same tropes of poison and madness to relate the condition of being in love with Socrates. Nevertheless, it precisely to *eros* and it’s poisonous, maddening sting that Plato turns to in *Phaedrus* as he attempts to articulate a philosophically informed, politically actionable erotic friendship. Reading the Socrates’ speeches in *Phaedrus* against the caricatures of *eros* as offered in

Republic and *Symposium* it is possible to see Plato re-appropriating the experience of *eros* as a necessary propaedeutic to living the good life. The dialogue *Phaedrus* ends closes in rather standard Socratic dialectics which, this paper argues, is meant to *dramatize the experience of theoria as an experience of ethico-political praxis*.

“What is wrong with degenerate souls in the *Republic*?” (Saturday 11:15 am, Room 2)
Era Gavrielides, King’s College London, era.gavrielides@gmail.com,

The *Republic* splits the soul into three parts. The *logistikon* (reason), the *thumoeides* (spirit) and the *epithumetikon* (appetite). A virtuous soul is one where all the parts are doing their own work and the *logistikon* is ruling. This is described as psychic harmony and it is a condition that characterises philosophers in the *Republic*. A question that arises from this is what precisely is wrong with degenerate souls, ruled either by spirit or by appetite.

An indefensible, I take it, answer is that what is problematic about degenerate souls is that they cannot be unified at all. Such a view clearly contradicts the ability of degenerate characters to organise their lives, and ignores that even the tyrant who is in the worst state in terms of his soul can bring a city under his complete control (578d). Indeed, as I will argue, noting this allows us to cut across the vexed question of whether the tripartite psychology of Book IV departs from Socratic psychology.

An answer, which seems to be on better footing, is that the problem with degenerate souls is that their unity is unstable or fragile. In this paper I will argue that this is not sufficient to account for the unattractiveness of degenerate souls. Whilst, I grant that, such accounts capture part of the truth – the description of degenerate characters and states in Books VIII and IX does after all provide an illustration of the process by which decline into a lower form of character and state is possible – excessive focus on this can be misleading. This is because it diverts our attention from the fact that it is the condition of degenerate souls per se that is problematic rather than the possibility of decline into a lower condition. I will argue that what is primarily problematic about degenerate souls is that they have the wrong kind of unity – a unity by force – which can be very stable but which is nonetheless a unity and thus stability in tension. On the other hand the rule of the *logistikon* can provide unity by persuasion, a unity which is not only stable but also not in tension.

Having argued for this I will then illustrate how my account can help resolve a problem often associated with readings of psychic harmony in Book IV of the *Republic*. Namely that of the purported lacuna between the rule of the *logistikon* in Book IV where, it is argued, we are told nothing of the *logistikon*’s ends and the fuller exposition of the middle books (V-VII) and the explicit presentation of the *logistikon*’s ends in Book IX (581b5-7). This is a lacuna, I will argue, we need not accept.

“Plato and Hegel on the Paradoxes of Forms” (Sunday 11:15, Room 1)
Paul Gelbach, Bridgewater State College, semiosis2@gmail.com

What is the relation between Plato's dialectic and Hegel's? For both of these philosophers, a kind of reasoning that bears the name dialectic plays an essential role in their understandings of metaphysics. For Plato, dialectic stands as the highest kind of knowing--it is at the top of the divided line; pure dialectic has freed itself from appearance and considers the forms as they are in themselves. Reasoning at the level of pure form, however, takes on a paradoxical character. For example, in the *Parmenides*, Parmenides considers hypotheses about the one. From the hypothesis "if it is one," Parmenides reaches the conclusion that the one does not partake of being, and conversely, if the one is, it must have parts, and therefore is many. In this fashion, Plato's dialectic is congruent with Hegel's; Hegel even credits Plato with the invention of dialectic (*Enc. I*, § 81, addition 1). While Hegel does not strictly follow the method of hypothesis as Plato employs it in the *Parmenides*, hypothesis does bear a relation to what he calls the dialectical moment of thought. The dialectical moment of thought is the self-sublation of finite determinations; finite determinations contain their opposites within themselves.

While it appears that Hegel and Plato both share in the dialectical moment of thought, it is less clear that they both share in what Hegel calls the speculative moment of thought. According to Hegel, the dialectical moment of thought leads to the speculative; the dialectical moment of thought is the passing over of a form or a concept into its opposite and back again. This passing over ultimately leads to a form different from the first form and its opposite. The speculative moment is itself unsayable--it is the inseparability of the finite determinations, but it at once preserves the difference between the opposed moments. Hegel does claim that the *Parmenides* does include the speculative moment of thought and is akin to his own understanding of becoming as the unity of being and nothing. The example he gives is found at the very end of the dialogue: "...whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and relation to each other." (166 C). Why would or why would not this conclusion represent the unsayable speculative moment?

"Platonic Rational Egoism" (Saturday 2:00, Room 1)

Jyl Gentzler, *Amherst College*, jgentzler@amherst.edu

In the *Republic*, Socrates' general strategy for defending a practical commitment to justice is to appeal to considerations of self-interest. It appears, on the face of it, that both he and his interlocutors hold some version of rational egoism, that is, the view that, ultimately, all facts about what S has the most reason to do are grounded in facts about what is in S's self-interest. While there has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist, extending at least from Henry Sidgwick to Terence Irwin,¹ some scholars

¹Henry Sidgwick, *The Method of Ethics*, 7th ed. (1907) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 171-2; Henry Prichard, "Duty and Interest" (1928), reprinted in H. Prichard, *Duty and Interest and Moral Obligation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); M.B. Foster "A Mistake in Plato's *Republic*," *Mind* n.s. 46 (1937), 386-93;

have recently challenged this reading.² I agree that the textual evidence to which these scholars appeal does show that Plato is not committed to the simple-minded theory of practical reasons that often goes by the name of “rational egoism.” However, I argue that Plato is indeed committed to a conception of practical reasons that is properly regarded as egoist.

“Having One’s Own and Distributive Justice in Plato’s *Republic*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 2)

Anna Greco, *University of Guelph*, agrec@uoguelph.ca

Although Plato did not explicitly propose any principle of distributive justice, he indicated that justice involves both the doing and the having of one’s own. On the interpretation I’m proposing, (i) ‘having one’s own’ refers directly to the compensation one receives for doing one’s own; (ii) the principle of distribution of benefits that is actually operative in Plato’s system is that any form of compensation must be such that the worker (whether ruler, soldier, or producer) has his needs satisfied. I also highlight how Plato’s account does not quite fit any contemporary conceptual framework – either utilitarian or desert-based. But it encourages us to reflect on the moral aspects of economic interactions of exchange, resulting from a fundamental collective choice to associate in order to satisfy individual needs, broadly understood as what human beings need to flourish in their social life.

“Aristotle on Light, Hearing, and how (not what) the Maker Mind Makes” (Sunday 9:00, Room 7)

Mark Green, *Stony Brook University*, markblgreen@gmail.com

From its title, one can gather that this is a somewhat odd study; however its oddness does not follow from an effort to uncover hidden or novel connections but instead from two guiding assumptions: (1) our best chance of understanding Aristotle’s terse treatment of

A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 249-53; Gregory Vlastos, “Happiness and Virtue in Socrates’ Moral Theory,” *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 200-33; T. H. Irwin, *Plato’s Moral Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 177-191 and *Plato’s Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), chs 4 and 15. Some scholars resist attributing to Plato the doctrine of rational egoism, preferring instead to speak of Plato’s *eudaimonism*.

²Most notably, Richard Kraut, “Egoism, Love, and Political Office in Plato,” *The Philosophical Review* 82 (1973), 330-44; Nicholas White, “Harmonizing Plato,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59 (1999), 497-512; and Nicholas White, *Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

nous poiētikos, or ‘maker mind’, ‘agent intellect’ (*On the Soul* III.5), consists of coming to terms with its explicitly analogous relationship to light as a hexis (430a15), and (2) Aristotle’s understanding of light’s role as a hexis in visual perception is sufficiently counterintuitive to contemporary notions of light that we do well to understand it in conjunction with its counterpart in aural perception. In short, we can best understand Aristotle’s notion of nous poiētikos through an analysis of light’s role in vision, which in turn is best understood alongside its analogue in audition. Subsequently, this paper boils down to the attempt to clarify the important sense of the verb poein, ‘to make,’ invoked in Aristotle’s account of mental life.

This paper addresses these points in reverse order, beginning with (§I) a meticulous account of the structural components of vision, including a discussion of light’s potentially misleading role in visual perception as distinct from other possible analytic contexts pertaining to it. Aristotle does not, unlike his Latin commentators, forge a terminological distinction between ‘light’ and ‘luminosity,’ so extra care is required to thematize his notion of light as a hexis, an active state of some substance. My resulting analysis exposes seven conceptually distinct moments involved in Aristotle’s account of the entelecheia of vision: the sensory apparatus, proper sensible, mediating attribute, mediating substance, active state (hexis), absence (sterēsis) and ‘activator’. Though these seven components are explicitly labeled in the account of vision (II.7), Aristotle does not treat them with equal definition his account of audition (II.8), and the second section (§II) of this paper consists of the exegetical project of identifying these seven features in II.8. It is my contention Aristotle’s account does redeploy these seven parts, and the hexis at work in hearing turns out to be the ‘resonance’ that sufficiently-contained (sunechēs) air (e.g., the air within a concert hall) exhibits, allowing sounds to act so well on the ear. I use this conclusion to temper our understanding of light as a hexis, resulting in something more akin to illumination, or ‘being-lit,’ analogous with resonance or ‘being-well-contained.’ I show that Aristotle defines a sense in which these conditions ‘make’ (poein) a sensation happen, and I label this kind of making, hexis-making.

It is the contention of my final section (§III) that Aristotle invokes precisely this strictly delimited species of poein in the account of ‘maker-mind’ in III.5. I end by offering an interpretation of this infamously difficult passage motivated by the strict sense of ‘making’ articulated above. This interpretation entails emphasizing the maker mind’s categorial nature as a hexis, namely an active condition of a particular soul, and rejecting the tendency to hypostatize nous poiētikos.

“Potentiality, Actuality and the Logic of Sovereignty” (Saturday 4:15, Room 4)

Jeffrey Gower, Villanova University, jeffrey.gower@villanova.edu

In his work *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, the contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben makes the ambitious claim that in “describing the most authentic nature of potentiality, Aristotle bequeathed the paradigm of sovereignty to Western

philosophy.”¹⁰ This claim is striking, especially since Aristotle himself seems to associate the sovereign position of the ruler with the fulfilled actuality of the unmoved mover.¹¹ This essay attempts to elucidate the implications of Agamben’s analysis for Aristotle’s thought by raising the question of the relationship between potentiality and sovereign actuality.

The key text for understanding Agamben’s claim is *Metaphysics* Θ, where Aristotle discusses the relationship between potentiality and actuality. In order to understand how potentiality, and not actuality, serves as the fundamental, grounding moment in what Agamben calls the “logic of sovereignty,” I will turn in the first part of this essay to Martin Heidegger’s lecture course from the summer semester of 1931, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* Θ 1-3: *On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, where Heidegger offers an extended interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of potentiality. In this investigation, Heidegger emphasizes that potentiality (*Kraft*) must be understood in relation to its own im-potentiality (*Unkraft*), that is, that force or potentiality retains an essential relation with privation (*sterêsis*) or withdrawal (*Entzug*).¹² The reason for this becomes clear when Heidegger turns to Aristotle’s debate with the Megarians in Θ 3. For potentiality to have an autonomous existence such that it does not pass directly into actuality, it must be both a capacity to be actualized and a capacity not to be actualized. In other words, potentiality is most authentically and essentially what it is when it is not being actualized or passing into actuality, when it holds itself back from, withholds itself or withdraws from, actuality.¹³ For Agamben, this excess or reserve of a potentiality gathered into itself and thus holding itself back from actualization corresponds to sovereign power.

After exploring the notion of potentiality and its relation to actuality developed in *Metaphysics* Θ, I turn in the second part of this essay to *Metaphysics* Λ where Aristotle investigates the highest fulfillment of actuality in the unmoved mover and tacitly associates this fulfillment with political sovereignty. A traditional interpretation of the actuality of the unmoved mover would exclude any trace of potentiality and would thus associate sovereignty with a perfected actuality for which nothing remains potential. Guided by the unorthodox readings of Θ offered by Heidegger and Agamben, I show how traces of potentiality can be discerned in Aristotle’s description of the unmoved mover in Λ. If this is the case, I argue, the distinction between potentiality and actuality,

¹⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 46.

¹¹ In *Metaphysics* Λ 10, after considering the variety of first principles proposed by his predecessors, Aristotle concludes, “they give us many principles; but the world must not be governed badly” (1076a3). Aristotle then concludes Λ with a line from Homer in which Odysseus attempts to unify the Achaean ranks under the rule of Agamemnon: “The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler” (1076a4). The ontological unity of the unmoved mover is thus associated with the political unity of the sovereign figure.

¹² Martin Heidegger, GA 33, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik* Θ 1-3: *Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1980), 108-116.

¹³ GA 33, 182-193.

when taken to the level of the absolute, becomes undecidable. For Agamben, this undecidability or indistinction between potentiality and actuality is both the site of sovereign power's implementation and the site from which it can be resisted. Even if Aristotle bequeathed the logic of sovereignty to the West, then, his thought may also take egress from its power.

“A Non-ideal Conception of Flourishing” (Sunday 11:15, Room 3)

Selin Gursozlu, *Binghamton University*, Sgursoz1@binghamton.edu

Aristotle famously argues against the sufficiency thesis, which suggests that virtue is not only necessary but also sufficient for flourishing. However, I think his arguments against the sufficiency thesis are somewhat transposed as he denies that a virtuous person could ever be unhappy. Accordingly, “the happy man can never become miserable- though he will not reach blessedness”. In a much discussed passage of the *Nichomachean Ethics* (1100b29-1101a8), Aristotle seems to maintain two different senses of happiness; one, I believe, corresponding to the Platonic/Stoic conception of happiness and one corresponding to what we usually call the Aristotelian conception of happiness. Aristotle's focus on the external goods does not provide him enough space to talk about the non-ideal world; both the Platonic/Stoic and Aristotelian accounts are built around an ideal conception of flourishing. I want to point out the need to introduce a non-ideal conception of flourishing for contexts in which the lack of external goods is at a devastating level. I argue that one of the two different senses of happiness in *Nichomachean Ethics* opens a space to develop an ethics for those who are virtuous under adverse conditions.

I agree with Aristotle when he defines flourishing as not solely in an agent's power insofar as it depends on the contingencies of fortune. Conversely, the Stoics claimed that happiness is in an agent's power because to be happy all that is required is that the agent is virtuous. An interpretation of Aristotle's ethics that included two senses of happiness would indicate that being virtuous is more than our best bet to be happy; yet it would also imply that there is a final end that corresponds to the virtues that those who are like Priam can exercise. In this sense, one of the conceptions of happiness (if we assume that there might be two conceptions of happiness for the sake of this argument) assigns a remarkable power to the agent similar to the Stoics account. This sense of happiness for Aristotle seems to be intuitively absurd for the same reason as the Stoic ethics is. The other conception of happiness is a conception of what I will refer to as full/ideal flourishing. This second conception better fulfills the “intuitive requirement” because it does require the external goods that are commonly (“intuitively”) thought to be necessary for the good life. However, as absurd as it is, the first conception of happiness provides us with a better understanding of what a non-ideal conception of flourishing would be like.

“Socrates’ Conversation with Cephalus and the reform of religious patriarchy in the *Republic*” (Sat 11:15, Room 11)

Khalil M. Habib, *Salve Regina University*, Khalil.Habib@salve.edu

This paper examines Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus in Book 1 of the *Republic*. The conversation between Socrates and Cephalus is often read as Socrates’ attempt to rid the party of Cephalus in order for the real philosophical discussion of justice to take place. Consequently, Cephalus has been largely viewed as a minor character or ignored completely. I hope to show that the short but weighty conversation between Socrates and Cephalus actually reveals one of the major problems of justice the “City in Speech” is designed to solve – that is, how the fear of death and the love of one’s own that consoles man in the face of mortality are obstacles to the common good sought by Socrates and others in their quest for justice – and, therefore, sets the stage for Socrates’ later reform of the Gods and man’s relationship to necessity.

“Has Aristotle Got the Origins of Philosophy Wrong?” (Saturday 9:00, Room 6)

Robert Hahn, *Southern Illinois University*, hahn@siu.edu

The paper begins with the thesis of Daniel Graham’s *Explaining the Cosmos* (Princeton U.P. 2006), who argues that Aristotle’s got it wrong – the Milesians were not Material Monists, and focuses on Anaximenes to make his case. I point out that Anaximenes argues for cosmic change and process by appeal to PILESIS (“felting”), a process that Graham nowhere explores in his interesting book. In my annual travel-study programs to Greece and Turkey, I found communities on the west coast of Turkey still “felting” in ways that, by comparison to the surviving artifacts from archaic times, seem very much the same. By appeal to the product and process I challenge Graham’s interpretation suggesting rather that Aristotle had it right.

“The Cosmos as Ornament: East and West” (Saturday 9:00, Room 9)

Michael Harrington, *Duquesne University*, harringtonm@duq.edu

I propose to examine a rarely-treated claim that appears in both Western and Chinese philosophy: that the world is ornamental in nature. In the West, this claim is often made during the discussion of evil. Augustine, for instance, develops a theory of ornament in *De Libero Arbitrio* as a way of explaining how what we ordinarily call evil actions contribute to the beauty of the world. Evil makes the world more beautiful just as the color black makes a painting more beautiful. This link between the ornamental and the justification of evil persists in the Western tradition, even up to Nietzsche’s famous claim that the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.

The Confucian approach to ornament is somewhat different. As a component of human dress it appears as early as *Analects* 3.8. But the primary place for the consideration of the cosmos as ornament is the 22nd hexagram of the *Zhouyi*. In the Song dynasty commentaries on the *Zhouyi*, especially Cheng Yi’s, all things are considered

ornamental in so far as they possess an ordered relationship, and heaven itself is ornamental in so far as it constitutes the orderly movement of the stars and changing of the seasons.

I will make three points in connection with Cheng Yi's use of ornament, with the aim of carefully distinguishing it from the Western concept:

1. Ornament is not substance. Cheng Yi associates ornament (*shi*) with activity rather than with substance. Ornament gives regularity, civilization, and enlightenment to substance, but it cannot change that substance's basic character (*zhi*).
2. Ornament is neither good nor bad. This is not to say that ornament is merely aesthetic in character, but that it is not good or bad in itself. Its goodness or badness derives from the character of the substance that it adorns.
3. Ornament must not become superficial. Ornament is not, for Cheng Yi, a changeless harmony. It is forever pushing away from the substance that engenders it, drawing the character of the substance into ever greater civilization and enlightenment. If the extreme of ornament is reached, it becomes "splendor without reality" (*hua mei shi*). In other words, the extreme of regularity, civilization, and enlightenment is empty formality.

Cheng Yi does not use the theme of ornament, as often happens in the West, to shift the reader from a moral to an aesthetic perspective. Beauty and goodness are both at play in the relation between substance and ornament. Substance is forever ornamenting itself, but that ornament must always be reoriented toward the substance so that the two do not break away from each other. Such an activity does not easily map onto the Western trajectory of ornament.

"Play Fair, Crito" (Saturday 4:15, Room 1)

Jonathan Hecht, *San Diego State University*, JonHecht89@gmail.com

My purpose in this essay is to consider whether or not the notion of the obligation of fair play is present in the *Crito*. It should be noted that I do not necessarily agree that the notion of the obligation of fair play is involved in the foundational argument presented by Socrates and the Laws in the *Crito*. My goal is to demonstrate the most plausible arguments that one must commit oneself to if one argues for the notion of the obligation of fair play.

I shall argue from the perspective of one who believes that the notion of the obligation of fair play informs the primary argument in the *Crito*; the reason being that if it informs the primary argument, then it certainly informs an argument in the *Crito*. As well, the standards necessary in order to demonstrate this point are higher than that of simply demonstrating the presence of the notion obligation of fair play as part of some argument or other. And surely any arguments in favor of the claim that the notion of the obligation of fair play informs the primary argument presented in the *Crito* by Socrates and the Laws supports the weaker claim that the notion informs some argument or other in the dialogue, but with a lessened burden of proof.

Some interpretations of the dialogue are based on the idea that Socrates argued for legal obligation based on the obligation from gratitude. Whether this is an absolute obligation to the legal system or a pro tanto obligation is a matter of contention. I intend to explicate the view of obligation to a legal system based on gratitude, and analyze its implications. After this, I shall demonstrate that textual analysis and specific historical evidence provide inductive reasons to believe that the primary argument, presented by Socrates and the Laws in the *Crito*, implies obligation stemming from fair play, not gratitude (though gratitude may be a supporting argument for the obligation of fair play). This proposal has been made previously, but was dismissed—I think unfairly—on the grounds that there is not enough evidence to support it, thus making it seem purely speculative. I shall argue that, if we approach the argument using evidence from both philosophical and historical analyses, the proposal is adequately supported. Beyond the primary benefit of clarifying what is meant in the *Crito*, the resulting analysis based on this new foundation puts the final nail in the coffin for the myth of an argument by Socrates, in the *Crito*, for absolute obligation, adding to the mounting evidence that there is internal congruity between the *Apology* and the *Crito*, despite superficial differences.

“Oracularity, discursivity, and the Good in Plato’s *Republic*” (Saturday 2:00, Room 1)
Dirk t. D. Held, *Connecticut College*, dthel@conncoll.edu

The philosophical lover on the *Symposium* advances by means of logoi to reach the position from which he is able suddenly (exaiphnês) to envision Beauty. Likewise in the *Republic*, the philosopher proceeds up stages of the divided line through the discursive process of dialectic (that is, through logoi) to reach a position wherein he can apprehend the Good. In this way the dialectician attains a synoptic view of the affinities of the objects of knowledge with one another and with the nature of being. (eis sunopsin oikeiotêtos te allêlôn tôn mathêmatôn kai tês tou ontos physeôs). Plato says explicitly that the holder of synoptic vision is the dialectician (ho synoptikos dialektikos). In both works a process of dialectical investigation and clarification is necessary preparation for the consummate epistemological experience of apprehending Beauty and the Good. The *Symposium* passage however is permeated with the language of the religious mysteries and revelation missing from the *Republic* account.

The paper will examine the debate over the manner in which the Good, which Plato states is not an ousia (*Rep.* 509b), is apprehended in Plato’s *Republic*, and in particular whether there is evidence of non-discursivity. Cornford called apprehension of the Good “immediate knowledge” and others credit it to intuition of some sort. Even M.M. McCabe who objects to any form of non-rational knowledge in *Republic* admits that “verification” [of what dialectic achieves] is provided by “the dialectician’s view of the good” (her emphases).

I will argue that greater sensitivity to Platonic religion called for. Richard Sorabji spoke of the apprehension of the Good as having “an almost religious significance” and Myles Burnyeat presents the notion of “sacralized spectating.” In the paper, I plan to develop those insights as a means of reaching a deeper understanding of Plato’s Good.

Select bibliography:

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"Plotinus on Magic" (Saturday 2:00 pm, Room 8)

Wendy Elgersma Helleman, *St. Augustine University of Tanzania*,
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Porphyry's *Vita* presents Plotinus as a gentle, caring and humble teacher, with a keen understanding of character and even clairvoyance (as in the incident of Chione's necklace, *Vit.* 10). Plotinus enjoyed mystic union with the 'One' at least four times in the six years that Porphyry knew him (*Vit.* 23). How did he achieve such union? Plotinus' own explanation differs radically from that of later Neoplatonists like Iamblichus, who practised theurgy, which clearly involves magic. Even with a modern understanding of magic, as a (respectable) form of religious devotion, it is clear that for Plotinus mystic union did not involve magic of that kind. Yet it is also clear, from *Enneads* 4.3 and 4.4, that basic elements of theurgy were recognized by Plotinus himself. Inasmuch as his philosophical approach sought to revive an ancient wisdom (*Vit.* 16), not simply "Hellenic rationalism", he might be expected to make greater allowance for magic than did Plato himself. How, then, did he understand magic, and how did he explain its efficacy? In this reconsideration of the matter I want to indicate the significance of the introductory argument of *Enn.* 4.3.1-8 (that the individual soul is not derived from the World-Soul, but has its own origin, alongside the World-Soul, in the world above) for Plotinus' appreciation of magic. In that light I wish to examine also the significance of the incident in the Iseum, where Plotinus' guardian spirit appeared not as a daimon, but a deity (*Vit.* 10), a revelation confirmed by the presence of the snake at his death (*Vit.* 2).

"The Philosophy of Vision of Robert Grosseteste" (Sunday, 9:00 am, Room 6)

John Hendrix, *Rhode Island School of Design*, jhendrix@risd.edu

Last year I presented a paper at Fordham on the philosophy of intellect of Robert Grosseteste; this year I would like to present a paper on the philosophy of vision of Grosseteste. In the treatise *De Iride* (*On the Rainbow*, or *On the Rainbow and the Mirror*), written just after 1230, Grosseteste defined the science of optics, or perspectiva, as being based on geometrical figures, which are in turn based on the operations of light. Sources for Grosseteste's theories of optics include the *Meteorologica* of Aristotle, the

Optica and *Catoptrica* of Euclid, and the *De aspectibus* of Alkindi. Light for Grosseteste is the instrument by which the species apprehensibilis (intelligible form) in the virtus intellectiva (nous poietikos) is known as the species sensibilis (sensible form) of the virtus cogitativa (nous pathetikos) in perception. The visible species is defined as “an assimilating substance of the nature of the sun, lighting and radiating, the radiation of which, conjoined with the radiation of a wholly outwardly illuminating body, completes perception.” Thus, “sight occurs through reception from within.” Visual perception is both passive and active, because what is seen is the species of an object, as it is imprinted in the oculus interior, the mind’s eye. But the species sensibilis of the object must always already be an intelligible, given by the species apprehensibilis, the product of the virtus intellectiva, in the irradiatio of the lux spiritualis (spiritual light) to form the visible species. As impressions are printed by the rays of light upon the oculus mentis in the phantasia (imagination) in the anima rationalis (rational soul), the passive part of vision in intromission, they are discerned by reason, subject to the vis aestimativa, which is the active part of vision. The lux spiritualis “floods over intelligible objects,” or res intelligibiles, and “over the mind’s eye,” and “stands to the interior eye,” or oculus interior “and to intelligible objects as the corporeal sun stands to the bodily eye and to visible corporeal objects.” Sensible objects are understood to the extent that they correspond to the visus mentalis, the mental vision of them, which is made possible by the irradiatio spiritualis in the oculus mentis, as the lumen solare of the sun makes sensible objects visible to the corporeal eye.

“Friendship, Justice, and Communal Living: The Status of Friendship in Epicurean Thought”

Mark A. Holowchak, *Muhlenberg College*

Contemporary scholars and even ancient critics like Cicero have been puzzled by the special status that Epicurus awards friendship. As an egoistic hedonist, Epicurus is committed to a form of consequentialism: Every action ought to be done through consideration of the perceived pleasure to be had through avoidance of pain. Thus, traditional virtues like courage and self-sufficiency are goods only insofar as they are instruments that lead to pleasure. Yet friendship, Epicurus states at *SV* 23, is choice-worthy in itself, and that seems to place it on par with pleasure.

There are good historical reasons for friendship’s singular status in Epicurus’ ethical thinking—i.e., the existence of Epicurean communities—and there is evidence of disagreement among later Epicureans on the nature of friendship (Cicero’s *Fin.* I.65-70). Is the later disagreement the result of Epicurus’ own conceptual confusion?

This undertaking is an attempt to clear up the confusion.

“The Myth of Learning in Plato’s *Meno*” (Saturday 2:00, Room 3)

Burt Hopkins, *Seattle University*, bhopkins@seattleu.edu

In its very being philosophy is a violation of the technical rule that cognitive inquiry cannot begin without first arriving at an agreement about words. The manifestation of this

violation is called “opinion” by philosophers and non-philosophers alike but it is the philosopher alone who recognizes that the remarkable power of the opinion to cloak the unknown in the guise of the known brings with it a responsibility that is as unavoidable as it is impossible for any human soul to measure up to completely. This responsibility involves “testing” the unknown that is unified and therefore made one by an opinion for its veracity vis-à-vis the true being of the unknown. This test that can only occur through (dia) logos, either in the soul’s silent conversation with itself or in its spoken discourse with another soul, because it is logos that, in the face of the unknown, forms an opinion about it that nevertheless treats it as something known, and it is also logos that discerns that the true being of the unknown must be something other than its unknowing opinion about it. This testing of logos by logos, of course, is called dialectic by Socrates and its most basic supposition termed recollection. It is my contention that Plato’s *Meno* shows that not only is the outcome of this testing something that can only end in failure, but also that the most appropriate word for this failure is “learning.”

That the testing of logos by logos can only end in failure is rooted in its inability—for all time—to appropriate the telos proper to its dialectical search, namely knowledge (epistêmê). This is signaled by Socrates’ dialectical recognition of his inability to provide an account of the difference between true opinion and knowledge, even though he is convinced that they are different. Logos’ investigation of the unknown must necessarily posit epistêmê as something “other” than the opinions, even the true opinions, with which it cloaks what is unknown in the guise of what is known. Socrates’ exhibition (epideixis) with Meno’s slave makes manifest, above all, that the condition for the movement of dialectic is the recognition of the difference between opinion and knowledge, a recognition that Meno’s soul is incapable of making. Meno’s failure to recognize this difference is tantamount to his failure to “recollect.” The decisive reason for this is Meno’s inability to make the effort necessary for learning. The motion in the soul that follows this effort and leads to learning, however, does not straight away yield the eidê and their interconnectedness, to which, presumably Meno’s and each of our souls already somehow have noetic “access.” What is decisive in this regard is rather the soul’s submitting to the necessity made apparent by the dialectical interrogation of its opinions in the face of the unknown, namely, that despite its logos somehow being related to the eidos of what is sought after and therefore unknown, the latter nevertheless remains unknown and therefore must be sought out. The search for the unknown that follows the soul’s submitting to the necessity of its own thought is called learning, and learning’s ultimate inability and therefore “failure” to cognize the telos of its learning is what I will argue is the proper lesson to be drawn from Plato’s Socrates’ telling (in the *Meno*) of the myth of recollection.

“The Contemporary Relevance of Aristotle’s Notion of Political Friendship” (Saturday 2:00, Room 6)

Noel Hubler, *Lebanon Valley College*, hubler@lvc.edu

Stephen Salkever analyzes the “Crisis in Democracy” as the contradiction between rule by the many and the goal of the common good (See Stephen Salkever, in Deutsch, ed.,

The Crisis of Liberal Democracy). Aristotle's theory of political friendship provides a way out of the paradox, along with important lessons for the maintenance of a democratic community, but we first have to understand the nature of political friendship, which has been a subject of scholarly debate (see Cooper, Annas, Irwin, Kostas, Miller, & Yack). The notion of political friendship has been clouded by attempts to define political friendship in terms of the three types of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Political friendship does not fit any of the types of personal friendship. Friendships are defined in terms of a shared good and unlike personal friendship, political friendship has common good of the city at its core. In order to act together for a common good, the citizens must all share the view that they have shared common good in mind, even if there are disputes about the best means to reach the end. Aristotle claims that political friendship is necessary and that it can be undermined by excess inequality in the state. Aristotle's notion of political friendship is key to overcoming the paradox Salkever raises. Citizens must recognize that they have a shared good, but such recognition is undermined by excess inequalities in a society.

“Socrates’ Account of his Own Wisdom” (Saturday 2:00, Room 7)

John Fredrick Humphrey, *North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University*,
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In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates distinguishes two sets of accusers: the first accusers and the later accusers (18 b). Although the first set of accusers did not actually bring the philosopher to court, Socrates attributes the following accusations to them: “Socrates does injustice and is meddlesome, by investigating the things under the earth and the heavenly things, and making the weaker speech the stronger, and by teaching others these same things” (19b-c). Socrates responds to these accusations by arguing that he is not the kind of person that Aristophanes makes him out to be, that he is not a teacher because he does not charge money, and that he does not corrupt the youth. After his second but before his third argument, Socrates poses the question, “Where have these slanders against you come from?” He responds to this question in a detour that gives an account of how he started philosophizing and how he understands his own ‘wisdom.’

In this paper, I will examine Socrates’ account of his own wisdom in the *Apology*. In particular, I will examine Socrates’ claim that the god has used his name in order to make him a paradigm, “as if he would say, “That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom” (23a-b). I will argue that Socrates is conscious of himself as the paradigm – indeed, a new paradigm of the rational human being. My paper is intended to shed light on Socratic wisdom and also Socrates’ concept of paradigms.

“Plato and the ‘Art of Antilogic’” (Sunday 9:00, Room 1)

Hugh Hunter, *University of Toronto*, hunter.hugh@gmail.com

Throughout the middle and later dialogues, Plato repeatedly mentions the ‘art of antilogic’ (antilogike techne) as a method characteristic of some, or perhaps all sophists. G. E. Kerferd made this clear, and speculated on what this art might have been, but philosophers have since found little to say about antilogic. Most strikingly, there has been very little consideration of an example of antilogic which Plato himself gives us, in the *Republic*.

In this paper I will subject this example to philosophical analysis, to arrive at two perhaps surprising conclusions. First, as Plato defines it, antilogic is a genuine philosophical method. As a method, it has a greater range than the elenchus. Whereas on a standard definition the elenchus merely points out contradictions in a person’s views, one could employ antilogic to learn new things. Unlike the elenchus, however, antilogic presumes a somewhat dubious and vague philosophical principle: that opposites (tanantia) cannot have the same properties. The principle is reminiscent of the Pythagorean tables of opposites. A reader assuming that Plato opposed all things sophistic might expect that Plato would reject this principle and the method that depends on it.

The second conclusion of my paper is that there is no Platonic rejection of antilogic. Indeed, there is little reason to think that Plato opposed the use of antilogic. Though he occasionally writes of it disapprovingly, his disapproval seems largely directed against antilogic in the hands of the young and philosophically undeveloped. And if we hold Plato to his own definition, Plato has his character Socrates employ antilogic on several occasions. Plato even seems to endorse the principle that opposites cannot have the same properties.

The immediate result of these conclusions should be to undermine our easy certainty that Plato was, in fact, opposed to all things sophistic. Though I won’t explore them in this paper, I think the problems raised in it may well inform a discussion of Plato’s understanding of contraries and contradictories, as well as his closeness to the Pythagorean cult.

“A Hegelian Reading of the Divided Line” (Sunday 11:15, Room 1)

Tim Hyde, *Stony Brook University*, TimHyde@compuserve.com

There are several traditional controversies concerning the divided line. The exact nature of the mathematical forms is, for instance, disputed. Here, as elsewhere, precisely what Platonic dialectic involves is uncertain. Nor is it sure how dialectic resolves the criticism Socrates has of geometry, nor even quite what the internal logic of his criticisms is. Lastly, quite how the line maps onto the allegory of the cave and analogy of the sun, as Plato tells us it does in some fashion, is not entirely clear. I argue that we can find an answer to these questions if one interprets the construction of the line phenomenologically. Just as Greek geometry is based on construction, so too the line. The line doesn’t just come in sections, it comes in four stages with later stages having more sections. It doesn’t just enumerate types of objects, but ever more complicated ways of looking at the same world. I argue that the ever more complicated divisions—first we have just a line, then a line divided into two, and then three, and so on—are based on

resources within our everyday experience that leads us to understand that an implicit knowledge of the forms and the existence of the form of the Good is the condition of possibility for the veridical experience we do in fact have. In this paper I concentrate on the changing but related nature of the sections at each stage of the Divided Line, changing natures that accounts for the interminable disputes as to the meaning of Eikasia among other things. I suggest that one can make an anachronistic analogy between the shortcomings of a pragmatic justification of empirical science and the third section of the line, and suggest that Platonic dialectics must in large part be a self-grounding methodological inquiry. Key to the construction of the line is that we start off with a line of a determinate length, and that is akin to saying that there is some determinate reality or that there is a form of the good. However, the length of the whole line which includes the visible can also be thought asymptotically in the last purely intelligible section of the line as one comes to methodologically analyze the procedure of the construction of the line as a whole.

I
J

“Aristotle on Courage as the mean” (Sunday 9:00, Room 4)

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Every body has a nebulous idea of what a courage is, but few realize that courage is a virtue as the mean state in the sphere of fear of death, especially in war; it is not having knowledge of fighting skills, nor having a hot temper as a motivation of fighting, but having a persistent, settled, and long-evident state of character. Because someone is assumed typically to possess this fixed state feels intermediate feelings, both fear and confidence, and acts well in war, he or she comes to be treated as among the goods of the life we praise. The courageous person is not a person who is so belligerent never disposed to feel fear. Instead, the courageous person is one who is disposed to feel confident when it is appropriate to do so and to lack confidence when lacking it is appropriate; the person who tends to be confident all the time is rash, and the one who tends to lack confidence all the time is coward.

The understanding of Aristotle view of courage as the mean has fueled a continuing debate. Some scholars reject the idea that courage is a virtue, since, in ancient time, courage might be regarded as a daily requirement instead of a virtue; courage would usually be depicted as a “burst” or sudden appearance of unexpected heroism or integrity; a courageous person is just as ready to serve for an unjust cause; an evil man with his evil purpose can also overcome fear and danger to fight.

Courage as a virtue is figured centrally more in classical than in modern thought. Homer thinks that living and dying with honor were the most important parts of being a hero, so being courageous is a virtue for hero and the society, showing Achilles has his courage with farsighted fighting skills emerged from anger and loyalty when he lost his friend. According to Plato, courage is the one of the four cardinal virtues, especially for soldiers, which is same as knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared.

According to Aristotle, however, courage is not knowledge, nor great skills to attain the goal of victory, but the mean state that is inward as second nature: “in feeling of fear and confidence the mean is courage. The excessively fearless person is nameless, and the one who is excessively confident is rash. The one who is excessive in fear and deficient in confidence is cowardly.” (*NE* 1107b3-4) This is why we can call a person courageous even if that person might flee to perspire nervously in battle or even if that person might be dampen by his failure.

I argue that by taking account of this dimension, Aristotle’s courage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* clarifies a virtue as the mean state. I think courage as the mean must be reassessed in focusing on the four features of the doctrine of the mean; (1) it is the mean state; (2) it is intermediate in feelings and actions; (3) it is relative to us; (4) it is chosen by practical wisdom. If we can get a grip on Aristotle’s view, then, the questions must be set and answered in terms of this paradigm: How does the courageous feel fear in a battle? How does we deflect the courageous from the rash? To give accounts of these answers, and of the diagnosis, are the objects of this paper.

“Aristotle’s Psychology in Contemporary Perspective” (Sunday 9:00 am, Room 7)
William Jawoski, *Fordham University*, jaworski@fordham.edu

Many philosophers have had the idea that Aristotle’s psychology has resources that could help us resolve problems in contemporary philosophy of mind and action theory. Over the past fifty years, however, Aristotle’s psychology has been interpreted in a variety of mutually inconsistent ways: as a form of substance dualism (Howard Robinson), a type of dual-attribute theory (Jonathan Barnes), an identity theory (Thomas Slakey), a functionalist theory (Edwin Hartman, Kathleen Wilkes, Marc Cohen), a form of neoparallelism (G.R.T. Ross), panpsychism (Myles Burnyeat), a view based on a strange ontology that is incoherent (Herbert Granger), a view that waffles between incoherence and nonreductive physicalism (Bernard Williams) – the list goes on. One explanation for this plurality of opinion is that our contemporary philosophical concepts are so thoroughly informed by post-Cartesian modes of thinking that they help us little in understanding a pre-Cartesian view. This would also explain why scholars who are capable of explaining Aristotle’s views with admirable clarity in Aristotle’s own terms often have difficulty bringing his ideas to bear on contemporary problems or evaluating the merits of those ideas over against their contemporary competitors. The result is that Aristotelian psychology has seldom been brought to bear on contemporary problems in a fruitful way. The goals of this paper are twofold. First, I aim to clear one of the obstacles that has stood in the way of bringing Aristotelian insights to bear on mind-body problems: confusion about what distinguishes hylomorphism from nonreductive physicalism and classic emergentism. Second, I present an argument in favor of hylomorphism, one that to my knowledge has never appeared in the literature. It appeals to work in biology and biological subdisciplines such as neuroscience.

“Plato and Practical Wisdom” (Saturday 2:00, Room 1)

Elizabeth Jelinek, *Vanderbilt University*, Elizabeth.j.jelinek@vanderbilt.edu

In the *Republic*, obtaining knowledge of the Form of the Good is the peak of the Philosopher-King's education. During the philosophers' training to become kings, they must turn away from the visible world and contemplate only Forms until they reach the Form of the Good. It is suggested that knowledge of the Form of the Good is what makes the philosopher a Philosopher-King, for those who come to know the Good "shall use it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens themselves" (540a).

The standard interpretation among contemporary scholars is consistent with the notion that gaining knowledge of the Form of the Good is the pivotal event that makes a philosopher into Philosopher-King. For example, Kraut says: "Such a person is in the best possible position to make wise political decisions; having understood the Forms, she can see more clearly than others what needs to be done in particular circumstances."¹⁴ Rowe suggests that it is knowledge of the Form of the Good that enables the Philosopher-King to "unerringly make correct choices."¹⁵

In this paper, I will argue for a view that departs radically from the long-held assumption that knowledge of the Form of the Good provides the Philosopher-King with the ability to rule. On the view I shall defend, the role of the Form of the Good is greatly demoted: I argue that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Form of the Good is in fact insufficient for the Philosopher-King to "unerringly make correct choices."¹⁶ Instead, I attribute to Plato a view that might seem quite un-Platonic: I claim that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Forms must be complemented with a type of "practical wisdom." Knowledge of the Forms provides the Philosopher-King with knowledge of ideal ends, but such knowledge is insufficient because it does not provide him/her with the "know-how" to judge the best possible actions to achieve those ends. I define "know-how" or "practical wisdom" as the ability to discern information about sensible-world circumstances and the capacity to choose the best sensible-world actions that will bring about ideal ends for each circumstance. Pace Kraut, it is not the case that the Philosopher-King can "see more clearly than others what needs to be done in particular circumstances" by virtue of his knowledge of the Form of the Good.¹⁷

My proposal that the Philosopher-King uses practical wisdom may seem at odds with the text, given that the subject of practical wisdom is the sensible world, and the Philosopher-King is trained to turn away from the sensible world and instead contemplate only Forms themselves, "moving through Forms and ending in Forms" (511c). I demonstrate that the Philosopher-King can be plausibly understood as engaging in both

¹⁴ Kraut, Richard. "The Defense of Justice in Plato's *Republic*." *Plato's Republic: Critical Essays*. Edited by Richard Kraut. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997. p 209.

¹⁵ Rowe, Christopher. "The Form of the Good and the Good in Plato's *Republic*." *Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato's Republic*. Edited by Douglas Cairns, Fritz-Gregor Herrman, and Terry Penner. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. p. 133.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Kraut 1997, 209.

activities if we interpret the Philosopher-King as a type of craftsman; specifically, the type of craftsman that is described in the *Phaedrus*. If my argument succeeds, then I will have undermined standard interpretations of the role of the Form of the Good in a Philosopher-King's education.

“Why Bad Men Cannot Be Friends: Ignorance and Love for the Good in Plato's *Lysis*”
(Sunday 11:15, Room 4)

David Jennings, *Boston University*, davidleejennings@gmail.com

The central question of Plato's *Lysis* is who or what is the friend. Since this dialogue is aporetic, no definition of the friend escapes refutation. Nevertheless, at least one negative conclusion stands firm: Socrates never abandons the idea that bad men cannot be friends to the good (214d6). In fact, once established, he uses this as a principle by which to support or reject the definitions of the friend he goes on to consider. In my paper, I show first that Socrates' arguments for this principle in the *Lysis* are consistent with some of the fundamental commitments of his moral psychology, despite an apparent contradiction, and second that seeing badness as ignorance provides us with a good reason for thinking bad men cannot be friends.

Socrates' most basic reason for holding that bad men cannot be friends is that the bad men do not desire the good (217c1). But this principle apparently contradicts another, more basic Socratic principle: that all human beings love and desire the good (see, for instance, *Rep.* 505d-e, *Gorg.* 468c). We can avoid this contradiction, I argue, by pairing two separate conclusions found in the *Lysis*. On the one hand, Socrates argues that understanding (*epistēmē*) is required to connect what we desire with what is actually good for us (see 210b; compare *Gorg.* 466eff). On the other, he argues that the bad man has the full presence of ignorance: he lacks wisdom and understanding without realizing it (218a). As a result, the bad man desires what merely appears good but is in fact bad. Measured by what he achieves, then, and not what he wishes for, the bad man does not love the good.

Seeing badness as a form of ignorance nicely explains why the bad man cannot be a friend: his ignorance prevents him from realizing his dependence on others for his wellbeing. To be a friend, one must see that he needs others (215b) and that their wellbeing is linked to his own. Socrates' account of friendly love (*philia*) reflects this linkage. For him, we love others only insofar as they are useful (210c), but loving them means wishing for and trying to bring about their happiness (207e). Because bad men fail to understand the value of other's interests to their own, they cannot love or be friends to anyone. Instead of working toward common goods, they seek only their own good without regard for that of others. Hence, bad men do injustice to whomever they meet (214b). By contrast, those who recognize both their own limitations and their need for others are suited best for friendship. Since philosophy involves a similar type of recognition (218b), Socrates suggests the philosopher is the true friend of the good.

“Divine Causation in Aristotle” (Sunday 11:15, Room 5)

Anthony K. Jensen, *Xavier University*, jensena@xavier.edu

Under which of Aristotle's four causes does the causality of the first mover most appropriately fit? While this has long been an issue in Aristotle scholarship, I wish to challenge specifically the interpretive strategies of Sarah Broadie, on the one hand, and Gregory Vlastos and G.E.R. Lloyd on the other. Broadie has put forth a rather unique and controversial view which denies that the prime mover's causal efficacy could be grounded in its essential activity of contemplation. The prime mover is essentially an efficient cause of motion, she claims, on the grounds of *Physics* Book VIII; Aristotle's remarks that illustrate the prime mover as divinely contemplative Nous in *Metaphysics* Lambda really ought to be understood as an exegetical construct. Broadie's contention here challenges the widely accepted views of Vlastos and Lloyd, versions of which date back to the commentaries of Aquinas, Alexander of Aphrodisias and possibly to the Lyceum itself. On this 'standard interpretation', the type of causation Aristotle has in mind for his first mover is essentially that of final cause—or perhaps as an exemplary cause. By means of its divine action, which this interpretation takes to be the eternally active contemplation of its own thoughts, the prime mover invokes the wonder of the first sphere of the heavens, compelling the sphere to emulate its perfectly divine action. It does not, however, and could not affect motion efficiently.

In my own attempt to clarify these points of discrepancy, I shall advance the view that Broadie's interpretation is overly dismissive on points where she thinks Aristotle is merely being illustrative rather than explanatory. I shall maintain that while there are genuine problems in taking the prime mover as both the efficient cause of motion and as an eternally self-contemplating divine entity that is itself also the exemplary cause of motion, these problems do not warrant her conclusion that Aristotle is merely being exegetical in *Metaphysics* Lambda. On the other hand, Vlastos and Lloyd do not escape Broadie's objections to the doctrine of the contemplative divinity. My original suggestion is that, in interpreting the prime mover's type of causation, we look first not to the prime mover itself but to the various classifications of objects that fall under its causal influence. I argue that Aristotle had both efficient and final modes of causality in mind in describing his ultimate principal, but that the causal modes themselves were each appropriate to different classifications of objects. Animate self-movers are caused by their object of desire and intellect as that for the sake of which they move. Inanimate entities, because they have no faculty of desire and the nothing 'for the sake of which' their motion is internally produced, are only moved from without by an efficient mover. Should my suggestion be correct, it opens a new way to solve this longstanding tension in the scholarship.

"Contradictory Pairs in *De Interpretatione*" (Saturday 2:00, Room 11)

Russell Jones, *University of Oklahoma*, rustyjones@ou.edu

In *De Interpretatione* 7, Aristotle discusses statements which are made non-universally about universals: statements like 'Man is white (*esti leukos anthropos*)' and 'Man is not white (*ouk esti leukos anthropos*)'. It has been fairly common to take these as indefinite

statements: ‘A man is white’ and ‘A man is not white’. On this reading, these appear to be the contradictories of ‘No man is white’ and ‘All men are white’. Against this view, Whitaker argues that the subjects of these statements are universals, so that ‘Man is white’ and ‘Man is not white’ are predicating whiteness and non-whiteness of a universal, namely, *man*. I argue that there are serious problems with both of these accounts; neither can account for the explicit things Aristotle says about statements which are made non-universally about universals. In their place, I offer an interpretation according to which such statements are indeterminate. Their indeterminacy explains a number of puzzling features, including how such statements as ‘Man is white’ and ‘Man is not white’ can be contradictories and yet both true at the same time.

K

“Necessary Being in Ibn Rushd’s Tripartite Model” (Saturday 9:00, Room 10)
Shalahudin Kafrawi, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*, skafrawi@gmail.com

This paper will consider Ibn Rushd’s tripartite paradigm of truth: demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical. It will then use the paradigm to examine the characteristic features of Necessary Being in Islamic philosophy, Islamic theology and Qur’anic literal significance. It will primarily focus on whether the Necessary Being of philosophy is in conflict with that in theology or that in Qur’anic literal sense. I will present the arguments he put forward in defense of his thesis that demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical truths are not in conflict and that Qur’anic texts that appear to be in conflict with demonstrative or dialectical truth should be allegorically interpreted with some clarifying examples from the Qur’an. Departing from this stance, I argue that the Medieval controversy on the function and nature of Necessary Being in Islamic cosmogony stemmed from their exclusive view of truth.

“Aristotle, Liberalism, and the Common Advantage” (Saturday 9:00, Room 5)
Irfan Khawaja, *Felician College*, khawajai@felician.edu
Carrie-Ann Biondi, *Marymount Manhattan College*, cbiondi@mmm.edu

Contemporary Aristotelian theorists are locked in a debate over whether Aristotle’s work can contribute to rather than compete with or replace liberal political theory. Fred Miller argues yes; Alasdair MacIntyre argues no. MacIntyre famously draws on Aristotle in *After Virtue* as part of his project of providing an alternative to what he rightfully sees as the bankrupt moral pluralism and confusion of liberalism. However, we maintain—as does Miller in *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics*—that MacIntyre is mistaken to think that Aristotelianism and liberalism are at odds with one another. Rather, liberalism can gain much from Aristotle’s thought, especially about the common advantage.

It is crucial to understand what Aristotle means by the common advantage and the private advantage and how he conceives of the proper relationship between the individual and political society before knowing whether or not his thought is compatible with

liberalism. We shall thus examine Aristotle's discussions of both the common advantage in the context of correct versus incorrect constitutions in *Politics* and the nature of the individual's good in *Nicomachean Ethics*. This will be done in the context of explaining, assessing, and revising Miller's taxonomy for characterizing the debate over Aristotle on the common advantage. We argue that although Miller's taxonomy is a useful initial heuristic, it has two significant difficulties that impede further progress in this debate: (1) the basic organizing principle rests on a blurring of the egoism-altruism distinction that Aristotle in fact maintains, and (2) there are an insufficient number and type of subcategories to capture adequately and keep distinct the possible positions in this debate. Refining Miller's insights will clear the way for challenging MacIntyre's thesis that Aristotelianism and liberalism are incompatible.

There are three interrelated components of MacIntyre's understanding of an Aristotelian common advantage which lead him to think that it is incompatible with liberalism. These components are: (1) the self is socially constituted, (2) the private is pleonectic, and (3) the concept of rights is illegitimate in pursuit of the human good. We maintain that all of these claims are in some way mistaken and that Aristotelianism is both compatible with (and necessary for) a defensible version of liberalism. Ultimately, we suggest that a rationally grounded view of the good life along Aristotelian lines supports a liberal individualist conception of the common advantage as the maintenance of liberty, properly understood.

“Islamic Notion of Rights of Civilians During War” (Saturday 11:15, Room 10)
Achim Koeddermann, *SUNY Oneonta*, koeddea@oneonta.edu

This paper begins by a summary of the basic Islamic legal theories with regards to the rights of civilians during war. In addition it compares the logic of the arguments as well as the implicit presuppositions of Islamic doctrines in question with the corresponding Western European medieval views on protections of civilians. In conclusion the paper reflects on the possibility of a trans-cultural vision of legal theory in light of a Kantian doctrine of universality of the rational basis of morals.

“Aristotle's Ergon and the Family: Human Flourishing in Human Families” (Sunday 11:15, Room 3)
Andrew Komasinski, *Fordham University*, Komasinski@fordham.edu

In this paper, I look at two different ways that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) relates to children. First, I argue for a perspicuous interpretation of the ergon argument in BK I. With this, I argue that for Aristotle eudaimonia could not be achieved for human biological life outside of a family. Second, I argue that while children are not eligible for eudaimonia there are good Aristotelian grounds for suggesting they can possess a certain type of flourishing (and possibly ethical life) which sees as its outcome growth and development into the sort of adult who could have eudaimonia.

EN begins with the reasonable claim that all human action seeks some goal or end which is the good (*EN* 1094a1). As Aristotle later states in Book I, ‘flourishing’ or eudaimonia is the one end or goal that all of our actions seek (1097b20-25). In its initial formulation, Aristotle states his thesis perspicuously, a term to which I will return as the sort of life which all seek. As Aristotle’s argument continues, he clarifies ‘flourishing,’ as the right function of the soul (1098a9). Aristotle immediately qualifies this by saying it is the “activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (Ibid). This conditioning of the soul’s activity by reason is the basis of ethics for Aristotle.

I argue that the broad notion of human function described at *EN* I.VII. 1098a1-4 should be as perspicuous as Aristotle’s beginning suggests but occur in such a mode as to be guided by reason. To indicate the beneficial outcome of this account, I focus on its superior ability to integrate our biological end as animals and the idea of animal flourishing into a rationally-mediated affection in human families, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the possibility of eudaimonia.

After developing this account, I will apply the perspicuous notion of the human ergon to Aristotle’s treatment of affection and the family in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and will argue that Aristotle’s statements about the family and affection imply that one could not achieve eudaimonia outside of the family and thereby imply that Aristotle supports the same perspicuous line that I suggested as my thesis.

“Buddhist Contributions to the Question of (Un)mediated Mystical Experience”
(Saturday 2:00, Room 9)

Yaroslav Komarovski, *University of Nebraska - Lincoln*, ykomarovski@gmail.com

It is true that virtually all Mahayana thinkers treat the highest ultimate reality and its direct realization as ineffable and transcending words and concepts. Nevertheless, the ineffability of the ultimate implies neither its similarity across different systems nor its accessibility. As some critics rightly observed, interpreters of mysticism can be misled by similar-sounding descriptions of mystical experience as ineffable, inexpressible, transcendent, sublime, and so forth. Even within one and the same Buddhist culture, such as Tibetan, in the context of discussion of the same system, such as Madhyamaka, Buddhist thinkers offer multiple and contradictory interpretations of ineffable ultimate reality. They also conceive different ways of accessing the ultimate, and hold dissimilar opinions on the process of transition from its conceptual understanding to its direct realization. Likewise, the direct realization of ultimate reality can be described as having content or being contentless and having no object at all. Because the direct realization of ultimate reality occupies the place of paramount importance in Buddhism, it comes as no surprise that Buddhist thinkers tend to argue that such interpretations do not just describe the same reality in different ways, but actually shape mental processes in such a way that some of them can grant access to direct realization of that reality while others, being wrong and misleading, only obscure it.

L

“Hearing Voices: Socrates and His Daimonion” (Saturday 4:15, Room 2)

Anna Lännström, *Stonehill College*, alannstrom@stonehill.edu

Socrates seems to be deeply committed to reason, and he famously expresses this commitment in the *Crito*: “We must ... examine whether we should act in this way [that you suggest] or not, as not only now but at all times I am the kind of man who listens only to the argument that on reflection seems best to me” (46b). But in the *Apology*, he says that his most important actions (and inactions) are done in obedience to divine authority, or more precisely a divine sign: “I have a divine or spiritual sign [theion te kai daimonion] ... This began when I was a child. It’s a voice [phônê], and whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do” (*Apology* 31d-e). The two seem to be inconsistent. How can Socrates both obey the voice of God and act only based on the basis of reason and argument?

Scholars have proposed a number of different solutions which save Socrates from inconsistency while ensuring that his commitment to God can be subsumed under the flag of reason. Following Brickhouse and Smith, I identify the following four as the most prevalent:

- Socrates isn’t really obeying God at all; talk about gods and signs is just metaphorical or ironic.
- The signs from the God are so vague that they leave Socrates’ reason free reign to find a reasonable interpretation.
- Socrates has empirical reasons to trust divine signs, so his trust in them is rational. (This is Brickhouse and Smith’s own solution)
- Socrates has already established through reasoning what God is like. Based upon his knowledge of God, he has concluded that he can trust God and that he should obey his commands. Thus, his trust in God is itself rational.

Either Socrates isn’t really obeying God, or he is obeying the divine sign only because he knows that the sign is trustworthy. In either case, his commitment to his own reason remains intact. I accept Brickhouse and Smith’s criticisms of the other solutions, but I argue that their own solution also has problems. I argue that trying to save Socrates’ commitment to reason might be a mistake because Socrates’ commitment to God is not as rational as we would like to think. When faced with a choice between using his reason and obeying God, Socrates obeys God and he simply trusts that doing so is for the best. I deny that this means that Socrates contradicts himself and suggest that the scope of his remarks in the *Crito* is limited; it only applies to situations when God is silent, not to all situations.

“The Cause of Human Conceit in Plato, Epictetus, and Proclus” (Saturday 2:00, Room 7)
Danielle A. Layne, *De Wulf-Mansion Centrum, Catholic University Leuven*,
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In the Platonic dialogues, it is generally considered self-evident that when it comes to moral terms such as justice, piety and temperance, Plato abhorred the pretense to

knowledge more than mere ignorance. In fact, Plato's repugnance and condemnation of pretense was observed in several of his inheritors. Recognizing that Socrates abhorred the conceit to knowledge over general ignorance, the Stoic Epictetus wrote that the first business of philosophy is "to part with self-conceit."¹⁸ In the Neo-Platonist Proclus, the reprehensible state of "double ignorance", i.e. the ignorance of ignorance combined with pretense and conceit, is continuously associated with error and evil. Notably then, for Plato, Epictetus and Proclus, conceit versus a mere lack of knowing obstructs the masses of men from virtue and the good life. Yet, an important question looms: How is it that so many err in this way or, to restate the problem, why do almost all men arrogantly believe they know virtue when they do not? In response to this, Proclus expands on Plato's theory of recollection and refers to the concept of innate notions in the soul. Despite a desire for the good and happy life, the majority become excited by the mere representations of the good corresponding to their unconscious possession of the essential reasons or logoi.¹⁹ Aware of this correspondence, most men fail to examine or articulate their vague remembrances carefully, deeming these faint impressions to be perfect. Hereby, they "acquire twofold ignorance under the impression that through such notions they possess knowledge."²⁰ Similarly, Epictetus, while never invoking the theory of recollection, also argued that human conceit arose from a perversion of an innate understanding of the virtues; what he called "pre-conceptions." The Stoic emphasizes that men come into the world without preconceptions of mathematical things such as triangles or hemitones in music, but learn all of these things through instruction. Epictetus argued that since men do not have a pre-conception of these things they are not naturally inclined to "form any conceit of understanding them." Yet, in the case of "good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and improper," all men use these names because "we come instructed in some degree by nature upon these subjects...". Strikingly, in accord with both Epictetus' and Proclus' conclusions, dialogues like the *Meno*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus* and the *Philebus*, also allude to the idea that human conceit arises from the exposure, possession and even remembrance of the divine ideas. For example, consider the *Republic* where Socrates explicitly blames a latent knowledge of the virtues for the corruption of the philosophic nature. In this context, the mere presence of temperance, justice or wisdom in the souls of particular citizens leads to false vanity and sinfulness through the improper training and the warrantless flattery of the masses.²¹ Ultimately, this cursory glance of the works of Plato, Epictetus and Proclus evidences how the origin of human conceit warrants an examination. In this paper what shall be questioned is whether one of the most shame-worthy conditions in the Platonic tradition springs from the same well as the good.

"A Rivalry Dissolved: Plato's Reappraisal of Medicine's Standing in the *Laws*"
(Saturday 4:15, Room 3)

¹⁸ EPICTETUS, *Discourses* 3.27.

¹⁹ Cf. PROCLUS, *In I Alc.*, 135.

²⁰ PROCLUS, *In I Alc.*, 189.

²¹ See PLATO, *Republic* 491b.

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Commentators often assume that Plato's stance involving medicine is uniform throughout the dialogues. In fact, developments in Plato's construction of medicine continue to the end of his life and are deeply intertwined with shifts in his view of philosophy and its role—or lack thereof—in the best community that human nature allows. Plato's securing of philosophy's primacy on questions of phusis and eudaimonia in the period up through the *Republic* centrally includes critical engagement with poetry, sophistry, and medicine. This agôn is conducted via the *Gorgias*' technê framework, whose strict criteria poetry and sophistry never meet. In contrast, having overtly valorized medicine as a technê in the *Gorgias*, Plato opposes its preeminence in the *Symposium* and is committed by implication to withdraw its very standing as a technê in the *Republic*.

Plato's rivalries with poets and sophists continue in the *Laws*. Strikingly, however, the doctor is not presented there as competing with any official emblematic of Platonic constructions of virtue and flourishing. Why is this particular dispute over governing authority vis-à-vis phusis and eudaimonia put to rest, even as others continue? I argue that Plato's view in the *Laws*, contra the *Republic*, that even the best natures are corruptible—and hence that no praxis can function any longer as a technê à la philosophia in Kallipolis—is the archê from which pertinent changes with a bearing on medicine stem. Even as Plato's estimation of what the finest human beings are capable of declines, his confidence in ordinary citizens' abilities is enhanced. The *Laws*' provisions for maintaining unity—salient among which is citizens' marked responsibility for the detection of injustice—take the weight off moments of medical decision making as the junctures where assessments of the whole person, including the soul, must be made. The *Gorgias*' valorization of medicine as a technê coexists uneasily with Plato's recognition there that considerations of justice sometimes dictate not treating a patient where medical aid is practicable. In the *Republic*, facility in discerning what is and is not dunaton in medical practice was insufficient since in a range of cases one must pose the further question of whether what is possible is best—and this role is something that physicians as a class were categorically unable to assume. Since health-related judgments in Magnesia can focus on ta dunata involving bodily conditions without also addressing whether “the possible” is also optimal from a broader standpoint, medicine can reassume the self-sufficiency and technê status that it had lost in the *Republic*'s scheme—now, however, without the tension that had lodged the *Gorgias*' encomium on shaky ground.

“Seneca and Heloise” (Saturday 9:00, Room 8)

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Heloise's intellectual ties to the Stoic Lucius Annaeus Seneca were intimate and profound. She cited him more often than any other pagan writer and went so far as to call him the greatest of all the ancient philosophers. From his letters to Lucilius in particular, she derived not only a model for her own prose and a way of speaking about philosophy in the context of personal experience but also the substance of her ethical theory of friendship, the notion of “moral indifferents” employed to crucial effect in her outline of

a proposed monastic rule, and — perhaps most dramatically — the image of the philosophical life as a heroic enterprise, single-minded in its object, austere in its practice, and thrilling in the rhetoric surrounding it. (It is this image, above all, that informs her famous argument against marriage, quoted at length in Abelard's *Historia Calamitatum*.) I argue that Heloise also found in Seneca the philosophical basis on which to set such heroics aside, rejecting both physical and ethical austerity and religious perfectionism for the Stoic values of sufficiency, moderation, and discretion, grounded in natural decorum. In her second letter to Abelard, she set out these values as the foundation for a personal ethic; in her third, she extended them as the institutional underpinnings of the convent of the Paraclete. I also argue (pace John Marenbon 1997) that when Abelard took a similar turn in his own later work, he was both prompted by Heloise and specifically following her lead.

“Socrates and the Poets” (Saturday 11:15, Room 3)

Donald Lindenmuth, *The Pennsylvania State University*, dcl1@psu.edu

In this paper I approach Socrates' speech in the *Symposium* as a response to Aristophanes and Agathon as well as a presentation of a defense of Socratic philosophy that agrees with but brings out more effectively than Plato's *Apology* of Socrates could do what that defense at its deepest level would have to be.

I present Socrates' interrogation of Agathon, the recently crowned head of the rhetoric and sophistry of the new poetry and the poetic conceit of Diotima interrogating Socrates as Plato's way of having Socrates not only respond to Agathon but also to Aristophanes, the leader of his old accusers. Unlike the *Apology* of Socrates, which occurs in the most public of settings, the presence of Socrates with the poets, Agathon and Aristophanes, is one of the most private settings. And in the *Symposium* Socrates can freely show the importance of eros in philosophy, which he must abstract from in the *Apology*.

In the case of Agathon, logos is presented as omnipotent, when embodied in poetical and rhetorical mastery. Unlike Aristophanes, who centers on the failure of logos to articulate or lead to wholeness, Agathon like Socrates is an advocate of logos, a consummate artist of the look (idea) of the human at its best. Socrates is portrayed in the *Symposium* as engaged in dialogue with Agathon but never shown directly to engage in dialogue with Aristophanes. Agathon is in his emphasis on logos closer to and even an image and competitor of Socrates, while Aristophanes' reliance on deeds rather than speeches, which is meant to reveal the defective nature of the human in its absurd attempts to achieve a wholeness by either speech or action, sees himself as Socrates' and Agathon's superior in human wisdom.

Socrates responds to the opposition of the poets by agreeing with Aristophanes and disagreeing with Agathon in a special way that justifies philosophy as more effective speech than the poetic speech of either of his adversaries. In doing so Socrates reveals a deeper level of similarity between philosophizing and excellence than he could afford to bring out in the *Apology*. His speech also provides the basis for Socratic emphasis on logos, as intermediary between Aristophanes' mythic presentation of the failure of logos

to achieve wholeness and Agathon's portrayal of poetic logos as the supreme maker of wholeness.

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“Plotinus and Indian Thought: a Search for Universals” (Saturday 4:15, Room 8)
Deepa Majumdar, *Purdue University North Central*, dmajumda@pnc.edu

The discourse on Plotinus and Indian thought and its larger context of Neoplatonism and Indian philosophy are embedded in the complex historical backgrounds of colonialism and post-colonialism. The fact that the broader arguments for and against “eastern sources of Plotinus’ thought” were equated with those for and against the “purity” of Plotinus’ philosophy is telling, for it points not only to pervasive intellectual prejudices in the underlying colonial mindset, but also to stereotypes of eastern spirituality and mysticism. Such condescension, while foreseeable, is never justifiable. Thus it has been decried by critics, both eastern and western. Pervasive prejudices underlie much of the twentieth century discussion as well, resulting in a mutual insularity of east from west in the scholarship on Plotinus and India – a limitation that threatens to catapult us into the artificial gap between east and west.

Bréhier, whose work is a milestone in this discourse, does not deny Plotinus’ obvious Hellenism, but asks if the problems Plotinus raises – in particular, that of understanding “how a distinct individuality could proceed from the universal being and how it can be reabsorbed into it” – comes from “outside the Hellenic tradition.” Bréhier is led to seek the source of the philosophy of Plotinus beyond the Orient close to Greece, in the religious speculations of India, which, by the time of Plotinus had been founded, for centuries, on the *Upanis,ads*. Yet, as has been pointed out in recent scholarship, there are “formidable obstacles” to truly investigating the relationship between Indian and Greek philosophies. Nevertheless, the discourse on Plotinus and India has come a long way since these early speculations of Bréhier. Comparative studies have probed into the substance of the two traditions, demonstrating a common conceptual ground, thus corroborating earlier estimations of the possibility of a general impact of Indian thought on Neoplatonism.

That there are noteworthy historical parallelisms between Plotinus and Indian thought has already been noted by Mayer, Hatab, and others. In this paper, I steer away from the question of whether Plotinus was influenced by Vedantic theology, to an exploration of these fascinating parallelisms, which lend credence to the faith-laden insight that immanent consciousness, in its universal aspect, is governed by epochal thought patterns, disguised in myriad cultural garbs. I compare the *Enneads* of Plotinus (ca A.D. 204-270) with representative texts from Vedanta, like some of the *Upanis,ads* and the *Bhagavadgita*. I focus on the nature of the First Principle – especially its degrees of monism and omnipresence. My purpose is, on the one hand, to distinguish between broader spiritual parallelisms and technical differences between the two bodies of works, and on the other, to reflect on which of these two (parallelisms versus technical differences) lends more meaning to human existence and experience.

“Plato’s Poetry, Plato’s Poem” (Saturday 9:00, Room 3)
Anne Mamary, Monmouth College, annem@monm.edu

At the end of his life, Plato’s Socrates composed poetry, saying:

In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams “that I should make music.” The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: make and cultivate music, said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has always been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this, as the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that I should be safer if I satisfied the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, composed a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honor of the god of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet or maker, should not only put some words together but make stories, and as I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and knew, and turned them into verse. (*Phaedo*)

As a fable is intended to provide a moral or political message, often hidden in the story’s unfolding and the character’s development, so, too, are Plato’s dialogues. It is through the artfulness of each that a reader or listener might reflect on his or her life and the state of his or her own character. In *Republic*, Book III, Socrates says:

Musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad....

This paper will attempt to reconcile these passages with the fate of the poets in the *Republic*, who, anointed and praised, are led to the limits of the city. I will argue that, like Plato’s Socrates, the poets-- the philosophical poets—and poetry, will refuse exile. Plato allows for this possibility when he makes a challenge to poetry, as if there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy. Socrates say in *Republic*, Book X,

“Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she make a defense of herself in lyrical or some other metre?” Plato also invites lovers of poetry to make an apology, writing,

And may we further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, I mean if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

I shall argue that Plato makes both defenses. In the form of his fable-like character, Socrates, who sets Aesop’s fables to verse, Plato makes a world that, through delight, ennobles humanity. In the form of his nuanced, ironic, opaque sorcerer, Socrates, Plato writes a poem, both beautiful and good.

“Causation, agency, and law in Antiphon: On some subtleties in the second *Tetralogy*”
(Saturday 11:15, Room 6)

Joel E. Mann, *St. Norbert College*, joel.mann@snc.edu

In his magisterial study, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Jonathan Barnes considers the refinements made by the early Greek sophists to the related concepts of cause and responsibility. Barnes judges Gorgias’ *Helen* to have dealt “in philosophical depth with the issue of responsibility,” in apparent contrast to Antiphon’s second *Tetralogy*, which, presumably, does not (524). The *Tetralogy* itself comprises four speeches, two each by an imaginary plaintiff and a fictitious defendant. Certain facts are undisputed. In the course of an athletic contest among youths of training age, the defendant threw his javelin with the intention of hitting the prescribed target. Instead, the javelin hit a young man charged with picking up grounded javelins, who died instantly. The plaintiff pleads with the jury to find the thrower *aitios*, or responsible, for his son’s death, while the defense maintains that the thrower is not responsible by virtue of the fact that, though he threw his javelin, he did not kill the deceased.

According to Barnes, the problem is that, like the English “responsible,” there are two distinct uses of the Greek adjective *aitios*—a causal and an evaluative—and Antiphon fails to recognize the difference. To illustrate: a bus driver may play a causal role in bringing about an injury to a pedestrian but may not be evaluatively responsible for it, as might be the case if the injured attempted to cross the street against the pedestrian traffic signal. This example is particularly salient to Antiphon’s second *Tetralogy*, which turns on the question of responsibility for unintentional harm. According to Barnes, Antiphon’s defendant should have made the argument we would supply for the bus driver. Instead, the defendant “argues, bizarrely, that his client did not kill the youth at all, that he is not causally *aitios*. The correct defense, that the boy is causally but not morally *aitios* [moral responsibility being a species of the evaluative], was apparently too subtle for Antiphon” (524). If true, this is especially embarrassing for

Antiphon and his defendant, who at several points in the *Tetralogy* flags the subtlety (akribeia) of his argument (3.2.1-2, 3.4.2). But embarrassment may well be Antiphon's due. Since Barnes published his remarks, other influential commentators have concurred, whether consciously or not, with his assessment that the defense denies its causal role in the death.

I maintain, pace Barnes, that in the second *Tetralogy* Antiphon has the distinction between causal and moral responsibility in full view. But I accept also that Antiphon's defense fails to make the argument Barnes thinks he should have. I show that this is due not to any lack of subtlety on Antiphon's part, but rather to his more general interest in identifying competing species of responsibility and posing difficult questions regarding their kinship (questions that, it should be added, are still much debated in contemporary philosophy of law). In short, Antiphon is concerned not with determining who is responsible for the killing but rather with analyzing the conditions under which it is correct to say that one person has killed another. The project is neither bizarre nor beside the point; it identifies and investigates fundamental assumptions about action and ethics. If I am correct, then Antiphon is remarkable for having drawn fine distinctions between confusing and oft-confused concepts, and the arguments he makes in the second *Tetralogy* are subtle indeed.

“Painting, Image and Metaphor in Plato's *Republic*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 3)

Brian Marrin, *Boston University*, bmarrin@bu.edu

In book X at 596a-602e Socrates gives an account of painting as a kind of faulty imitation of individual physical objects and so as twice separated from the reality of the intelligible form. Earlier in the dialogue, however, he had several times (472d-e, 497e-488a, 500c-501c) described painting differently, as in fact attaining a greater beauty and truth than possible in particular objects. I begin by examining these various passages in the attempt to articulate this alternate account of painting—one, in fact, that agrees largely with various statements of Plato's near contemporaries. While these passages do not present a completely coherent account of the metaphysical status of the image, they do support this inversion of the relation between image and object, and suggest an important distinction between the use of image as representation and as metaphor. As metaphor, the image is an analogical correspondent to, rather than a literal resemblance of, its object, and as such is outside the schema of original and image from book X. Though it receives no special name, metaphor plays a key role in the dialogue. In fact, the passages in question all use painting as a metaphor to explain the dialogue's activity of founding a “city in speech” and so invite us to consider its status as image. Based on a detailed analysis of these passages the “city in speech” turns out to fit both descriptions: it is a metaphor for the soul and the blueprint for the legislator (the “painter of constitutions,” 501c) to copy. I argue that the context of the critique of painting and imitation at 596a-602e encourages us to apply its schema to the city in speech and to draw the conclusion that the attempt to realize it through legislation is equivalent to the faulty imitation of painting, leaving it to serve only its original purpose as metaphor for the soul. In concluding, I suggest some

possible answers to the question why the dialogue should present two such inconsistent accounts of painting as it does.

“Aristotle’s Manner of Inquiry in Political Manners” (Saturday 4:15, Room 10)

Greg McBrayer, *University of Maryland*, gmcbrayer@gvpt.umd.edu

Many have argued, based on the problematic nature of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that the work is not a whole. Indeed, Aristotle writes in a particularly perplexing manner, hesitating, hedging, and even contradicting himself. Aristotle’s contradictions and peculiarities in argument are often found within the same book, often within the same chapter, and sometimes even within the space of a few lines. I will also argue that these perplexities are not the result of carelessness but are carefully and deliberately made. Additionally, I will offer some suggestions as to why Aristotle would have chosen to write in this deliberately perplexing manner. There are at least four reasons that explain why Aristotle wrote in a deliberately perplexing manner: first, to avoid persecution; next, to protect salutary opinions; third, for the sake of education; and, lastly, as a result of the necessary incompleteness of human knowledge.

“Woundedness and political community in the *Iliad*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 8)

Marina McCoy, *Boston College*, mccoyma@bc.edu

My paper will examine the philosophy of vulnerability, both physical and moral, through the looking at passages in Homer’s *Iliad* that feature woundedness. Special attention will be given to Achilles’ heel, the site of his humanity and the limits of his divine origins in offering his protection, Agamemnon’s fear in looking at his own bleeding wound, and the occasion when Achilles bandages his friend Patroclus’ wound. My argument will look at ways in which the Homeric view presents vulnerability (literally, in its Latin roots, the capacity for woundedness as both a “weakness” and the location of our humanity and interconnectedness with one another. Vulnerability is the “site” of human interdependence and community in the *Iliad*.

“Plato on the Value of Work” (Saturday 4:15, Room 3)

Catherine McKeen, *Williams College*, cam3@williams.edu

Philosophers, during Plato’s time, were commonly regarded as lazy idlers who did not contribute materially to society. In Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, for example, the character Socrates praises the Clouds for their patronage of philosophers. *The Clouds* are, according to Aristophanes’ Socrates, “great goddesses for idle men, who provide us with notions and dialectic and mind, and marvel-telling and circumlocution and [rhetorical] striking and seizing” (*Aristophanes’ Clouds*, trans. Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West, Cornell University Press, 1998; lines 316-318.) And at 330 and following,

Aristophanes' Socrates classes philosophers with "sophists, Thurian diviners...idle long-haired onyx-ring-wearers...imposters and idle do-nothings".

Of course Aristophanes' picture of philosophical idleness is caricature and comedic excess, but we can find anti-work attitudes in Plato's own texts. At *Republic* 495e, for example, Plato disparages those whose "minds [are] as cramped and crushed by their mechanical lives as their bodies are deformed by manual trades (banusias)" (trans. Desmond Lee). *Laws* 741e also warns against the detrimental effects of banusiastic labor. On the other hand, occupational specialization provides the main structural skeleton for the *Republic's* kallipolis. Work determines the organization of the polis. Work is the primary determinant of what sort of life any given kallipolis citizen will have. Work determines education, culture, property, family life, etc. So, work has some value for Plato, but does work only have value as an instrumental good? That is, is work only valuable because it provides the necessary conditions for a polis? Or does work have some further value for Plato?

Plato's retelling of the myth of the Golden Age seems to show work as having only instrumental value. In the *Statesman* and in the *Laws*, Plato (like Hesiod before him) imagines a Golden Age in which human beings are not required to work. In this Golden Age, food is so plentiful that no human effort is needed to provide for sustenance. No effort is needed to provide for shelter or clothing. Moreover, the Golden Age world is a peaceful world so humans need not protect themselves against animals or other human beings. Plato recognizes that, in such a world, human beings have no technai (*Statesman* 274c). (Plato leaves it an open question whether philosophy would be practiced in such a world (*Statesman* 272b-d).) Thus, in the world which is most directly under god's control, humans do not work. Moreover, the gods themselves do not work, but live lives free of toil. So, to be more divine apparently means to work less or not at all.

In my paper, I wish to argue that, contrary to these appearances, Plato holds that work has value exceeding the merely instrumental. I hold that Plato establishes work's more-than instrumental value, in part, by reconceptualizing the nature of work. Common Greek attitudes towards work regard work as the application of human effort to natural materials to change these materials in ways that are beneficial for human beings. Plato conceptualizes work not just as the application of human effort, but as the application of human intelligence to resistant materials and states of affairs. This reconceptualization shows work as having value beyond the merely instrumental. In addition, this reconceptualization allows Plato to defend philosophers against the charge that they lack industry.

"Ontological Primacy in the *Categories*" (Saturday 2:00, Room 11)

Keith McPartland, *Williams College*, Keith.E.Mcpartland@williams.edu

In the *Categories* Aristotle holds that individual horses, cats and men count as primary substances or primary beings, and tells us that nothing else would exist in the absence of such entities. When Aristotle explicitly discusses priority later in the *Categories*, he seems to take ontological priority to involve nonreciprocal implication of existence. One entity is prior to another in this sense if and only if the existence of the second entails the

existence of the first while the converse is not the case. However, primary substances do not seem to be prior to other entities in implication of existence. While the existence of any entity other than a primary substance does entail the existence of at least one primary substance, the existence of a primary substance also entails the existence of at least one nonsubstantial entity. To make matters worse, the existence of a primary substance, say Socrates, entails the existence of the secondary substance that is its species, say human being, while the converse is not the case. It seems then that secondary substances will be prior to primary substances. In this paper, I try to figure out what Aristotle ought to say about ontological priority to ensure that primary substances are indeed primary. I draw on Aristotle's discussion of one thing's being a cause of being for another in his discussion of ontological priority and simultaneity. Aristotle holds that one entity can be prior to another even where the two reciprocate with respect to implication of existence, provided that the first is a cause of being of the second. I argue that an item can be a cause of being in the sense needed for ontological priority even when implication of existence runs in the wrong direction. I distinguish two ways in which one thing can imply the existence of another. I then argue that in the case of primary substances and their species, the primary substances count as causes of being for the species in a way that secures their ontological priority.

“Individual Substances and Individual Accidents in the *Categories* of Aristotle”

(Saturday 4:15, Room 4)

António Pedro Mesquita, *University of Lisbon*, apmesquita@netcabo.pt

In the second chapter of *Categories*, Aristotle introduces a conceptual scheme which Angelelli designated as “ontological square”, in accordance to which, using only two criteria, “being in a subject” and “said of a subject”, it is possible to distribute reality over four types of beings: individual substances (or primary substances, in the nomenclature of the treatise), which are neither in a subject nor are said of a subject; universal substances (or secondary substances, according to the same nomenclature), which are said of a subject but are not in a subject; individual accidents, which are in a subject, but are not said of a subject; and universal accidents, which are in a subject and are said of a subject. The problem arises with the third type of entity, individual accidents (or, in modern words, “inherences”), due to the way they are defined in the text, namely as something which “cannot exist separately from what it is in”.

In fact, what does Aristotle wish to signify by this stipulation? Certainly, it would be said, that that which is in a subject cannot exist separately from that subject. Nevertheless, there remains an even greater margin for interpretation than what could initially be imagined. Well then, the importance of this clause, and therefore of its correct interpretation, goes far beyond the mere decision on textual or even doctrinal matters, if restricted to the passage and to the question under consideration.

What is at stake here is the significance that Aristotle wishes to attribute to the individuality of inherences and, through that, the way in which the ontological distinction between individual substances and individual accidents – that is to say, between primary substances and their accidents as diverse types of individual items – is conceived by him.

Indeed, inversely to what is sometimes heard, the recognition of inherences, or, in general, of individual predicates of substances, is far from being an eccentricity of the *Categories*, being, on the contrary, a theoretical and structural constant in Aristotelian thought.

On the other hand, the last passage in the chapter under consideration, in which it is said that “things that are indivisible and numerically one are never said of a subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject”, opens the way for a promising conceptual discrimination between things indivisible and numerically one which are in a subject, that is, accidents or individual predicates, and things indivisible and numerically one which are not in a subject, that is, the ultimate subjects, or primary substances themselves, which is precisely the distinction we pointed out above as being most decisive.

Here, then, is the scope of the present investigation: to grasp the meaning and the rationale of the distinction between individual substances and individual accidents in Aristotle, based on the analysis of the statute of inherences in the second chapter of the *Categories*.

“Cosmopolitanism in Gandhi and Seneca” (Saturday 11:15, Room 7)

Mohamed Mehdi, *Oakton Community College*, mmehdi@oakton.edu

In his *de Otio* as well as in several of his *Letters*, Seneca presents the greater commonwealth, in which one can aspire to co-citizenship with other philosophers and wise men from history, as an alternative sphere of action to the state. It therefore serves as one basis for arguing against the duty to be directly involved in the world of conventional politics. By engaging in this commonwealth, Seneca argues, we provide greater benefit to humans than by merely taking part in the machinery of state.

There is, however, a rather different use of cosmopolitanism, for example, in Seneca’s *de Tranquillitate Animi*. Here it is argued that if one is discouraged for various practical reasons from taking part in the affairs of a particular state, another state can be found where one’s talents can be put to better use. Rather than take refuge in philosophy, one should seek out another existing state in which to be politically active. But while these different senses of cosmopolitanism provide contrasting practical lessons, in both cases Seneca sounds a cautionary note about political involvement. Cosmopolitanism is invoked as a way of ensuring that the aims of political action can be carried out despite the fact that it is very often not advisable to engage in the political circumstances one finds oneself in.

There are parallel ways in which Gandhi employs a cosmopolitan outlook in arguing against conventional forms of political engagement. Gandhi’s nationalism is premised on a conception of the Indian nation that identifies its unity and historical continuity primarily in terms of an ethical outlook whose significance extends to all humanity. In seeking to attain Indian freedom, according to Gandhi, one is doing a service to all humanity by ensuring the survival of an ethical outlook that is a condition for our well-being as a species. This implies, however, that only those forms of political

action that are based on this ethical outlook can be fruitfully taken up. This rules out, therefore, engagement that is based on attaining power through the use of violence. Like Seneca, Gandhi employs a cosmopolitan ideal to support the position that a virtuous life can be lived politically when we develop the proper context for and understanding of political action. Pessimism regarding the nature of conventional politics need not prevent one from conceiving of oneself as a political actor. There is, however, a striking difference from Seneca in the practical implications that Gandhi draws from his appeal to a cosmopolitan ideal. Unlike Seneca, Gandhi argues for the obligation to contribute to the particular political communities that are nearest to oneself: the villages.

Seneca and Gandhi both employ a cosmopolitan conception in attempting to understand the nature of the duty of political engagement from the standpoint of a life of virtue. Both, however, are able to draw rather different practical lessons on these grounds. This divergence results in part from different understandings of what political action consists in, in particular the different ways in which the concepts of rule on the one hand and service on the other are used to explicate the nature of beneficence. At a more general level, this comparison of Seneca and Gandhi suggests that it is not simply the case that cosmopolitanism on the one hand and nationalism on the other imply different kinds of political engagement. Rather, there is an important range of ethical implications for political involvement that should be explored from within a cosmopolitan outlook.

“The Role of Rights in Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics” (Saturday 9:00, Room 5)

Fred D. Miller, Jr., *Bowling Green State University*, millerfd17216098@aol.com

I have argued previously that there is a place for rights in Aristotle’s political theory in the sense that a completely just city-state would recognize the just claims (i.e. rights) of all citizens. Here I take a different tack by arguing that Aristotle’s moral philosophy is defensible only if presupposes a concept of individual rights. For Aristotle maintains that justice is a virtue, and he distinguishes between universal and particular justice (e.g. distributive or corrective justice). This account gives rise to difficulties: Is justice an exception to Aristotle’s general thesis that the virtues are intermediate states between extremes in all cases? Why is justice unlike other virtues (e.g. friendship) in that one cannot be just or unjust towards oneself? Can universal justice (promoting the common advantage) come into conflict with particular justice? I argue that these problems can be solved once we recognize that Aristotle’s account of justice presupposes a concept of individual rights.

My argument, if sound, has significance for modern moral philosophy. Virtue ethics, generally speaking, is a theory of moral obligation, which holds that an action is morally correct because it is an expression of moral virtue, e.g. courage, generosity, or justice. A serious issue for modern virtue ethics is whether it can accommodate the respect for individual rights. If it cannot, this would seem to be a crucial lacuna for a theory of moral obligation. If however my argument here is correct that the theory of virtue in its canonical Aristotelian version presupposes rights, then modern virtue ethicists would do well to consider whether rights have a place in their own theories.

“Aristotle on the Separability of Mind” (Saturday 11:15, Room 5)

Fred D. Miller, Jr., *Bowling Green State University*, millerfd17216098@aol.com

Aristotle in *De Anima* makes a number of controversial claims concerning the separability of the soul, culminating in the claim that the productive mind (poitikos nous, aka agent intellect) is separable. In order to interpret this claim it is necessary to answer (at least) three questions: What exactly is the productive mind? From what other thing is it alleged to be separable? And in what sense is it alleged to be separable: spatial, definitional, ontological, or taxonomical? After canvassing several interpretations of the claim that the productive mind is separable, two leading contenders emerge:

-DMO The divine mind (which is a productive mind) is ontologically separable from the individual human mind.

-PMO The productive mind (which is a part of the individual soul) is ontologically separable from the passive mind and from the body.

Commentators loath to attribute soul-body dualism with its attendant difficulties to Aristotle are attracted to DMO, but this raises problems of its own: What contribution could the divine mind make to human knowledge? Does the divine mind already know the intelligible forms of the natural universe, knowledge which is subsequently imparted to human minds when they learn? But how is it possible for an eternally disembodied mind to possess knowledge of natural forms? And even if the disembodied divine mind had such knowledge, how could it communicate it to embodied human minds?

PMO evidently offers the most straightforward interpretation of the text, based on textual and contextual evidence. But there are doubts whether it is defensible on even Aristotelian grounds. Aristotle offers two main arguments in *De Anima* iii 4 and 5: the argument that the mind has unlimited scope and is therefore unmixed with the body; and the argument that the mind’s acquisition of knowledge requires a productive, actual and a passive, potential factor, each of which must be separable from the other. Although these arguments have some plausibility within Aristotle’s theoretical framework, worries persist: Why conclude that (PMO) the productive mind is ontologically separable?

Further, what intellectual activity could the productive mind carry out if it were ontologically separate from the body? Even if all of Aristotle’s premisses are granted, in the end we may wonder whether they establish anything more than the following weaker claim:

-PMD The productive mind, which is a part of the individual soul, is only definitionally separable from the body.

If this is the case, Aristotle would not be the only philosopher whose theoretical reach exceeded his grasp.

“Autonomy, Disdain, and the Death of Political Theory: The case of Zeno’s *Republic*” (Friday 7:15, Plenary session)

Phillip Mitsis, *New York University*, phillip.mitsis@nyu.edu

There has been a long tradition (Sabine, McIlwain, Sinclair, Berlin, etc.), given famous expression by Hegel, that finds in Hellenistic philosophers' sometimes theatrical celebrations of individual autonomy and their ultimate disdain for the material conditions of life an explanation for Hellenistic philosophers' failure to adequately address central questions of political philosophy. For many contemporary scholars, no doubt, this is a tradition that recent professional scholarship has made rather out of date. However, I will consider a range of recent major reconstructions of Stoic political views by scholars who claim that the period did indeed engage in genuine political philosophy and that the traditional view needs to be displaced. In each case, I think, the arguments for these reconstructions fail to convince, at least on the basis of the surviving evidence. Moreover, even if we were to grant the plausibility of these reconstructions, they seem insufficient on their own to give us much traction on basic questions of political disagreement, much less on such fundamental political decisions as the kinds of large-scale actions that should be undertaken by political authorities deploying institutional and state power. Thus, in the case of the Stoics, we have no reason to reject Berlin's general conclusion that it is "as if political philosophy suddenly vanished in the Hellenistic period."

"The Logic and the Ethics of Passions in the Philosophies of Tusi and Schopenhauer"
(Sunday 9:00, Room 8)

Parviz Morewedge, *SUNY OWB*, pmorewed@gmail.com

This research depicts the similarities between the role of passions in the philosophies of Nasir ad-Din Tusi (thirteenth century Iranian theologian, philosopher, scientist, and author of about 200 works including commentaries on works of Euclid and Ptolemy) and Schopenhauer (*The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes*). Instead of proffering a moral evaluation of judgments of passions based on some ethical codes, both philosophers, not assuming "free will," presuppose a pragmatic view that passions are embedded in human beings. Subsequently instead of making judgments on the passions they analyze the pragmatic results of passions. While Schopenhauer emphasizes the irrationality of passions and its damaging effects to human beings, Tusi proffers passions as a gift of the world order (in the sense of Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds." The paper concludes by a support of thesis of H.A. Wolfson that Leibniz's theodicy is linked to Islamic philosophy, via ibn Sina's (980-1037, Iranian philosopher, physician who wrote about 250 works) influence on Maimonides, and Maimonides' influence on Spinoza—and obvious debt of Leibniz to Spinoza. In addition, the paper challenges the common misinterpretation of Islamic views on passions. It argues that Islamic doctrines on pleasure and passion are akin to Greek naturalistic theories and explicitly reject the ascetic views of rejection of 'physical pleasures' dominant in Manichaean religions (the dualistic Gnostic type of religion of the Prophet Mani [c. 210-276]) and some Christian monastic traditions. While there is a close relationship between Muslim and Christian theologies (Aquinas mentions Avicenna over 500 times), major differences separate the Islamic Shi'a ethics and the earlier Christian ascetic traditions.

“Plato’s *Ion* as Dramatic Preparation for the Treatment of Poetic Mimesis in the *Republic* and *Statesman*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 7)

Mark Moes, *Grand Valley State University*, moesm@gvsu.edu

Albert Rijksbaron’s recent *Plato. Ion. Or On the Iliad*, the fourteenth volume in *Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology*, will surely come to rank highly among the best books ever done on Plato’s *Ion* and to be considered an indispensable aid to careful *Ion* scholarship. The commentary attends to the interpretation of the dialogue and its place in Platonic thought, and shows extensive familiarity with secondary literature on the dialogue and on Platonic philosophy. Nevertheless, if good philology is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of good interpretation, Rijksbaron’s excellent work leaves much to be done by other scholars who follow him. His claim that there is no room for a *techne poetike* of any kind in Plato seems to ignore that Plato uses the literary form of the Socratic dialogue to create a distinctive kind of drama. And there are indications in various dialogues that Plato does envision a *techne poetike*. For example, in *Phaedrus* 268d-269a Socrates maintains that poetry could be a true *techne*, and in doing so he refers both to the *tragikos* and the doctor as craftsman. And the final division of statesmanship in the *Statesman* yields a continuum of crafts that includes crafts providing amusements (among them poetic and musical crafts).

This paper argues that scholars might build upon Rijksbaron’s philological work by attending more than he does to the ways in which the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogue forms its communicative content. It sketches a reading of the dialogue outlined as follows. 530a-533c is an elicitation and refutation of *Ion*’s claim to possess a *techne* of rhapsody that includes theoretical understanding of reality-as-a-whole. 533c-536d is Socrates’ introduction of a set of reorienting considerations concerning how different Muses apparently provide very different and mutually irreconcilable views of reality-as-a-whole. 536d-542b is a set of pointers toward the as-yet-unfulfilled need for a Basilike *techne* that, unlike *Ion*’s pseudo-*techne*, might include both a unified theoretical vision of the Good and the practical wisdom needed to realize the Good in individuals and communities. It is a clarion call to the workers of the Academy, and to those in all academies, to begin with the tasks of philosophy. Such a reading indicates that Plato has employed *techne* in constructing the *Ion* itself, a *techne* whose chief aim is to bring auditors or readers to self-scrutiny concerning their opinions about *ta megista*?

The paper in the end points to the interrelationship between one’s interpretation of the *Ion* and one’s interpretations of, for example, Socrates’ critique of poetry in Books II, III, and X of the *Republic* and the Stranger’s treatment of poetry in his final division of statesmanship in the *Statesman*. It suggests that the *Ion* is a preparation for the treatments of poetry in the *Republic* and *Statesman* (and perhaps also in *Philebus* and *Timaeus*), and contends that there is room for attributing to Plato a view of the importance of imitative drama to good education in a good city.

“The Math of the *Meno*: Imaging the Incommensurability of Knowledge and Ignorance” (Saturday 2:00, Room 3)

Holly Moore, *Colby College*, hgmoore@colby.edu

In his ambitious treatment of the mathematical passages of Plato's dialogues, Robert Brumbaugh entitles the first part of his book: "Mathematical Images Relatively Independent of their Dialectical Contexts" (*Plato's Mathematical Imagination*, 1968). This assertion is given no argument, and in the case of the *Meno*, which Brumbaugh includes in this section, I claim that no such argument is possible. Indeed, I show in this paper that the mathematical demonstration that Socrates offers to Meno as an explanation both of the possibility of recollection and of the value of elenchus is itself an image of how the incommensurability of ignorance and knowledge may be overcome by means of the "diagonal" of opinion.

In book V of the *Republic*, Socrates discusses opinion, "the wanderer between," and its complicated relationship to being and not-being (479d8). In book VI, the distinction between opinion and knowledge remains an important aim of the divided line, but to a certain extent we are left in Meno's paradox, not knowing how one can move from the dim light of shadows toward the bright light of knowledge of the forms. I begin the paper, then, setting up the context of the mathematical demonstration of the *Meno* by reference to the transition from the divided line (another mathematical construct) to the cave allegory. It is my argument that the slave's progress through the geometrical problem of the *Meno* demonstrates the way that a mathematical imagination, noted in Book VII of the *Republic* as the key to developing abstract thinking, is required in order to pass from opinion toward knowledge.

In the second section of the paper, I show that the Meno's geometrical problem of the double area of the two-foot square is a mathematical expression of the conceptual incommensurability of knowledge and ignorance. Socrates claims that working through the problem with the uneducated slave will be a demonstration to explain to Meno how recollection works, but, by the end, Socrates also claims that the slave's working of the problem equally demonstrates the efficacy of elenchus to prepare someone for making judgments and opinions about something they do not yet understand. Following upon this meaning of the demonstration, I will show that the problem, in its geometrical configuration, also functions as an image for the place of opinion as the "wanderer between" what is and what is not, between knowledge and ignorance.

"What Intellectual Excellence Was Aristotle Encouraging in the *Politics*?" (Saturday 2:00, Room 5)

J.J. Mulhern, *University of Pennsylvania*, johnjm@sas.upenn.edu

The question in my title is an important question, because how one answers it will affect how one reads the *Politics*. Surely Aristotle had some intellectual excellence in mind as he addressed his intended audience in the discussions that we have recorded as the *Politics*—those who would be deciding, among other things, who would be citizens in ongoing cities and new foundations, and those who would be writing the laws that the officials in these cities would be required to follow.

In recent years, scholars have taken different positions on this question. Some have suggested that Aristotle was encouraging political judgment, though their meaning here sometimes is not clear. They render *phronēsis* by ‘judgment’, though ‘judgment’ more often is used (by Ross and others) to render *hupolēpsis*, which is not an intellectual excellence at all, or *gnōmē*, which is a minor excellence. Others, such as Ruderman, appear to believe that there is a distinct Aristotelian political science, and that, at the very least, *phronēsis* “will have to rely in some measure on political science, in part a discovery of contemplative reason.” How this reliance would work, though, is not obvious.

In this paper I propose to look at the evidence for an Aristotelian political science in Book Six of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as at the evidence for it in the *Politics*. I propose to examine the passages in which Aristotle may have used *politikē* to modify *epistēmē* in these works and to consider in what sense he was using *epistēmē* in these texts. I shall consider also Aristotle’s references to the *Posterior Analytics* in *EN VI 1139b27 (71a1)* and *32 (71b20)*, since these texts have been considered to be germane to this question in connection with the so-called practical syllogism—though, as Joachim pointed out in his 1902-1917 lectures, Aristotle does not use the phrase ‘practical syllogism’. I propose finally to describe more clearly the position of *phronēsis*.

“Aristotle’s Use of *huparxein*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 4)

Mary Mulhern, *Brookside Institute*, mulassocs@verizon.net

Much of Aristotle’s discussion of logical points and his analysis of language in the development of his syllogistic employs the verb *huparxein*. This is noteworthy because his constructions with *êprxein*, as noted by Patzig and Smith²² following Alexander of Aphrodisias, are unnatural, stilted, and possibly technical. This paper urges that *huparxein* is part of Aristotle’s metalanguage for his syllogistic.

Aristotle had made use of *huparxein* in the *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, e.g. at *Cat. 1a25*, where *huparxein* is used of what is in a subject as a part but which cannot exist separately from the subject of which it is a part. It is used, for instance, in the *Prior Analytics* as a metalinguistic operator indicating the relation that terms have to one another in premisses. It figures first in Aristotle’s distinction among universal, particular, and indefinite premisses at *An. Pri. 24a18*:

By universal I mean a statement which applies (*huparxein*) to all, or to none, of the subject; by particular, a statement which applies (*hupaprxein*) to some of the subject, or does not apply to some, or does not apply to all; by indefinite, a statement which applies (*huparxein*) or does not apply (*me huparxein*) without reference to universality or particularity, e.g., ‘contraries are studied by the same science’ or ‘pleasure is not good.’
(Trans. Hugh Tredennick)

²² Gunther Patzig, *Aristotle’s Theory of the Syllogism*, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1968)

It is interesting that here in this statement, which sets the parameters of Aristotle's discussion of the quantity of propositions, only 'indefinite' (adioriston) has examples—'contraries are studied by the same science' and 'pleasure is not good.'

In another example, *huparxein* is used by Aristotle in part because it is neutral between descriptive and definitory predication. Aristotle's analysis of premisses in the *Prior Analytics* 25a22-26, which interestingly is his first use of variables, is striking for its use, as if it were to be expected, of *huparxein* as its main expression for whether one term applies to another. Aristotle, of course, already employs *huparxein* in the *Prior Analytics* (24a16-22), apparently in its standard usage, since he makes no remark about it. Here he uses it to unpack his basic definition of premisses, distinguishing universal, particular, and indefinite senses of *êprxein*.

For Aristotle, *huparxein* is a term used with deliberately minimal meaning. The arcs with which it is likely that he joined the terms in his premisses when discussing them for an audience are to be read as inflections of *huparxein*.

"Skepticism, Politics, and Philosophy" (Saturday 4:15, Room 7)

Joyce Mullan, *New Jersey City University*, joyce_mullan@msn.com

This paper investigates Plato's criticism of piety as it relates to political action. Plato's task is complicated by a strand of skepticism which recommended suspension of belief, thus frustrating necessary action. This paper makes an argument for Plato's philosophy as civic religion. I will especially look into the *Republic* and Thucydides.

"Philosophy as Imitation: Inspiration and Irony in Plato's *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Letter*" (Sunday 9:00, Room 2)

Dana LaCourse Munteanu, *Ohio State University*, danamunteanu@yahoo.com

This paper examines the association between philosophy and ironically defined inspiration. In the *Phaedrus* (243e - 245c), Socrates' palinode opens with a praise of madness that describes divine inspiration in three traditional forms, prophetic, telestic, poetic, and culminates with postulating a new form, the erotic-philosophic ecstasy. Unlike other Platonic dialogues, the *Phaedrus* appears to display admiration toward the concept of enthusiasm (Pieper 1962). Numerous commentators (e.g. Burger 1947, Hackforth 1972; Ferrari 1987, Brisson 1989), nevertheless, have noticed a certain inconsistency between the initial commendation of mania and the hierarchy of the souls (*Phdr.* 248d). The contradiction, it will be shown, goes far beyond this ambiguity. Layers of irony undermine the praise of each type of divine madness throughout the dialogue. By playfully assuming the first three forms of possession, Socrates systematically undermines each. Consequently, the only praiseworthy type of inspiration remains the

love of philosophy. Yet, the philosopher resembles one who is divinely inspired and possessed. And here may lie the supreme irony.

Büttner (2000) has argued that poetic inspiration cannot be seen as being entirely divorced from knowledge in Plato, since a type of inspiration is necessary even for the pursuit of philosophy. This may be true, but the “negative” features of inspiration affect the knowledge of philosophy as well. If philosophy represents a form of inspired ecstasy, can philosophical knowledge ever be fully reached through any specific skill (*techne*)? The skill of writing means nothing else but a pale imitation of the dialogic word, we hear in the last sections of the *Phaedrus*. If this is so, what is the relationship between Plato’s written dialogues and genuine philosophy?

In the *Phaedrus*, the skill of writing is not necessarily a valueless imitation (Nightingale, 1996, 166), but it remains a static copy of a living philosophical experience (275d4-9). Certainly, philosophy derives from the best sort of inspiration, and the dialogues represent the best form of imitation. Writing cannot, however, translate enthusiasm completely. After all, it may be impossible to describe philosophy in words (*Seventh Letter*, 341c5). This may be the ultimate irony of a writer who implies that his own dialogues represent copies of philosophic enthusiasm, “likening” the truth but never capturing it.

“Is ‘Knowledge of Knowledge’ Rejected in Plato’s *Charmides*?” (Sunday 11:15, Room 2)

David J. Murphy, *The Nightingale-Bamford School*, david.murphy20@verizon.net

Over almost half of Plato’s *Charmides*, Socrates dismantles Critias’ reformulation of “self-knowledge,” his second definition of *sophrosyne*, as “knowledge of the other knowledges and of itself” (166c2-3), or “knowledge of knowledge” (169b1). The steps: 1) knowledge of nothing but knowledge appears impossible (166c-169c); 2) knowledge of knowledge does not seem to reveal what we and/or others know and do not know, as Critias had claimed it does (169d-172a); 3) knowledge of good and evil, not knowledge of knowledge, makes life happy (172b-175a).

Although Critias’ definition is rejected, various critics have thought that Plato hints between the lines that “knowledge of knowledge” has a valid sense for *sophrosyne*. Weaknesses in Socrates’ argument, and his own disavowals (169a-b, 175a-c), seem to invite us to see through his refutation. After all, Plato associates Self-Knowledge and *sophrosyne* at *Ti.* 72a (cf. also *Alc. I*). *Charmides*’ and Critias’ earlier definitions link with *sophrosyne* elsewhere in Plato, and the ability to know what one knows and does not know, and to test others’ knowledge, sounds like the “human wisdom” of Socrates in *Apology*. Some have tried to salvage “knowledge of knowledge” by rehabilitating it as:

- A. Socratic wisdom, self-critical rationality (Schmid, Press, Roochnik, et al.)
- B. knowledge of Forms (Natorp, Dieterle, G. Müller, et al.)
- C. nous (Oehler, Martens, Vorwerk to an extent)
- D. insight into the multipartite soul (Apelt, Friedländer, et al.)

These strategies appeal to Platonic themes, but they depart from the text. Against all: they slip in some object of knowledge different from knowledge, despite Critias’

repeated insistence that sophrosyne has none; in its only appearance elsewhere in Plato, “knowledge of knowledge” is rejected at *Tht.* 200b-c; sophistic interlocutors do not introduce positive results into Platonic dialogues. Additionally: A. overprivileges the *Apology*, undervalues knowledge of the good, and fudges the difference between knowing that one knows something and knowing what one knows; B. and C. are irrelevant or wrongly make the Forms thoughts (cf. *Prm.* 132b, and *So.* 248e cannot be decisive).

Critias’ mistake is not that he allows Socrates to cast self-knowledge as episteme; rather, “knowledge of knowledge” has no value-content, which self-knowledge must have to undergird virtue. Developing Socrates’ Craft Analogy, the *Charmides* shows how virtue-knowledge is built on two levels (cf. Thesleff): purificative and constructive. First, the Socratic elenchus beckons Charmides toward cognitive restraint, an aspect of sophrosyne (cf. *So.* 230d). But Socratic Ignorance cannot bring us to happiness, as sophrosyne should do (174b). We must understand ethical realities; virtue-knowledge is not mere critical rationality, and the elenchus cannot establish knowledge (171c-172d). The *Charmides* only points to the constructive level: Socrates, who exemplifies sophrosyne, is still to administer to *Charmides* the promised epodê, or “beautiful discourses,” which he traces to the god Zalmoxis (cf. 176b with 157a). By argument and dramatics, Plato hints that deeper substance about an art of living awaits – perhaps in future dialogues, or oral discussion.

“On Studying Philosophy” (Sunday 9:00, Room 4)

John Murungi, *Towson University*, jmurungi@towson.edu

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that a young man is not competent to study political science. Would he similarly say a young man is not competent to study philosophy? In this paper, I argue that the answer is yes. I argue for the intrinsic connection between the two claims. If one goes along with what Aristotle says, one has to go along with the answer that I give. Moreover, Aristotle if making a philosophical claim, which I believe he is making, it is unwise the separate the two. The issue that will preoccupy me is the problem of determining what constitutes competence in the study of philosophy. Because what is at stake here is ultimately philosophical competence, I will focus on philosophical prerequisite for studying philosophy. By nature, it appears that a philosophical determination is philosophically problematic. This is not as clearly stated by Aristotle as it would be by Plato. The paper will articulate this claim. The problem of competency in studying philosophy is the attended by the problem of competency in teaching philosophy. I conclude my paper by arguing that if a young man is not competent to study philosophy, teaching him or her philosophy may be philosophically irresponsible.

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“Some Reflections on the Early Greek Notion of Poetic Inspiration” (Saturday 4:15, Room 9)

Gerard Naddaf, *York University*, naddaf@yorku.ca

The origin and meaning of “poetic inspiration” has always been the subject of considerable controversy. The first individuals to reflect on this phenomenon were, as is the case with so many other cultural issues, the ancient Greeks. Indeed, the fifth-century materialist philosopher Democritus coined a word that we still use today to account for this mysterious predisposition: *enthusiasmos*, which meant “possessed by a god,” or “having god within.” Some scholars have argued (e.g., Havelock) that inspiration is a fifth-century invention by philosophers (notably, Democritus) in their attempt to explain the oral poetic experience, which they now saw as a non-rational product of ecstatic possession. Others (e.g., Murray) have argued that Homer and Hesiod did indeed have a religious belief in poetic inspiration, but the notion of ecstatic possession or “madness” is a fifth-century invention.

What critics rarely ask are: what words or phrases did the early poetic texts use to express the poetic genius or *mousikê* we associate with inspiration in the early Greek poetry, and thus prior to the Classical period? In this paper, I examine first and foremost both the terminology employed by Homer and Hesiod to express the poetic experience and the role of the *aidos* or singer/poet in their respective accounts. I argue that not only are the physical and figurative notions of “inspiration” in Homer confused, that is, they are not consciously distinguished for the poet, but poetry itself for Homer and Hesiod must have been seen as a divine gift — as willed by the gods. I also argue that a number of etymologies and contexts strongly suggest that a type of mania or ecstatic possession was very much a part of the early poetic process. But I also address in the case of the *aidos* or singer/poet, the apparent ambiguous relation between his *technê* or “skill” and the role of the Muses prior to the advent of the poet as *poiêtês* or “creator.” Finally, I show that when Homer and Hesiod are exercising their poetic function, they are both poet and *mantis* or seer, and as such, like Zeus, they have access to knowledge of all things past, present and future. This explains why both Homer and Hesiod mention the Muses and Apollo, the patron of divination, together, as inspiring the *aidoi*. The work presented here is part of a larger research project that seeks to examine the origin and development of Platonic and pre-Platonic attitudes toward inspiration and allegory.

“Voluntary Inspiration? A Reading of the *Hippias Minor*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 9)
Ramona Naddaff, *University of California, Berkeley*, naddaff@berkeley.edu

In the *Republic*, Plato notoriously distinguishes philosophical truth from poetic lies. While the philosopher’s passionate attachment to the search for truth sometimes resembles an inspired and enthusiastic—even divine—vocation, he remains, in principle and steadfastly, in control, master of what he knows and how he can know it. He is, unlike the poet, committed to a voluntarism that assures epistemological success. And when philosophical knowledge fails him, he resorts, consciously and voluntarily, to the creation of a poetic myth and *pseudos*. The prime example in the *Republic* of this type of falsehood/lie is, of course, the “noble lie” (3.414e-415c). Necessity provokes the “invention” of this lie; self-consciously Plato’s Socrates voluntarily chooses to lie. What

then does it mean ethically and epistemologically for the philosopher to choose to lie? Is the creation of the philosopher's voluntary lie—a poetic fiction—an act of inspiration where neither muse nor divinity ignite the narrative flame?

The answer to these questions are not satisfactorily answered in either the *Republic* or the *Ion*, the early dialogue where Plato most fully develops his theory of poetic inspiration. Rather, I argue, the *Hippias Minor* offers significant clues to understanding why and under what conditions the philosopher is ethically permitted to lie—not because of ignorance or divine inspiration. Socrates, like the Odysseus represented in the *Hippias Minor*, lies best and is the “best” liar precisely because he has the capacity, as a human agent, to choose which stories are ethically and strategically better to tell. His “muse,” as it were, is not a divine one. Rather he is the philosopher's persistent rival: Homer. Homer, as with the sophist Hippias, “inspires” Socrates to narrate a new tale about ethical lies that will inform the use and necessity of the *Republic's* “noble lie.”

While scholars have frequently dismissed the *Hippias Minor* as either a spurious or philosophically trivial and flawed dialogue, I will follow the lead of Charles Kahn in thinking of the *Hippias Minor* as a dialogue aiming to understand the connection between moral knowledge and moral reasoning. However, unlike Kahn, I will concentrate on how the *Hippias Minor* anticipates the *Republic's* explanation of how the philosopher is justified in the voluntary creation of a noble lie, a form of philosophic rhapsody undetermined by and independent of divine possession and inspiration.

“The Order of Plato's Dialogues” (Saturday 11:15 am, Room 3)

Lawrence Nannery, *St. Francis College*, lejn42@aol.com

I propose a new and partially original theory of the order of the dialogues, and it may well be of help in achieving a fuller comprehension of Plato's motives and doctrines. If we ask: why did Plato found the Academy? We find that the first reason was to set aside a place protected by a god to allow full and free discussion without appearing in the public space, lest the fate of Socrates become the fate of Plato.

The second reason was to found a school for young scholars, to teach the methods and doctrines that Plato had derived from Socrates' practice of refuting common and traditional opinion in the public space. Plato must have already had derived his theory of Ideas by the time of the founding. Otherwise, there would have been no point in setting up a school. In other words, philosophy is the only secure basis of true paideia. Third, the Academy was founded as a repository of the dialogues. In this way Plato signaled his universal intention to reform the whole of the Greek world so that as much wisdom and virtue as possible could flourish, and the doctrines and the practices of the Academy last through the centuries.

I find that the dialogues do roughly fall into the generally agreed upon division of early, middle and late. But I do not agree with the general belief that they reflect the order of composition. My theory depends upon redaction. The date of composition is not important. Rather than the progress of doctrines in the mind of the author, the terms early middle and late refer to the proposed progression of the student in the

enlightenment process of reading the dialogues in a certain order. The periods are baggy, and it would depend upon the student's interests and the judgment of his teachers as to which dialogue he should next study within the same level of introductory, (mostly aporetic), adept, (mostly complex or layered), and advanced dialogues, which deal with "special problems" or a summing up of the education.

If I am right, what would be gained? Most problems posed in the earlier dialogues are solved at a higher level by a later dialogue. For example, the conundrum of Socrates' belief that virtue is knowledge entailing the unhappy conclusion that virtue enables a man to deceive, is "solved" by the ladder of enlightenment found in the Allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line in the *Republic*. Again, the method of scientific investigation adumbrated in the *Phaidon* derives directly from the elenchus practiced by Socrates. And, it is quite clear that the claim of Socrates in the *Apology* that his enemies are the rhetors, the poets, and the politicians is redeemed in the middle dialogues. The *Gorgias* is an attack and improvement upon the practice of the rhetors; the *Symposium* does the same with the poets; and the *Republic* again does the same with the politicians.

I am confident that my outline could serve as the guide in a fecund research program. Hundreds of implications and correspondences exist among dialogues to the point that, in the end, we can see that the first two periods form a loose system, though not in the strict modern sense of that term.

"The Riddle of the Partly Undescended Soul in Plotinus" (Saturday 2:00, Room 8)

Jean-Marc Narbonne, *Universite Laval*, Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca

The thesis of the partly undescended soul, typically Plotinian, is not a simple testimony of Plotinus's personal abilities to ascend on his own to the First Principle – as it has long been thought to be, for want of a better suggestion – but the reformulation of a specific doctrine, that of the Gnostic/Hermetic ὁμοούσιος. The soul of the Gnostic chosen – the "pneumatic" soul, to be more precise – remained consubstantial to the divine Pleroma, never losing its substantial link with, its salvation being thus guaranteed. The soul, not only akin (συγγενής) to the divine, as Plato taught before, but in fact undescended and consubstantial to it, (cf. 2 [IV 7], 10, 19), as Plotinus conceives it, grants therefore to every man what the Gnostics denied to all but a few, an uninterrupted and indissoluble link with the highest realities. The audacity of this approach, recognized by Plotinus (cf. 6 [IV 8], 8, 1-3), consists in challenging, not Platonic adversaries, which in fact cannot be found, but Platonic Gnostics, "Sethians" who attend his school and who claim for themselves only the power to reach the Intelligible (cf. 33 [II 9], 9, 79), whereas, in the opinion of the Neoplatonic philosopher, "every soul is a child of That Father". (33 [II 9], 16, 9)

"The Development of the Concept of Natural Virtue in Plato's Ethics" (Sunday 9:00, Room 3)

Griffin T. Nelson, *University of Dallas*, griffintnelson@gmail.com

In the *Republic*, Plato states that the philosopher must have certain natural qualities to both philosophize and rule, including physical, moral and intellectual qualities. The natural qualities of high-spiritedness, gentleness, intellectual acumen, memory, etc. tend to be idealistic and are particular to a small, select group of men and women. There is no doubt about the role these natural qualities play in the selection, ability, and education of the rulers. The question concerns whether such qualities can count as “natural virtue.” Given Plato’s claims concerning the corruption of the philosopher in Book VI, it seems that they cannot be so considered. This is because the major and surprising source of corruption is the natural qualities themselves. The very qualities which can produce a Pericles, for instance, could also produce an Alcibiades. The natural qualities at the time of the *Republic*, then, are morally neutral. This is mostly on account of Plato’s claim that education determines the direction the qualities will take, either toward the good or not. Strong-natured people, according to Plato, can accomplish very great or very terrible things, while weak-natured people cannot do anything great or terrible. “Strong-natured” indicates a morally neutral set of qualities. This position is very similar to the one Kant holds in the *Grounding*. For Kant, intellectual acumen, qualities of character and physical qualities are all good or bad according to the will. That is, the qualities themselves are neutral and become good or bad depending on some other factor(s). By the time of the *Laws* (Book I), however, Plato begins to think of natural virtue in terms similar to Aristotle’s account in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. People are born with characteristics somewhere on a scale between too much or too little. Plato says in *Laws* I that his discussion on bravery will act as a new model (paradigm) for virtue. Instead of bravery being the right belief about what is to be feared or not, as it is in the *Republic*, it is now discussed in terms of too much fear and too little confidence. If this is true, that we are all born on a scale between too much and too little, then we now have the possibility for natural virtue, as some of us may be born close to the right amount, that is, have natural virtue. Thus, as Plato develops as a moral philosopher he begins to incorporate concepts of natural virtue normally associated with Aristotle.

“Why the Cyclops Can’t Carry a Tune” (Saturday 11:15, Room 8)

Heidi Northwood, Nazareth College, hnorthw6@naz.edu

That there are parallels between the Scythian king Polymester who kills Hecuba’s youngest son in Euripides’ *Hecuba*, and the Cyclops Polyphemus in *Odyssey* IX has been noticed by Segal and others: both are blinded in response to their transgression against a xenos or xenoï, both pray to a god in their blindness (Helios and Poseidon respectively), and both prophesize the delayed punishment of their attackers (Hecuba and Odysseus respectively). But there are other similarities between the two characters as well. For instance, despite their prayers neither Polymester nor Polyphemus seems to fear the gods, neither obey any law outside of their own desires, and neither of them seems to have a city or the arts. In other words, both the Cyclops and the Scythian Polymester, as tyrants, do not have the same ties to the gods, other humans, and even human activities as do others; they are outsiders, alone, monads. They are without philoi, nomoi, or limits.

These similarities will be explored here as well as the conceptual relations between *philia*, *nomos*, and *peras* (or limit) as found in the *Odyssey* and *Hecuba*, as well as in Euripides' surviving satyr play, the *Cyclops*. It will be argued that the reason why Euripides' Polyphemus in the *Cyclops* is so strikingly characterized as not being able to carry a tune is the very same reason why he (and likewise Polymester and Homer's Cyclops) has no piety, city walls, or friends. To be without *nomoi* is not only to be (etymologically) without song, but it is also to be without those bonds of affection (*philia*) which (with *Stocks*) form the basis of those ethical and metaphysical limits which underlie the arts, virtue, and the cosmos (those same limits which also turn up in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Philebus* and the early Pythagoreans).

O

"Language and the Ineffable: The Task of Philosophy in Tsongkhapa, Mikyo Dorje, and Wittgenstein" (Saturday 11:15, Room 9)

Matthew Ostrow, *Skidmore College*, mostrow@skidmore.edu

Central to Buddhist philosophy is the claim that the highest kind of insight—the understanding of emptiness—is non-conceptual or ineffable. But what does that really mean? How could a Buddhist practitioner ever know that he had attained such an insight? One way to approach this question is through a consideration of the status of emptiness itself. Here I will contrast the view of Je Tsongkhapa with that of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyo Dorje. For Tsongkhapa, emptiness is understood as a real existent—the true nature of conventionally existent phenomena—and is held to be describable linguistically, albeit in a partial manner. For Mikyo Dorje, by contrast, emptiness is said to be free from the extremes of existence and non-existence, and is viewed as altogether inaccessible to conceptual consciousness. While this disagreement would appear to turn on a number of differences of philosophical doctrine, I will suggest that at bottom it is an expression of two very dissimilar conceptions of the role of reason in the attaining of wisdom. I will then argue that these contrasting conceptions are analogous to, and can be illuminated by, certain key debates in Western philosophy—most notably, the recent disputes over how to read Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. While standard readings of the *Tractatus* hold that Wittgenstein is committed to a notion of philosophical truth as real but beyond the bounds of language, the newer, so-called resolute reading insists on the incoherence of that whole notion. Instead, resolute interpreters argue that the Tractarian remarks have their life only as directed against the confusions that, for Wittgenstein, constitute the heart of philosophy. The text's insight is then communicated precisely in the complete dissolution of those remarks, in the recognition of the *Tractatus*' claims, and those of philosophy in general, as nonsense. In this sense, the resolute reading can be understood as mirroring Mikyo Dorje's conception of the purpose of Madhyamaka: rather than attempting to incompletely describe the empty nature of reality, as Tsongkhapa evidently aims to do, for the Eighth Karmapa philosophy leads to insight just through the abandonment of all attempts at such description.

P

“Compassion and the Middle Way” (Saturday 11:15, Room 9)

Linda E. Patrik, *Union College*, patrikl@union.edu

One of the most important texts of the Middle Way school, Chandrakirti's *Madhyamakavatara*, begins with a homage to compassion. Because the Middle Way school employs deconstructive, critical reasoning to develop wisdom (prajna), the link between wisdom and compassion is not obvious. How could such a critical approach support the genuine heart of compassion, which recognizes the suffering of sentient beings and aims to free them from suffering? According to the 9th Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje, the bodhisattvas' wish to become a Buddha arises from their understanding of the link between wisdom and compassion (Feast for the Fortunate). This link occurs in Chandrakirti's distinction between three stages of compassion's evolution, from (1) experiencing or understanding the suffering of others while identifying these others as a reference point to (2) experiencing or understanding suffering as mere phenomena to (3) experiencing or understanding suffering without any reference point. In this paper, I'll discuss Chandrakirti's and Wangchuk Dorje's theory of the bodhisattva's progressive evolution through the three stages of compassion, as it is motivated by growing awareness of identitylessness.

“The King of Truth: The One as Condition of Phenomenality in Plotinus” (Saturday 4:15, Room 8)

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The philosophy of Plotinus is phenomenological in that its most basic principle is that to be is to be intelligible. Thus being means, only, that which is given to thought, while thought is, only, the apprehension of being. Being, therefore, is never apart from consciousness, but always already stands in relation to thought as its content. Thought and being are thus not two separate spheres which are only extrinsically related, but rather coincide, constituting a unity-in-duality. The various levels of reality and awareness, intellect, soul, and the sensible, are higher and lower levels of this togetherness, or phenomenality.

When being and thought are understood in this way, the One can then be interpreted as “generative” of them not as an entitative cause, but rather as the condition of phenomenality, and therefore at once of being and of awareness at all levels. Anything can be given to awareness only as one determinate “this.” The One is thus the principle of both being and thought as the enabling condition of their togetherness, outside of which neither can occur. This in turn explains the sense in which the One is, as Plotinus so often says, “beyond being”: as the condition of givenness, it is universally present wherever there is any being or thought, but it is not itself given, and is therefore not itself any being, any content of thought.

Plotinus expresses this understanding of the One most clearly in his frequent use of the analogy of light. The One, he says, should be compared not to a thing which is illuminated and therefore visible, or even to a source of light, but rather to pure light itself as the condition by which things are visible. Just as light is necessarily present and involved in every act of seeing but is not itself an object of sight, so the One is necessarily present and involved in every act of thinking but is not itself an object of thought, and thus not a being. To ascend from beings to the One is to turn our attention from phenomena, from that which is given to awareness, to the condition of phenomenality. The analogy of light thus expresses the sense in which the One's otherness is an "other otherness" than the otherness of beings from one another or even of the levels of being from one another. To "see" the One is like seeing pure light rather than any illuminated thing. But to see pure light is in fact to be blinded, not to see anything. Thus, to turn to the One, as not any phenomenon but the condition of phenomenality, is, as Plotinus says, to "unknow all things."

"The Cave of Homer and the Cosmos of Porphyry: Creating a Picture, Reading a Picture, Creating a Theory" (Saturday 9:00, Room 7)

Marcin Podbielski, CNRS, UPR 76 "Centre Jean-Pépin", marcin.podbielski@kul.lublin.pl

Through his Cave of Nymphs, Porphyry proves to the ancient public that he truly is an expert Homeric interpreter, well versed in the hidden meanings of the Poet, as they can be read through the lens of various philosophical and religious traditions. Moreover, his elaborate and apparently heterogeneous interpretation of a brief passage in the *Odyssey* is also an exercise in rational approach to the embarras de richesse of symbolic readings and symbolic systems.

I believe Porphyry could have gone one step even further. It may appear he used his method of allegoresis to construct an original philosophical doctrine from symbolic senses he found in the Homeric picture of the Cave of Nymphs, and using the aesthetic logic of the very same picture as his main methodological tool. His account of the soul's position in the universe seems different both from the views of Plotinus and the ones of Porphyry's Medio-Platonic predecessors.

The paper I propose will discuss this hypothesis through (1) a reconstruction of the doctrine put forward in *De Antro Nympharum*; (2) its brief comparative analysis, referring it to various conceptions of Platonic philosophies. Still, yet another analysis will be necessary: (3) the one of the aesthetics of various Platonic depictions of how the soul descends into this world. For one must decide whether the opinions of various Platonists of the era differ from the one of Porphyry in respect of their philosophical contents or rather merely due to the divergent imageries that philosophers employ as the vehicle of their ideas.

In reconstructing the imageries, yet another issue will become prominent: Porphyry's approach to the problem of fiction. His idea of Homeric plasma appears to be built on a contradiction. The passage of the *Odyssey* describing the Cave of Nymphs is for Porphyry an instance of plasma, i.e. fictional creation. On the one hand, Homer bases his picture on facts. On the other hand, the very picture is his complete creation, or at

least must be treated by readers as such, because what counts is the conveyed meaning. Even if he did not make the cave up, and described a real cave used as a sanctuary, the Cave is still to be a piece of fiction. In such a case, a product of nature, which the cave is, had to be turned into a sanctuary by the wisdom of the ancients, who could explain it as a picture of the Universe. Human situation in respect of nature emerges as the one of readers of signs, but reading presupposes creating them, at least as a concrete piece of imagery, imposed on facts on nature. This may also mean that any picture must be creative — what is re-creative, is its reading.

“Aristotle on ‘Pure Stuffs’: Rethinking His Concept of Homoiomeres” (Saturday 4:15, Room 5)

Tiberiu Popa, *Butler University*, tpopa@butler.edu

This paper is meant to bring aspects of Aristotle’s worldview into sharper focus by clarifying a crucial notion of his natural philosophy. My central claim is that *Meteorology* IV – Aristotle’s (today rarely discussed but once extremely influential) ‘chemical treatise’ – proves that, contrary to the traditional interpretation, not all homoeomers or uniform materials are mixtures of earth, water, air and fire. Rather, some of them consist of only one element, and yet that does not prevent, for instance, bodies consisting entirely of earth from displaying remarkably different behaviors among them and, so, from being divisible into distinct ‘classes’ according to their material dispositions.

Thus, I would claim that there is sufficiently robust evidence in *Meteor.* IV for a distinction between two sorts of uniform bodies – mixtures and simple or pure stuffs (consisting only of water or only of earth). Furthermore, this is not simply an isolated and whimsical point, subsequently disavowed in Aristotle’s works: in the biological works, in passages clearly echoing *Meteor.* IV (e.g. *Parts of Animals* II 2.649a30, *hosa hudatos monon*, “the stuffs made only of water”), he still seems to maintain that some homoeomers consist of just one (so-called) element. I should add that the references to ‘pure stuffs’ in *Meteor.* IV do not actually contradict what *Generation and Corruption* (e.g. II 8.334b31 ff.) tells us on this issue.

Accordingly, a generic definition of homoeomers, as treated in Aristotle’s science, should point out that they are like-parted or uniform materials, but they are not necessarily compounds or mixtures (although it is clear from the examples discussed by Aristotle in *Meteor.* IV, *Parts of Animals* II, *Generation of Animals* V etc. that the majority of the homoeomers are indeed compounds). This revision of the traditional understanding of homoiomeres bears on how we regard the Aristotelian cosmology and ontological landscape, of which uniform stuffs are a major component (as evidenced primarily by Aristotle’s biology and philosophy of biology), and on his theory concerning the emergence of dispositions (a topic still very much at the center of ongoing research and debates); it amounts, above all, to the reconsideration of a central concept in Aristotle’s science and natural philosophy.

“Is Plato’s Republic a Utopia?” (Saturday 9:00, Room 2)

Nathan Powers, *The University at Albany (SUNY)*, npowers@albany.edu

Is Plato's *Republic* "utopian"? If we define a utopia as an attempt to describe an ideal society (or a set of ideal political institutions), then clearly the answer is yes: in some sense, the *Republic* is a utopia. There are further interesting questions to be asked; what, for example, are we to make of Socrates' claim that the "city of pigs" is perhaps, in fact, the best sort of human community (372e)? But there can be very little doubt that the *Republic* represents a serious attempt to describe an ideal community. Indeed, and with good reason, no text has had a greater influence than Plato's dialogue on the tradition of utopian literature other than (perhaps) Thomas More's *Utopia* itself.

In More's usage, however, "utopia" is literally a "no-place." A utopia is a description of an ideal society that cannot be established in the real world—or (as we might put it) a merely ideal society. So, we can also ask whether the city described in the *Republic* is utopian in the sense of being merely ideal, so far as Plato is concerned. In other words, does Plato conceive of the institutions of his ideally just city as being impracticable in an actual city?

The answer to this second question is much less clear. In the twentieth century, Plato's interpreters often answered it in the affirmative on metaphysical grounds: it was often taken to be the case that Plato conceives of his ideal city as existing at the level of Forms. On this view, actual particular cities may approximate more or less closely to the Form of City; but they will always fail to fully instantiate the Kallipolis, in the way that particulars always fail to fully instantiate Forms.

Burnyeat (in "Utopia and Fantasy: The Practicability of Plato's Ideally Just City") issued a useful corrective to this line of interpretation, by showing how shaky the grounds are for thinking that the city of the *Republic* is meant to be a Form; and also by drawing attention to the way in which Plato himself takes pains to identify certain features of the city as fantastical, precisely in order to make the case that these are possible (as opposed to impossible) fantasies.

I take Burnyeat to be right so far as he goes, but he misses some significant nuances of Plato's attitude towards the realizability of the ideal city. In this paper I offer a close reading of several passages in the dialogue where Socrates describes the city as a "model" or a theoretical artifact, paying particular attention to the comparison between the city and a painting at 472c-e. I argue that Plato intends to draw a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, possible social arrangements—arrangements compatible with human nature and the general conditions of terrestrial life—and, on the other hand, arrangements which human societies in their present condition could in fact come to possess through some possible process of development or social reform. The Kallipolis is meant to be an example of the former, but (importantly) not necessarily an example of the latter. This distinction, I argue, in turn frames the extensive discussion of philosopher-kings that dominates the central books of the *Republic*.

"Eudemean Theoria" (Saturday 2:00, Room 5)

Tony Preus, *Binghamton University*, apreus@binghamton.edu

The *Nicomachean and Eudemean Ethics* are often contrasted on the ground that *EN* makes the theoretical life the highest goal for human beings, while *EE* proposes the life

of the “perfect gentleman”, the Kalokagathos. This presentation reviews the evidence for place of theoria in the life of the Eudemian kalokagathos in the hope of moving toward a reconciliation of the two models of the Aristotelian best life.

Q
R

“Aristotelian Definitions of Political Communities: A Re-evaluation” (Sunday 9:00, Room 5)

Jean-Philippe Ranger, *St. Thomas University*, jpranger@stu.ca

This paper examines Aristotelian definitions of the concept of “political community” to show that it encompasses more communities than is normally thought. Most accounts of Aristotelian political communities focus on the polis, but I show that other communities such as some communities of philoi (friends) not only count as political in the Aristotelian sense, but might also challenge Aristotle’s own claim that the polis is the best political community (*Pol.* I 1252a6-7). The misunderstandings around the definition of political communities is due to a semantic difficulty in Aristotle’s own use of the term “political” which is either interpreted too narrowly as pertaining only to the polis or too widely as referring to any type of sociability. The first part of my discussion deals with the narrow uses of the term “political” to claim that they cannot reflect Aristotle’s position since he considers some animals to belong to full-fledged political communities (*Pol.* I 1253 a 7-9). Second, I analyze the concept of “community” (Gr. koinônia) to claim that it is a specific type of sociability. This is necessary to show how interpretations of political communities as mere sociability are inadequate. Finally, by centering the debate on distinctions between communities in Aristotle’s *EN* VIII-IX, I will examine the specific differentia of political communities and show how virtue-friendships not only count as political communities, but insofar as they minimize the tension between the individual and the common good of their members, they can rival Aristotle’s polis as the highest form of political community.

“Socratic Self-Knowledge in the *Charmides* and the *Apology*” (Sunday 11:15, Room 2)

Bryan Reece, *University of Oklahoma*, bryanreece@ou.edu

A number of scholars have noted that Socrates’ description of his practice in the *Apology* appears to be inconsistent with statements he makes in his examination of Critias’ definition of σοφροσύνη as knowledge of knowledge in the *Charmides*. In particular, Socrates’ claims that self-knowledge is neither possible nor beneficial seem especially problematic. However, we should not think (and Plato did not think) that the statements in the *Charmides* that self-knowledge is neither possible nor beneficial conflict with the Socratic mission statements expressed in the *Apology*.

There are at least two ways we might advance the notion that they do not conflict. First, we might admit that what Socrates says in the *Charmides* indicates that he indeed believes self-knowledge is impossible, which would push us to offer a reading of the

Apology passages that vindicates some, but not all, of what seems prima facie to be the Socratic mission. This approach is roughly similar to the one taken by Hugh Benson. A second method for absolving Socrates from the charge of inconsistency would be to show that though Socratic practice as described in the Apology does require self-knowledge, nothing Socrates says in the *Charmides* commits him to self-knowledge being impossible or unbeneficial (despite what have been traditionally viewed as appearances to the contrary). I interpret G.R. Carone as employing a nuanced version of this strategy.

The first approach, in my estimation, does a better job of taking seriously Socrates' inductive argument in *Charm.* 167b11-168a10, while the second approach allows us a less revisionary characterization of the Socratic mission as expressed in the *Apology*. Though both Benson and Carone have given appealing defenses of their views, I prefer an interpretive approach that I believe encapsulates the advantages of both views and the disadvantages of neither.

I submit that Socrates is quite right in the *Charmides* that something under the label 'self-knowledge' is impossible and unbeneficial. However, this is a different notion than the one involved in the statements he makes in the Apology. I will argue that because of an assumption Critias introduces in *Charm.* 165c7, the notion of self-knowledge up for discussion by *Charm.* 167c7 differs significantly from any type of self-knowledge which could legitimately be said to underwrite Socrates' statements in the Apology. I will motivate the distinction by considering the sorts of objects that cognitive states can take. I will further show that not only are the notions different, but there is textual evidence that Plato is representing Socrates as being aware of the difference. This view has several attractive features. First, it can accommodate the idea that Plato regards as cogent the argument Socrates gives in *Charm.* 167b11-168a10. Relatedly, it explains why Socrates would think Critias has failed to give an adequate account of σοφροσύνη. Finally, it can accomplish both of these without ruling out any parts of what has traditionally been characterized as the Socratic mission.

“The Epicurean Spectator” (Saturday 9:00, Room 11)

Heather L. Reid, *Morningside College*, reid@morningside.edu

Whereas Ancient Greece's games have traditionally been favored by historians, it is Rome's spectacles and ludi that capture popular imagination. Hollywood's portrayals of chariot racing in *Ben Hur* and arena games in *Gladiator* have complemented an array of sword and sandal films that revel in the grandeur that was Rome. It is telling that we moderns are so fascinated by Roman spectacles; it is something we have in common with the Romans themselves. Greek athletics seem to have been staged for the gods as much as the people; they emphasized democratic ideals such as equality and participation and they venerated pain (ponos) and struggle (agōn) as part of the noble pursuit of personal excellence (aretē). Roman games, by contrast, focused on human spectators rather than divine observers or mortal participants; they retained some religious flavor but functioned primarily as political tools serving the government's interest. Individual Romans needed

a particular kind of philosophy to understand their role in this giant political machine and learn to find happiness through it or despite it.

Epicureanism served them well in this regard. It posited pleasure rather than virtue (aretē) or happiness (eudaimonia) as the highest good; it aimed for independence from (autarkeia) rather than engagement with society, and embraced peace of mind (ataraxia) rather than a struggle for excellence. Epicureanism and Stoicism would become Rome's favored schools of thought, perhaps because Roman life was full enough of work and strife, but also because these philosophies were more practical and relevant to the masses. Using the historical context of Roman sport and spectacles, this paper examines the Epicurean idea of spectatorship. Texts from Lucretius as well as Epicurus are interpreted to show how the Roman spectator could find pleasure at the Colosseum, not from the victims' blood or the Emperor's gold, but rather from the understanding that has liberated him from the common concerns and anxieties of the masses.

It turns out that Epicurus' so-called four fold remedy (tetrapharmakos) suits the Roman age especially well. As democratic participation and political independence became luxuries of the past, intellectual autonomy and moral independence became more attractive. Both sport and philosophy in Archaic and Classical Greece had promoted community engagement and the pursuit of personal excellence, Rome's adaptation of that heritage shifted the emphasis to spectatorship and social withdrawal as a practical form of therapy aimed at pleasure and peace of mind. Rome is rightly remembered for lavish indulgences and extravagant spectacles, but the hedonistic philosophy of Roman Epicureanism distances itself from these. It seeks intellectual independence and peace of mind—not least because the political versions of these ideals were so often in short supply.

“Classical Sufi Themes in Iqbal's Philosophy” (Saturday 2:00, Room 10)

Habibeh Rahim, *St. John's University*, rahimh@stjohns.edu

This study investigates presence of Sufi themes in the philosophical writings of Iqbal (Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal [1877-1938]), the celebrated philosopher and a poet (of Persian and Urdu verses). The Sufi themes in question include: the notion of the unity of being (al-wahdat al-wujud), the Islamic epistemic ethics of the way of self-realization (The Dao, Tariqa), and symbolic role of the mediator figure (murshid, pir) which is the link between the finite self-soul and the indefinite One. In conclusion the paper reflects on the general influence of Persian mystical themes in the development of Indo-Pakistani philosophies.

“Wisdom, eutuchia, and happiness in Plato's *Euthydemus*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 3)

Benjamin A. Rider, *University of Central Arkansas*, brider@uca.edu

Plato's *Euthydemus* includes an early contribution to one of the major debates of Greek ethics—to what extent does human happiness depend on good fortune (eutuchia)? Socrates' young interlocutor in the dialogue, Clinias, apparently believes, as many of us

do today, that eutuchia is among the greatest of goods—i.e., he thinks that, in large part, what determines a person’s happiness—his birth, wealth, and innate character, as well as the events that shape his life—comes from external circumstances not in the power of the person himself. Socrates argues against this view, contending that “wisdom is good fortune,” or, as he says later, “wisdom makes men fortunate in every case” (279d6, 280a6). Socrates wants Clinias to devote himself to the hard work of caring for his soul, and so he tries to convince the boy that his happiness depends not on external fortune, but on his own efforts.

My paper analyzes and evaluates Socrates’ arguments about eutuchia and happiness. By my reckoning, Socrates makes two distinct arguments for his strong claims. The first appeals to examples—navigators, doctors, etc.—to illustrate that it is the wise or skilled person who has the best fortune in any area of expertise. The second argues that wisdom, by its nature, necessarily makes no mistakes; therefore, a wise person necessarily has good fortune. Socrates concludes that if a person is wise, he will have all the good fortune he needs.

Whatever their ultimate merits, these arguments serve an important pedagogical function in Socrates’ efforts to turn Clinias to philosophy. The first argument demonstrates that, in many endeavors, wisdom is a major determinant of success. Clinias recognizes that, in general, skilled navigators, doctors, and so on are more successful than unskilled ones. With the second, Socrates calls attention to the important fact that wisdom enables one to avoid mistakes. Insofar as mistakes lead to failure and thus unhappiness, wisdom would thus be crucial to living well (as Socrates argues in more depth later).

Nevertheless, neither argument is sufficient to support Socrates’ rather strong conclusions. For one thing, both arguments seem to sidestep the real question. When conventional wisdom holds eutuchia to be the greatest of goods, it means a divine favor or random benefit in contrast with what we get through our own efforts—e.g., the goods we are born with, or the good fortune that favors our undertakings. Although Socrates’ arguments show that a skilled person’s efforts are (usually) better done, they do not address the question about how external fortune might impact those efforts. Moreover, Socrates’ own examples illustrate the vagaries of luck. The success of a navigator, general, or doctor often does depend, to large degree, on external circumstances. Finally, although it is plausible that wisdom avoids mistakes, Socrates fails to show that avoiding mistakes is itself sufficient for success in general or human well-being in particular. Therefore, despite their positive function in dialogue’s drama, Socrates’ arguments beg questions about happiness and eutuchia that are central to the issue at hand.

“Understanding the Friends of Augustine” (Saturday 2:00, Room 6)

David Robertson, *Independent Scholar*, djdh_robertson@hotmail.com

Augustine’s concern with understanding friends is a persistent theme in his writings. In this paper, I argue that Augustine wrestles with problems of reconciling experiences, even among kindred souls, more deeply than any other philosopher of antiquity. This

comes into focus by reference to Neoplatonism and Roman Stoicism, although other currents such as the Epicurean tradition are also important. There is a conceptual divide between his early accounts of understanding other souls by contemplation in the *Soliloquies*, *De Libero Arbitrio*, and the *De Magistro*, and his later accounts of accessing other souls by memory in the *Confessions* and *De Trinitate*. These accounts reflect Augustine's trademark obsession with conversation and friendship.

Aside from tracing the move from understanding by divine illumination to understanding by the memory and the will, I address two problems that seem to exercise Augustine. First, there is the problem that since friendship depends on the uncertain fortunes of understanding, what bond is possible between souls? This relates to Augustine's ideal of ordered friendship (*concordia*), derived from the Roman Stoic view that true friends understand each other by natural transparency (Seneca, *Tranq.* 17; Cicero, *Fin.* 3.63–65). Second, how do we understand crucial features of experience, such as someone else's experience of pain? This worry emerges in several texts, but most famously it appears in the *Confessions*. In his discussion of memory, Augustine argues that understanding something like pain requires prior experience of pain registering a representation (*imago*) of pain in the memory.

The contours of Augustine's thought on psychology and friendship deserve more attention, not least on account of his transforming influence on posterity.

“Stasis in the ‘substantial City’: Reflections on Aristotle’s *Politics*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 6)

David Roochnik, *Boston University*, roochnik@bu.edu

Book 5 of Aristotle's *Politics* addresses the causal mechanisms of regime change and stasis, often translated as “faction” or “conflict.” At its beginning Aristotle says, “we must investigate the sources of change in forms of government and what things destroy each form of government; from what sort and into what sort they principally change” (1301a21-23). By knowing this, one would furthermore know both “the general ways to preserve forms of government” and “the means by which each form of government is principally preserved” (1301a25). This last clause seems to promise a value-neutral analysis, for knowledge of how to preserve regimes would apparently be useful to all rulers, even the most corrupt. So, for example, Aristotle seems to offer “Machiavellian” advice to a tyrant who desires to retain (efficiently) his despotic rule. He should, for example, “perform or seem to perform everything else in a noble, kingly fashion” (1314a38). This impression of value-neutrality, however, is misleading. For as in the rest of the *Politics*, Book 5 treats the polis as (or as like) a natural substance. As a result, Book 5 is a thoroughly teleological work and so its account of what-is also includes what-should-be.

“To Become a Perplexed Knower: The Paradox of Learning and Unlearning in the *Meno*” (Saturday 2:00, Room 3)

John M. Rose, *Goucher College*, jrose@goucher.edu

One of the subtle paradoxes of the *Meno* is how Meno could have such a rich dialogue with Socrates and come away seeming to have learned so little from him. The character of Meno becomes clearer when read we the dialogue as an account of various conceptions of teaching and learning that are contesting with one another in Athenian culture. The central problem of the *Meno* is, if Meno, or any student, has a false understanding of what learning is, one must “unlearn” or forget what one thinks of learning to come to a new understanding. My paper explores the reformulation of the “Meno Paradox” in terms of the question: “How can one learn something new when one thinks teaching and learning are something they are not?” The answer to this question lies in the multifaceted practices of teaching that Socrates exemplifies in his conversation with Meno. “If my questioner were one of the clever, disputatious, and quarrelsome kind, I should say to him, “You have heard my answer. If it is wrong, it for you to take up the argument and refute it.’ However, when friendly people, like you and me, want to converse with each other, one’s reply must be milder and more conducive to discussion.” (*Meno* 75 c-e.)

Exploring this paradox opens the field for a discussion of the reciprocal relation of learning and unlearning. Meno’s idea of teaching and learning is that knowledge is conferred from one person to another, much as Socrates ironically states he wishes knowledge could be acquired from Agathon, as water seeks its own level, in the Symposium. If such were the case, one could not learn by oneself, and there would be no way to tell, by oneself, if one was ever right. One would not be wise in Socrates’ sense, one could never become “the soul that sings to itself” of *Phaedo* 78, and one would be in the situation of only learning from the quarrelsome people who take up the argument and refute it.

At the center of this paradox is Socrates’ demonstration of the Pythagorean Theorem. While it is ostensibly a demonstration that one can come to knowledge without the necessity of a teacher who proclaims, the theorem also frames the lesson of the Indeterminate Dyad, that the finite hypotenuse of a right triangle whose sides are one will have an infinite name: the square root of two. All eide approximate in a more fluid movement than the proclamations of one who teaches so as to impart knowledge.

Socrates’ conversation with Meno wraps around this demonstration at its center to show a dialogue of the friendlier sort that is asymptotic rather than aporetic. Socrates’ dialectical search for the unity of virtue in the dispersed plurality of human actions, and the myth he heard from the priests that all learning is recollection, converts Meno’s expectation for being taught. One must move through the various dialectical possibilities of what virtue could be and “unlearn” them or forget what one thinks virtue is in order to re-collect human action into a virtuous purpose. This understanding of dialectic as a process of “hypothesizing of eide through logoi” is enunciated in the distinction between knowledge and opinion at the end of the dialogue. One must become aware that what one takes as knowledge can become opinion in the process of gaining new knowledge. One must become a perplexed knower.

“Forgiveness as an Aristotelian Political Virtue” (Saturday 2:00, Room 5)

Regan Rule, *Binghamton University*, rrule1@binghamton.edu

While much has been made of the importance of trust in Aristotle’s conception of civic friendships in recent scholarship, less attention has been paid to the virtue of forgiveness that enables us to maintain our friendships even when that trust has been compromised. Civic friendship for Aristotle is a friendship of utility, and thus is liable—like all friendships that are not based on virtue—to mistrust and recriminations. This paper argues that trust and forgiveness (*syngnome*) need to be theorized as core political virtues, perhaps even as the highest virtues in Aristotle’s corpus. I argue that forgiveness for Aristotle acts as a corrective to justice, and thus is crucial for the stability of any political association that purports to aim at the common good. Forgiveness is not just a social virtue; in order to properly practice forgiveness requires a special kind of intellectual virtue that is related to judging well (*gnome*) but that extends beyond mere good judgment. This paper explores the necessity of the disposition and the practice of forgiveness, and concludes that the ability to forgive and to know when to forgive is not only personally, but also politically expedient.

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“The Question of Feminism in Plato’s Late Philosophy” (Saturday 9:00, Room 2)

Athanasios Samaras, *George Washington University*, samaras@gwu.edu

In this paper I argue that there are two aspects to the question of the position of women in the *Laws* and that these aspects are probably irreconcilable. On the one hand, Plato acknowledges the potential of women as equal or almost equal to that of men, and wants them to participate in both war and politics. He forces them out of their home and into the public sphere and gives them political rights which correspond to those of the *Republic*. Even allowing for the twenty years of public life that they miss due to child bearing, they are bestowed privileges unimaginable for the average Greek woman of the time. But within the household women remain legal minors under the control of some older male relative, their *kyrios*. How can women be reduced to such a subordinate role within their family and at the same time become the warriors and active citizens that Plato wants them to be? The psychological implausibility of this expectation indicates that Plato never quite reconciled these two sides of the social philosophy of the *Laws*.

“Plotinus and Homer: A Philosophical Study of the Homeric influence on Plotinus’ *Enneads*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 7)

David G. Santos, *University of Beira Interior* (Portugal), dgs@ubi.pt

Plotinus belongs to the late Greek philosophical tradition which can essentially be described as a complex maturation of a legacy of knowledge which undoubtedly owes much to the multiple influences of its predecessors. The legacy of this matrix has already been widely considered by many different authors throughout the history of Philosophy

which have devoted themselves to the analysis of Neoplatonism and its origins; in 2007 Gianni Stamatellos presented a brilliant study on the influence of pre-Socratics in Plotinus, however, up till today, in the specialized literature on the matter there are no systematic studies on the Homeric influence in Plotinus' work. Although there are no direct references to the Homeric works or to its author in the Plotinian texts, Henry-Schwyzler's *Index Fontium* notes 41 indirect references to Homer's work. With all due precautions in an analysis of this sort, in my paper I argue in favour of the vital importance of this influence and I carry out a systematic analysis of Homeric's legacy in the works of Plotinus examining the predominance and general status of this heritage within the context of Plotinus's late ancient philosophy, not just in its more general traits and scheme, but especially in a more direct way.

“Numbers matter” (Sunday 9:00, Room 5)

Eckart Schütrumpf, *University of Colorado at Boulder*, Schutrum@Colorado.EDU

Aristotle's theory of constitutions undoubtedly focuses on the description of the various forms of government and on their classification, that is the way their relationship to one another is or should be perceived. Less attention received the fact that Aristotle is interested in the question of when the various constitutions should be established. In *Pol.* III, the comparative assessment of kingship and aristocracy (ch. 14-17) includes to a large part considerations regarding the conditions under which either of these forms of government would be appropriate. In III 15 Aristotle gives a brief sketch of the historical development of constitutions: In the past, cities were ruled by kings since in cities that were still small it was rare to find men who were vastly distinguished in their personal excellence. However, this changed when a great number of men emerged who were equal in virtue and did no longer accept the rule of the king but installed a constitution that offered them an opportunity of common participation. Whether kingships or aristocracies are more “beneficial” to states is contingent upon certain conditions within the populace, here it is the distribution of aretē. The main criterion for considering a constitution appropriate is the quality of certain groups within the citizenry, while at times the number of these groups possessing a certain quality might become a factor to reckon with. This approach changes in book IV. There Aristotle devotes one chapter (IV 12) to the question of who should be in power. Aristotle starts with the general principle that “that part of the city that wants the constitution to last should be stronger than that that does not want it to last.” In order to determine which group is superior in strength, he applies separately the categories of quality and quantity. He goes on to say that “it is possible that one part of those out of which the city is composed possesses quality whereas the other part possesses quantity.” Whereas in *Pol.* III, when considering a specific quality, Aristotle could take into account the numbers of groups with that specific quality, in *Pol.* IV 12 the numbers of those who want to be in power in the cities become a criterion in its own right to be taken into consideration independently of the quality groups possess. The group rules “by nature” which is superior in one category and not too much inferior in the other. One could illustrate this from warfare. A well trained army might be defeated if it is too small, in the same way as a big army that fights without order cannot win. The new

approach of applying both categories independently is bad news for an aristocracy since “nowhere exist one hundred men of noble birth or virtue” (V 1 1302a1). In terms of the concept of *Pol.* book IV 12 this could be rephrased to mean that men of noble birth or virtue are not that far superior in quality as they are inferior in numbers. The numerical aspect “hundred men” is crucial, “numbers matter”.

“Confucian Virtue, Aretê or not?” (Saturday 9:00, Room 9)

Bongrae Seok, *Alvernia University*, Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu

In their discussions of ideal human person and moral values, Confucian philosophers identify, analyze, and compare ideal character traits and moral dispositions that underlie human actions and decisions. The paper discusses the diversity of Confucian virtues and evaluates the validity of the aretaic interpretation of Confucian moral philosophy. In the *Analects* and the *Mencius*, Confucius and Mencius discuss desirable human traits such as ren (benevolence) and yi (righteousness) in the development of the ideal human being. Often, several contemporary scholars compare these traits with the character traits of Aristotelian virtue ethics and translate them as if they are comparable or generally interchangeable. In many cases, however, a simple aretaic interpretation of Confucian virtues misses the diverse meanings of moral traits discussed in Confucian texts. So called Confucian virtues do not always mean character traits (i.e., long term, stable, mental dispositions). Sometimes, these traits reflect general moral rules or duties. Other times, they refer to the patterns of behavior, or the goals of actions. In addition to this ambiguity, several Confucian traits, such as ritual propriety (li), shame (chi), and reciprocity (shu), do not look like character traits at all. The paper analyzes the concept of Confucian virtues to discuss their diversity and to compare them with Aristotelian virtues (either in the sense of arête physike or arête kuria).

“Philosophy, Beauty and Psychic Harmony in Plato’s *Phaedrus*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 2)

Denise Schaeffer, *College of the Holy Cross*, dschaeffer@holycross.edu

Plato’s *Phaedrus* both invites and resists the attempt to resolve its tensions and harmonize its disparate parts into a coherent whole. The same can be said about the figure of Socrates himself. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates expresses a concern about whether his own nature is monstrous like that of the many-headed Typhon, and concludes his conversation with Phaedrus by praying for “friendship” between his inner and outer things. In form and content, the *Phaedrus* makes the achievement of harmony, whether in a piece of writing or in an individual life, a central problem—even, or perhaps especially, for the philosopher. That the genuine philosopher ought to be in harmony with himself may seem, to readers of the *Republic*, quite obvious, for in that dialogue Socrates characterizes the soul of the philosopher in terms of the harmony of its parts and the single-mindedness of his devotion to the forms. In the *Phaedrus*, however, Plato’s rendering of the philosopher suggests that the simplicity of such a characterization is

seductive but ultimately misleading. The eros of philosophy necessarily works against the achievement of harmony as well as toward it. That which works against the achievement of harmony in the human soul is as critical to the erotic yearning for transcendence of human limitation as that which moves us toward it.

Commentators seeking to discern thematic unity in the *Phaedrus* generally focus on the puzzle of its division into two apparently unrelated parts, the first on love and the second on rhetoric. Other divisions in the dialogue, however, also merit attention. In this paper I focus specifically on the structure of the palinode, which I argue has two parts that offer two differing accounts of the proper response of the soul to beauty. The second corrects the first by incorporating self-awareness, which is absent from the initial account of the philosopher's reverent response to earthly beauty. The initial account of this reverence functions as a beautiful yet misleading image; it abstracts from the dynamic complexity of the soul and presents the erotic character of philosophy overly static terms. The palinode therefore corrects not only Socrates' first speech (against love), but also itself, offering a revised, second-order understanding of the nature of philosophy.

“Drama and Dialectic in Plato's *Protagoras*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 1)

J. Clerk Shaw, *University of Tennessee*, jshaw15@utk.edu

I argue that on at least three occasions in Plato's *Protagoras*, Protagoras conceals his views because he would be ashamed to state them. That is, he would be afraid of acquiring a bad reputation (*Eu.* 12b), with all the professional and personal consequences that would entail. In all three cases, either Protagoras or Socrates uses “the many” as a proxy for Protagoras' concealed views. I argue for these interpretive claims in part by showing how they help to explain otherwise puzzling features of the text.

I begin with the initial interaction between Socrates and Protagoras. That exchange shows that both are well aware that Protagoras sometimes has an interest in concealing his views. Then I present three cases in which he does so. First, though he is not willing to say so (333b-334c), Protagoras thinks that unjust action is sometimes sensible. Part of the Great Speech indicates such a view, and the hypothesis explains several features of Socrates and Protagoras' discussion of that topic. For example, if Protagoras does not think that injustice can be sensible, then Socrates violates his own methodological strictures by examining a view not held by either participant in the discussion. If we suppose that Protagoras in fact holds such a view, and that Socrates recognizes that, then we can explain why he proceeds as he does. Second, Protagoras thinks that pleasure is the good. Again, the evidence for this is twofold: two earlier comments by Protagoras hint at such a view, and his initial answers on the topic (351b-e) strongly suggest that he holds it. (The views of the many play a more complicated role in this case than in the other two.) Third, Protagoras thinks that wisdom does not necessarily determine the wise person's actions, despite his disavowal of that view (352a-e).

I conclude by proposing that Plato's use of “the many” as a proxy for Protagoras is not philosophically innocent. Protagoras thinks that clever speakers like him can persuade the majority and so control them from the inside, as it were (317a-b). But this is

not Plato's view. He thinks the project of persuading others involves accepting crucial opinions that belong to those one attempts to persuade (G. 481d-e, 513a-c; R. 492-493). Protagoras has internalized and so been persuaded by the opinions of those he had hoped to persuade.

“Aristotle on Anger and Revenge” (Sunday 9:00, Room 4)

Krisanna Scheiter, *University of Pennsylvania*, scheiter@sas.upenn.edu

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle claims that there are times when the virtuous person should get angry. He claims that we get angry when we think that we have been slighted or that the people we care about have been slighted (*Rhetoric* II 2, 1378a31-33). In *Valuing Emotions* Stocker and Hegeman criticize Aristotle for the view that sometimes it is morally permissible, perhaps even morally obligatory, to get angry on behalf of oneself and loved ones. Aristotle defines anger as a desire for revenge (*Rhetoric* II 2, 1378a32). Revenge necessarily entails causing another person pain, so the desire for revenge is a desire to cause another person pain. Furthermore Aristotle claims that we take pleasure when we think about getting revenge. Stocker and Hegeman conclude that the “good aimed at in anger is the suffering of the other” (283). On their interpretation the virtuous person sometimes desires and takes pleasure in the suffering of another human being. In this paper I reject Stocker and Hegeman's interpretation. I argue that the goal of anger for Aristotle is not to cause the other person pain, but rather to seek justice on behalf of oneself and restore a sense of self-worth. The suffering of the other person is not the goal of anger, but rather a means to this further goal. The pleasure we feel when we imagine getting revenge on another person is not pleasure in the other person's suffering, but rather pleasure in righting a wrong.

Aristotle claims that revenge is different from punishment. Both are consequences of an unjust act, but punishment is for the sake of the person being punished, whereas revenge is for the sake of the person getting revenge (*Rhetoric* I 10, 1369b12-15). Punishment is meant to help the one being punished become more just or deter others from behaving unjustly. Revenge, however, is meant to “satisfy our feelings” (*Rhetoric* I 10, 1369b15). I claim that what Aristotle means by “satisfy our feelings” is that revenge restores our sense of self worth. Our feelings are not satisfied just by causing another person pain. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle explains that revenge requires that the other person know that we are the cause of his pain and that we are causing him pain because he slighted us (1380b20-22). If revenge was just about another person's suffering, then it would not matter who was causing the pain or why. We would be satisfied by the fact that the other person is suffering, but revenge requires more than this. I conclude that for Aristotle the goal of anger is not to cause pain in another, but to seek justice for oneself and protect one's sense of self worth.

“The Energeia of Being qua Being” (Saturday 11:15, Room 5)

Christopher Shields, *University of Oxford*, christopher.shields@lmh.ox.ac.uk

Aristotle's introduction of a science of being qua being in *Metaphysics* iv 1 carries three problems in its wake:

The Genus Problem: if science (episteme) requires a unified genus, and there is no genus of being, then there is no science of being. How, then, is there a science of being qua being? While a science of being qua being should not be equated with a science of being, a specification of the relevant difference proves a non-trivial matter. Indeed, one may simply redirect the question: if science (episteme) requires a unified genus, then what is the genus of being qua being? Most reasons for thinking that there is no genus of being seem equally to show that there is no genus of being qua being.

The Extension Problem: if the episteme of being qua being studies all beings, then its object cannot be just one being; if its object is just one being, then it cannot study all beings. Aristotle, however, suggests in one mode that the science of being qua being takes as its object all beings insofar as they are beings and in another that it takes as its object just one being, the divine being.

The Intension Problem: if there is an episteme of being qua being, and an episteme captures the essence (to ti en einai or ti esti) of its domain of inquiry, what might the essence of being qua being be? And which features will it have per se?

The two dominant approaches to these problems—one appealing to the causes of being and the other appealing to the homonymy of being—in their different ways attempt a coordinated solution to these problems. Unfortunately, neither succeeds. A competing account—rooted in some observations about the actuality (energeia) of being qua being—fares better.

“Plutarch on Erotic Wisdom and the Socratic Vocation” (Saturday 11:15, Room 1)

Mark Shiffman, Villanova University, mark.shiffman@villanova.edu

In his *Platonic Question* I, Plutarch attempts to interpret Socrates' description of his vocation to midwifery in Plato's *Theaetetus*. In the process, he articulates his Platonic understanding of skeptical philosophizing. The analysis of Socratic practice proceeds through three negative moments (elenchus, aporia, and ephexis) to culminate in two more positive moments (zetesis and anamnesis). Against Opsomer, who argues that Plutarch in the end resorts to recollection as a doctrinal epistemological “solution” to the skeptical problem of knowledge, I contend that Plutarch invites us to understand recollection in terms of what he calls Socrates' “erotic wisdom,” not as a prop to epistemology but as an experiential element of the erotic core of philosophical experience. At the same time, he

thus answers the question that he raises at the outset about the meaning of the divine character of Socrates' vocation.

“Varieties of Ancient Immoralism” (Saturday 11:15 am, Room 6)

Andrew Shortridge, *Cornell University*, aps235@cornell.edu

This paper argues against the view that the ethical views of the Greek Sophists can be best categorized by attending to the assessments of *nomos* ('law' or 'convention') and *physis* ('nature') made by different Sophists. Surveying the secondary literature, the scholarly consensus is that the Sophists contrasted law with nature. Guthrie, in his *History of Greek Philosophy*, gives clearest expression to the idea both that the Sophists held law and nature to be antithetical, and that they can be compared most fruitfully by attending to their different interpretations of this antithesis. Three Sophistic theories are then discussed. Accepting Kerferd's interpretation of Thrasymachus, it is argued that law and nature are not always antithetical to one another, since the law does not restrain the acquisitive nature of the ruler who makes the law. According to Glaucon's apparent restatement of Thrasymachus' argument, it seems that it is both natural to submit to law and just as natural to break the law. This is no antithesis. On Callicles' account of natural justice, it is unclear whether the equality of distribution which characterizes law is in fact genuinely beneficial to the many because of facts about their natures, or whether the many would attempt to get more, if only they could. Hence, it is unclear whether Callicles appeals to an antithesis of law with nature, or to one involving two radically different natures. In none of these three cases do we find a clear antithesis of *nomos* with *physis*; hence, there is little point in structuring any comparative inquiry of Sophistic ethics by taking "the *nomos-physis* antithesis" as a central organizing principle. The paper concludes with some tentative suggestions as to how Sophistic ethical theories might best be compared, if not by appeal to the supposed antithesis of law and nature.

“Why are election campaigns cases or causes of stasis?” (Saturday 4:15, Room 6)

Peter Simpson, *Graduate Center, City University of New York*, psimpson@gc.cuny.edu

Aristotle thinks that elections can be good but that election campaigns are always bad. The reason is party faction, or stasis as Aristotle terms it. For us stasis is a good thing because it is what gives point to election campaigns. For Aristotle stasis is a bad thing because it stops the life of the city. It is the difference, if you like, between the first mover and the first stopper. Stasis is the first mover for us because politics is about the means to happiness, and what these means are is determined by the people who determine the happiness that the means are a means to. To know what the people have determined one has to ask them regularly in election campaigns. For Aristotle happiness is the life of virtue as determined by reason, not the people. Toward such happiness political life should always be moving and stasis necessarily stops this movement. Who is right? Or, put another way, what is happiness? No there's an interesting question.

“Anaxagoras and Theistic Teleology” (Saturday 9:00, Room 6)

John E. Sisko, *The College of New Jersey*, sisko@tcnj.edu,

Anaxagoras is an early proponent of the notion that an intelligent being is responsible for the creation of our structured world. Many readers are inclined to view Anaxagoras as a champion of Theistic Teleology: the popular view is that he thinks the cosmos is divinely shaped for the sake of a purpose, or goal. Traditionally, this view has not found much support amongst scholars, owing to Plato’s insistence that Anaxagoras explains the structure of the cosmos, not by appealing to nous, but by appealing to blind mechanical causes (see Plato, *Phaedo*, 98B8-C3). Recently, however, a number of scholars (most notably David Sedley) have come to argue against Plato’s view and in support of the popular view. In this paper, we shall examine the key arguments on either side of this controversy. It shall be argued that the modern attacks on Plato’s interpretation lack real force: we have little reason to reject Plato’s assessment. In conclusion, it will be affirmed that Anaxagoras does not champion Theistic Teleology. Rather, when he explains the structure of the cosmos, Anaxagoras focuses almost exclusively on mechanical causes.

“Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on Conceptualizing Emptiness: Reason, Transcendent Wisdom, and Conventional Experience” (Saturday 11:15, Room 9)

Joel R. Smith, *Skidmore College*, jsmith@skidmore.edu

Tibetan Buddhist philosophy is often diverse and polemical, as the disagreements among the Madhyamika schools of Svatantrika, Prasangika, and Shentong show. Even within Prasangika there are serious disagreements. This paper explores some of the disagreements within Prasangika Madhyamika between the Gelukpa founder Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) and the Sakya scholar Gorampa (1429-1489), who explicitly criticized Tsongkhapa. My discussion emphasizes sections from two of Tsongkhapa’s last works, “Medium–Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path” (1415) and “Illumination of the Thought” (1418), and from Gorampa’s “Distinguishing the Views” (1469). I also comment on Sonam Thakchoe’s 2007 book, *The Two Truths Debate: Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the Middle Way*. I focus on two main topics: (1) To what extent can sunyata be understood conceptually, and what is the relation between conceptualized sunyata and yogic gnosis of sunyata? (2) Are the Two Truths compatible or incompatible, and what does this imply about conventional experience?

(1) Tsongkhapa holds that sunyata is effable and conceptually knowable (although only partially). Gorampa argues that sunyata is completely ineffable and conceptually unknowable. Tsongkhapa holds that conceptual knowledge of sunyata is a necessary causal condition for the gradual arising of yogic gnosis. Gorampa argues that conceptual knowledge cannot be a causal condition of yogic gnosis, which arises suddenly and spontaneously. (2) Tsongkhapa affirms the unity of the Two Truths and the identity of sunyata and pratitya samutpada. Gorampa argues that the Two Truths are mutually exclusive and that yogic gnosis eradicates Conventional Truth. Tsongkhapa holds that a

buddha simultaneously realizes the Two Truths, while Gorampa argues that Ultimate Truth is primary for a buddha and contradicts Conventional Truth.

I evaluate Tsongkhapa and Gorampa with regard to two issues. First, what does each view imply about the status of morality, including compassion? Second, what does each view imply about the reality of external objects? In light of these two issues, which view is more cogent?

“The Stoic revolution: individualism and freedom versus political commitment, or all of these?” (Friday 7:15, Plenary session)

Richard Sorabji, *Wolfson College, Oxford and New York University*

Isaiah Berlin saw Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, as the author of one of the three great revolutions in European political thought. Why? Berlin ascribed to Zeno the innovataion of allowing that one could lead a good life without taking part in civic life. This was a kind of individualism - a depoliticised individualism.

It took Berlin's genius to detect among the fragmentary remains of Zeno's work the mark of a great innovator. But I believe his innovation was not Berlin's at all. Zeno and his Stoic successors continued to insist that the good Stoic must normally take part in civic life. But I believe Zeno did make a major innovation in a related area, the area of individual freedom. He made into a respectable aspiration a kind of freedom that had previously been found, if at all, among his eccentric teachers, the Cynics, who might be grudgingly admired, but whom no respectable person would wish to follow. The new individual freedom is one I have called Gandhian. Gandhi had so reduced his desires that it was not he, but an empire that was afraid when they put him in prison, and it was an empire that crumbled, not Gandhi.

Berlin would be appalled at the suggestion. He recognised two kinds of individual freedom, but not the freedom of reduced desires, which he called 'sour grapes', not freedom. Nonetheless, I think that Zeno detected in his Cynic teachers ideas which they had not even named, and built them into a system that was to support political resistance, calmness of mind, and frank self-criticism, in a way that (suitably modified) can reach across the ages and inspire us today.

How can you plan to be emotionally detached, if you have political objectives, as both Gandhi and the Stoics did? The Stoics have an answer. Did Gandhi?

“Gandhi and the Stoics: is duty universalisable or unique to the individual?” (Saturday 11:15, Room 7)

Richard Sorabji, *Wolfson College, Oxford and New York University*,
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The later Stoics had a kind of individualism very different from the one ascribed them by Isaiah Berlin. In all decisions in life (not only moral ones) you must choose not only as a rational being. Rationality (and morality) provide a background constraint on all

decisions, but you must also decide in accordance with your individual persona, as they called it. A few people have personas that are unique. In those cases, it is completely uninformative to universalise (with Kant) and say that what is right for them would be right for everyone else in the same circumstances. There is often no one right decision in the circumstances: it depends on individual persona. Or if the persona is counted as part of the circumstances, then the morally interesting point may be that the circumstances will not in fact recur, because the persona is unique.

Gandhi had a concept of individual duty, *svadharma*. How far did he use it like the Stoics and did he use it to rule out universalising?

He liked to appeal to individual conscience. How far does the individuality of conscience exclude universalising?

Some of his decisions on action were breath-takingly unique. Could they be informatively universalised?

Would he find it easier to universalise about the right moral attitudes than about the right behaviour?

“Transcending Civic Friendship: Friendship in the *Republic*” (Sunday 11:15, Room 4)

John Spano, *Baylor University*, John.Spano@baylor.edu

Discussions of friendship (*philia*) often emerge in conjunction with dialogues like the *Lysis* and *Phaedrus*. This important philosophical concept is not typically associated with the *Republic*. Authors such as Leon Craig, however, have noted a proliferation of *philia* in the *Republic*, with thirty-one different words formed with *philia*, the most famous of which is philosophy. Further, in contrast with *eros*, *philia* is the love that Socrates has nothing critical to say about. Yet, little work has been done with *philia* in the *Republic*. In this paper I will examine the concept of friendship that can be found in the *Republic*. Specifically, I will claim that Polemarchus and Socrates use friendship to describe the unity of the city and that the civic friendship they describe is ultimately impossible in the setting of a city. The first section will examine friendship in Polemarchus’ definition of justice. He describes justice as doing good to one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies. Polemarchus’ understanding of friendship as a civic virtue is flawed in two ways: a misunderstanding of who the friend is and what the friend does. In the second section, I will show how Socrates addresses these shortcomings in his description of the friendship in the ideal city. Socrates restricts his discussion of civic friendship to the auxiliary class. By doing so, he is able to avoid the earlier critiques of Polemarchus’ civic friendship. The auxiliary class would be virtuous and would act to make both themselves and the other parts of the city happy. Socrates also adds an important feature of friendship in his discussion of civic friendship, namely, that sharing binds friends together. Though some bond is important for the unity of friends, I will argue that Socrates’ notion of binding together is extreme. The final section will examine an alternative way of reading Book V that addresses the problems of Socrates’ account. This reading examines Book V in light of the more literary interpretations of the *Republic*. This way of reading the *Republic* suggests one should not take the political philosophy of Book V as serious political philosophy. In light of these interpretations, I will suggest that the limitations of Socrates’

account of friendship are not with friendship per se, but with the extension of friendship to the city. Ultimately, by changing the setting away from the city, which may have been Socrates' intention all along, Socrates' account of friendship offers unique contributions to the philosophy of friendship.

“Connecting Plato to Attic Comedy: Humor in *Protagoras* and *Apology*” (Saturday 9:00, Room 1)

Sophia Stone, *Purdue University*, sstone@purdue.edu

Scholars usually do not pay much attention to Plato's use of humor in his dialogues because it is thought that nothing philosophical can be said. On the contrary, a close reading in two Platonic dialogues, *Protagoras* and *Apology*, show that when Plato uses humor it is often to teach a serious moral lesson. For the *Protagoras*, the best moral education comes not from the Sophists but through the dialectic; an examination of one's beliefs and values by means of dialogue among friends. In the *Apology*, the serious moral lesson is that the only life worth living is a life in pursuit of moral virtue. What is consistent in these claims is the importance of education in the moral development of a person.

First, to show Plato's humor comes from Attic Comedy, I give an overview of Aristophanes' comedy. In the *Acharnians*, *Frogs*, *Clouds* and *Knights* I analyze what I call comic topoi, Greek comic literary devices. Some of the comic topoi include: mimicry, word play, slapstick, invective, taking absurdities seriously, literary and intellectual mockery, bawdy language, innuendos and random food references. Aristophanes' comic topoi are used in his comic plays not only to incite laughter in his audience but usually undergird serious political and moral messages. Once these comic topoi are delineated I analyze Plato's use of comic topoi (which include some but not all of Aristophanic comic topoi) in his dialogues *Protagoras* and *Apology*. Finally, not only will I show that Plato's philosophy is more closely tied with Greek comedy than is ordinarily assumed, I will show in this paper how Plato's use of humor is formed by his moral philosophy.

“Philosophical Themes in Classic Arabic and Western Medieval Literature: Persons, Love, and Salvation” (Saturday 11:15, Room 10)

Saadun Sadun Suayeh, *GSP*, suayeh@hotmail.com

This paper proffers a comparison of the interrelationship between love and personal happiness in selected texts in classical Arabic and Western Medieval Literature. In addition, the study delineates the two common sources of both Arabic and Western literary traditions, namely sacred monotheistic texts as well as Greek philosophy. Sources examined include Arabic texts and pre-Islamic literature that have not been translated into European language prior to this presentation.

“Socrates the Absurd Lover” (Sunday 11:15, Room 4)

Sharon E. Sytsma, *Northern Illinois University*, ssytsma@niu.edu

Interpretations of Plato’s *Lysis* are wildly contradictory, ranging from denials that there is a coherent and meaningful thesis regarding philia put advanced by Socrates (Grote and Guthrie), to holding that there is indeed a positive tenable position which can be deciphered, despite the aporetic trappings. Further, those who argue for a positive thesis arrive at wildly different theses, from the notion that philia is based on usefulness (Annas; Bolotin; Penner and Rowe, MacHaffey), to the view that the story of the *Lysis* itself represents an “enactment” of friendship” (Lamb, Versenji, Gonzalez, Reeve)—an enactment facilitated by philosophical discussion. I further the attempt to identify a positive thesis on philia, but take a promising, yet neglected, approach. This approach balances the various claims about philia in the *Lysis* (which are rejected for various reasons) with Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as a friend in this and in other dialogues. When this is done, it becomes clear that Socrates is a friend to others in all the ways he rejects in the dialogue as impossible or absurd. For instance, Socrates is a friend to strangers, to enemies, to those who are lacking in virtue. He is also a friend (as he declares) to both Lysis and Menexenus, even though these men are too young to have a developed character, and even though, because they are mere youths, they can be of no use to him. These way of being a friend only appear to be absurd because they contradict common opinions about friendship (as articulated by the poets. Abstracting from Socrates’ declarations of friendship and from his activities of friendship, it becomes clear that Socrates allows a kind of friendship that Aristotle could not. While Aristotle denies that a virtuous person can be a friend to those who lack virtue, Plato portrays Socrates as a moral paragon, yet one who is “a friend” to those who lack virtue. Thus, the paper can explain what otherwise would seem mysterious—that Socrates could be a friend not only to mere boys, but also to the more mature, but ultimately traitorous Alcibiades.

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“Aristotle on Natural Law” (Saturday 11:15, Room 6)

John Thorp, *University of Western Ontario*, jthorp@uwo.ca

Aristotle is generally counted among the progenitors of what we now call ‘natural law’ theory in ethics, the theory according to which there are universal moral laws which which exist ‘by nature’, and which transcend and supersede any society’s positive laws, which exist by convention. It is true that some remarks in the *Rhetoric* (I, 13) convey this view, though it is hard to know whether Aristotle is there embracing the view, or merely describing it. More interesting is his chapter in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (V, 7) that bears on the matter.

This chapter sets out the standard distinction between natural justice and conventional justice – or natural law and conventional law – but it then goes on to claim, bizarrely, that natural law is changeable. The idea of a changeable natural law seems virtually a contradiction in terms, though, and centuries of commentators have tried to make sense of it. Broadly there have been three approaches. One approach has been to

suggest that Aristotle understands natural law as descriptive of people's behaviour, rather than prescriptive for their behaviour; the variability of natural law is thus nothing more than the fact that people don't always obey the natural law. Another approach has been to understand the variability of natural law as the observation that there may be slight differences from place to place in what people instinctively regard as the natural law: some societies have thought that it is part of the order of nature that women should keep to domestic functions, and others have not. The third and commonest approach has been to think that the variability in question is a matter of ineffability: one can never state a natural law with enough precision to cover all possible cases falling under it – a situation which Aristotle elsewhere addresses with his principle of 'equity' (*epieikeia*). Each of these approaches faces severe difficulties.

The present paper proposes an altogether different understanding of the matter. Although the text of *N.E.* V, 7 is compressed and crabbed, it can be illuminated by a much clearer and more careful discussion in the *Magna Moralia*, I, 33. In particular, Aristotle there gives a full explanation of an analogy to which he had passingly alluded in the *N.E.* text, that of ambidexterity. He explains that the changeability of natural law is like ambidexterity: people are naturally right-handed, but by training they may become ambidextrous.

Now the general Greek attitude to ambidexterity was very positive, admiring. So the implication of this analogy is that, though one is born with certain proclivities, it may be possible to bend and change them, and indeed to improve them. We may all find the moral principle that one should do good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies to be a natural moral proclivity; but it may be possible, with Socrates, to change that proclivity so that one is inclined to do good to all.

Aristotle is not a founder of natural law theory: he does not have the view that natural moral inclinations are, ethically, the bottom line.

"The Value of Mathematics for Plato's Philosopher" (Saturday 4:15, Room 3)
Christine J. Thomas, *Dartmouth College*, christine.thomas@dartmouth.edu

Perhaps nowhere is Plato's infatuation with mathematics more evident than in Book VII of the *Republic* where candidate rulers are required to complete ten years of training in number theory, plane geometry, stereometry, and pure astronomy and harmonics. Upon completion of those studies, the promising student embarks on only half as much time practicing dialectic. Finally, after fifteen years of practical political experience, the most successful guardians see the good itself and "using it as their model, must put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order each in turn" (540a8-b1). The curriculum Plato envisions prepares qualified guardians for their stints as rulers of kallipolis by facilitating their vision of the good itself. Mathematics is responsible for "turning the soul around (*metastrophês*) away from becoming and towards truth and being" (525c5-6; 521c5-8, 525a1, 526e3-5); the studies are truly beneficial only to the extent that they contribute to the search for the good itself (531c6-8, 505a3-b1).

There are a number of issues that Plato's characterizations of goodness and education invite us to explore. For the purposes of this paper, I would like to focus on the

following question: What role exactly does the mathematical curriculum of the *Republic* play for the philosopher? In particular, is the study of mathematics purely instrumental to the ascent to goodness or is mathematical expertise, as Burnyeat has argued, “the route to knowledge of the Good because it is a constitutive part of ethical understanding”?²³ I will argue that a stronger case can be made for an instrumental reading than Burnyeat at least allows. And I shall suggest that even though it may be ultimately advisable to regard the study of mathematics as partially constitutive of the study of goodness, it is important to ask after the nature of the constitution relation at issue. For the more inflationary we become about the role of mathematics as education in goodness, the less we leave for dialectic to accomplish. There is a sort of dilemma that faces interpreters of the role of mathematics in the philosopher’s education: a purely instrumental reading can seem too anemic to represent Plato’s commitments in the *Republic* and elsewhere; but then a richer, constitution interpretation – what one commentator has called a Pythagoreanizing interpretation - risks collapsing any significant distinction between ideal mathematics and dialectic.²⁴

“Sextus Empiricus on Skeptical Piety” (Saturday 4:15, Room 7)

Harald Thorsrud, *Agnes Scott College*, hthorsrud@agnesscott.edu

With respect to the gods, Sextus pursues his standard skeptical agenda: he argues both for and against them in order to achieve a standstill of reason, suspension of judgment, and tranquility, which is supposed to follow as a shadow follows a body. Nonetheless, in accordance with ordinary life, custom and law, the skeptic says that the gods exist and that they are provident. The skeptic also performs all the appropriate religious rites in a reverential and pious spirit—and he does so without holding any beliefs (*PH* 1.24, 3.2, *M* 9.49).

The skeptic’s relation to ordinary life is problematic in general. On one hand, Sextus presents the Pyrrhonian skeptic as its champion, concerned primarily if not exclusively with undermining the unjustified confidence of dogmatic philosophers. On the other hand, he presents the skeptic’s tranquility as a significant accomplishment, and not merely a matter of regaining what was lost or stolen from ordinary life by means of abstruse theorizing. So in some respects, the skeptic is supposed to live a very ordinary life—for example, when engaged in religious rituals he will appear no different from his fellow worshippers, at least from the outside. But it is extremely unlikely that his fellow

²³ M. Burnyeat, ‘Plato On Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul’ in T. Smiley (ed.) *Mathematics and Necessity: Essays in the History of Philosophy*, (Oxford Univ. Press: 2000) 1-81, at 73.

²⁴ M. White formulates a version of this dilemma in ‘Plato on Mathematics’ in H. Benson (ed.), *A Guide to Plato*, (Blackwell: 2006) 228-243, at 237. According to White, “To interpret Plato as holding that the content of mathematics, properly pursued, is to some degree constitutive of “ethical understanding” ... is, in my sense, to Pythagoreanize” (234).

worshippers will have no beliefs about the gods—in this respect, from the inside as it were, skeptical piety will differ markedly from the ordinary sort.

Skeptical piety reveals a dilemma that is emblematic of much of the skeptic's life. Either it is the same as ordinary piety or it is not. If it is the same, we will be committed to a view of ordinary life that is remarkably and implausibly free from any sort of dogmatic commitments. And if it is not the same, the skeptic will appear disingenuous in performing religious rites—lacking the beliefs and commitments that accompany ordinary pious behavior, the skeptic will seem to be merely going through the motions. In a forthcoming paper, Julia Annas grasps the first horn. She makes a distinction between theological beliefs, which have to do with the unseen nature of the divine, and religious beliefs, which have to do with the observable rites and practices associated with some particular conception of the gods. On her view, Sextus is only interested in suspending judgment on theological beliefs. But in order to preserve the compatibility of skeptical with ordinary piety, Annas insulates religious from theological belief to an extent that is unsustainable both philosophically and in regard to pagan religious practice. In this paper I argue that the second horn is the right one to grasp, but not by merely accepting the charge of disingenuousness (as Alan Bailey does in *Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonian Scepticism* Oxford 2002). The skeptic shares no beliefs with the ordinary religious practitioner regarding the gods—so insofar as ordinary piety is linked to such beliefs, skeptical piety will differ. But we need not see the skeptic as disingenuous since he is not trying to deceive others or to pretend to be what he is not. The more interesting question is whether skeptical piety retains any significant similarities to ordinary piety from the internal perspective of an ancient pagan (or a contemporary Christian). I argue that it does.

“Cosmic and Political Time in Plato's *Timaeus*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 4)

Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, *Binghamton University*, lewscassity@hotmail.com

In this paper, I will explain the two different notions of time at work in Plato's *Timaeus*, cosmic time and political time. After briefly reviewing *Timaeus*' famous definition of cosmic time as “the moving image of eternity,” I will turn to the treatment of time in the first part of the *Timaeus*, which is present in Critias' narrative of Solon's travels to Egypt. It initially appears that cosmic and political time are entirely separate notions, for cosmic time is characterized by eternal regular circular motion, while political time is characterized by memory and forgetting along a somewhat linear axis. I will argue, however, that Plato's notions of cosmic and political time share many structural features and that understanding these structural similarities is an important step towards seeing how Plato seeks to relate these seemingly different notions of time in his political philosophy.

“Plato and Painting” (Saturday 9:00, Room 3)

Andrea Tschemplik, *American University*, atschem@american.edu

In 1925 R.G. Collingwood wrote a stunning article on “Plato’s Philosophy of Art” (*Mind* 1925), which has received very little attention from Plato scholars. In it he argues that most readers miss the point of the discussion of art in *Republic X*, because they are focused on the details, without taking note of the context. The fact that Socrates identifies poetry and painting as being at a third remove from the good and truth respectively means for Collingwood that Plato is carving out a special metaphysical space for the arts and hence is at the precipice of an independent theory of art. He writes: “What the artist produces is not a bed or a battle or a hero or a villain, but an object sui generis, to be judged not by the standards by which these things are judged, but by a standard peculiar to itself. To distinguish art from science and morality and handicraft and to assert that it has a sphere of its own; to distinguish the value of its work from scientific truth and from practical utility, and to place them in a distinct metaphysical category; this is the first step towards any philosophy of art.” (159)

Much has been written about Socrates’ critique of poetry; but fewer works analyze the role of painting in Plato’s philosophy. References to painting are sprinkled throughout the dialogues, leading some commentators, most notably Nancy Demand, to catalogue the instances in an attempt better to fix the chronology of the Platonic corpus. In contrast, I will examine the philosophical work that can be done with Plato’s discussions of painting. My paper will focus on the discussion of *mimēsis* in *Republic X* and investigate the ways in which painting is the model for “mindful imitation”, i.e., it will pick up on Collingwood’s suggestion that the images created by a painter cannot be considered mere copies, but are rather windows into a new metaphysical space.

“Further reflections on Vasubandhu, Longchenpa and the Mind Only School” (Saturday 2:00, Room 9)

Toy Tung, *John Jay College*, ttung@jjay.cuny.edu

The Great Perfection view of Rabjam Longchenpa (14th C.) is generally thought to exclude or go beyond concepts of ordinary morality. Longchenpa’s own survey of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophical schools in his *Philosophical Treasury* (*Theg pa mtha’ dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa’i mtha’ rin po che’i mdzod*) presents the Great Perfection view in a way that is not incompatible with Vasubandhu’s (c. 5th C.) ideas of morality. Vasubandhu’s own works encompass the entire range from the Hinayana to the Mahayana views, and thus, they also span the gamut of moral views from ordinary rule-based morality to the Mahayana view of ultimate emptiness, a view which marginalizes ethical values, such as intention, consequence, and karma. This paper will sketch how Vasubandhu incorporates ordinary morality into his later philosophy, centered on the Mahayana Mind Only School. Based on Longchenpa’s favorable presentation of Vasubandhu in the *Philosophical Treasury*, the question will be examined of whether ordinary morality has any place in Great Perfection view of “nothing needing to be done.”

“Disagreeing with the same view: the alleged philosophical nature of Tibetan exegetical debates” (Saturday 2:00, Room 9)

Philippe Turenne, *McGill University*, philippe.turenne@mcgill.ca

Disagreeing with the same view : on the nature of some Tibetan “philosophical” debates
We often hear of the different Tibetan philosophical positions on central issues such as the two truths, and about how different people or schools take different positions based on different philosophical views. Yet upon consideration of Tibetan interpretations of the Five Treatises of Maitreya, it appears that most disagreements do not represent conflicting philosophical positions but exegetical disagreements pertaining to the purported intention of the authors and, most importantly, the alleged function of different doctrines and views. This reminds us of the general soteriological function of Buddhist “philosophy”, and calls into question the way we read some of the debates and problems encountered in the Tibetan tradition.

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“Through a Glass Darkly: Medea as a Reluctant Goddess” (Saturday 9:00, Room 11)
Christopher Vasilopoulos, *Eastern Connecticut State University*,
vasilopuloc@easternct.edu

Playing upon a mythological tradition rich in terrible, ruthless, and powerful females—many of whom were actually bestial and not seeming so—Euripides chose perhaps the most horrible of all, the teknophonos [the child-killing mother], at least to fathers as the central character of his play. Medea has been considered, in his portrayal as well as more generally, an archetype of the Terrible Mother.

Whatever the relationship between the psychoanalytical category of the Terrible Mother and the several female monsters of Greek mythology, an appreciation of the motif as a source of male anxiety to say the least provides a framework of analysis for one of the central ideas of *Medea*: the capacity of women for ferocious and violent acts, including becoming a teknophonos. Medea illustrated this capacity for transformation in a peculiarly rich and complex way. No Grendel's Dam, she had semi-divine status, became a devoted wife and mother and lived as a human woman, notwithstanding her violent acts in behalf of Jason, her eventual husband. Under provocation, she resumed her divine powers, expressing them with horrific effect and to her great joy. With great reluctance and regret she achieved her apotheosis by the sacrificing of her beloved sons to herself. Thus the granddaughter of Helios became the Goddess of the Lost Synthesis.

“Pleasure, Pain, and Law: Epicurean Naturalism” (Saturday 4:15, Room 6)
Katja Maria Vogt, *Columbia University*, kv2101@columbia.edu

Similar to modern contract theorists, Epicurus envisages a way of life prior to the establishment of law. In this way of life, we harm others and they harm us, an arrangement that is not to our advantage. Injustice is not bad by nature, but pain and fear are. Because pain and fear attach to the life of harming and being harmed, we seek to

establish laws. The law is 'by nature'—it is due to our natures as harmful and vulnerable beings that we need the law. But the law is nevertheless 'by convention'—in every given historical context, different laws will do the job of regulating social relationships in a way that is to our advantage. Epicurus thus formulates a kind of naturalism that is explicitly designed to account for social and political change as positive developments, rather than as violent crises.

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“On Various Senses of Theorein/ Theoria in Aristotle.” (Saturday 4:15, Room 11)

Julie Ward, *Loyola University Chicago*, jward@luc.edu

Aristotle’s references to contemplation, or study (*theorein*, *theoresai*) in *EN X*, 7 are well-known, if controversial, in their implications. In *EN X*, 7, Aristotle retails the features of contemplation that suffice for calling it “complete happiness” (*he teleia eudaimonia*): considered as an activity, or an *energeia*, it is the highest (1177a19), most continuous (1177a21), and self-sufficient (1177a27). It seems clear that Aristotle’s focus here is upon the characteristics of *theoria* belonging to it specifically as an activity. However, the references to *theorein/ theoria* outside *EN X* are more numerous and differ in kind from that in *EN X*, 7. One dominant use concerns the overall meaning of studying, considering, or looking at one or many things, perhaps sequentially, by reason. Thus, in *EN VI*, 5, we find that “We may arrive at a definition of practical reason (*phronesis*) by considering (*theoresantes*) those whom we call practically wise” (1140a24-5). Similarly, in *De Caelo* III, 5, he mentions where a certain conclusion does not follow, “for those wishing to consider the matter scientifically” (*physikos... theorein*, 304a25). Numerous references to *theorein* in the *Meta.* belong to this latter use, as, for example, concerning whether one demonstrative science “studies (*theorei*) all essential attributes” (997a20-1) –it does not– or whether “the study (*he theoresai*) of things that exist *qua* being” belongs to one science (1003b15)–it does. One feature that seems to be common among the latter uses concerns *theorein/theoria* as involving a process, not an activity. The extent to which the distinction between motions, or processes (*kineseis*) and activities (*energeiai*) in *Meta.* IX, 6 (1048b18-35) may be useful in sorting out these uses is then considered.

“The Fate of Theoria in Stoicism” (Saturday 4:15, Room 11)

Robin Weiss, *DePaul University*, featheroflead@hotmail.com

The only truths we generally appeal to for guidance in our practical affairs are the kind practice. Foucault and Hadot set out to show that, for the Stoics at least, the relationship between theory and practice was more complicated. However, their interpretation of the Stoics is hindered as long as they persist in attributing to the Stoics, in one form or another, the distinction between theory and practice that we moderns may have uncritically inherited from Aristotle, but which the Stoics consciously sought to undermine. The Stoics’ challenge to the dichotomy between theory and praxis comes by

way of their reconception of *phronēsis*. For they answered the question ‘does the virtuous man have knowledge of the truth?’ by attributing to the excellent person *phronēsis*, which they sometimes called ‘a knowledge of things good and bad.’ This would have made their stance on the relationship between theory and praxis similar to Aristotle’s if it had not been for the fact that they ultimately blurred the line between theory and praxis that Aristotle left intact. Unlike Aristotle, who distinguished between theoretical and practical knowledge, the Stoics refused to attribute to human beings a separate theoretical faculty of mind to which the practical could be subordinated. They categorically denied that human beings could, by way of *theōria*, grasp the causes of natural phenomena which, from their perspective, remained permanently hidden from view. However, they did attribute to human beings a single faculty of mind capable of perceiving relationships of antecedence and consequences. This, they said, was a single power of mind, just as useful for illuminating a choice-worthy course of action as for shedding light upon nature itself. of truths that are first established on solid theoretical grounds before they are applied in

“Plato on the Allegorization of Myth” (Sunday 9:00, Room 2)

Dan Werner, *SUNY New Paltz*, wernerd@newpaltz.edu

Plato’s *Phaedrus* begins in a most intriguing way. There we are, on a hot summer afternoon, strolling along the river Ilyssus with Socrates and Phaedrus. Coming upon the spot where—according to traditional legend—the god Boreas abducted the maiden Oreithuia, Phaedrus asks whether Socrates believes the myth to be true. Socrates’ reply is brief but suggestive, and raises a host of issues concerning the philosophical assessment of myth. My aim in this talk is to offer a reading of this passage, and to reflect on its broader implications.

Socrates considers but rejects an allegorical approach to Phaedrus’ question (i.e., an approach whereby he would regard the myth as literally false but symbolically true). Why? I argue that he is critical of allegorization for three main reasons: first, because he questions the reliability and veracity of the source-myths themselves; second, because he regards the method of allegorical interpretation as arbitrary and eikastic; and third, because he regards the practice and results of allegorical interpretation as less valuable than other pursuits. In particular, he explicitly valorizes the pursuit of self-knowledge as more worthy of our time, and as a central component of the philosophical life. By contrast, to immerse ourselves in the details of this or that myth is to allow oneself to be distracted by external matters—matters which are alien to the genuine attainment of wisdom through inner cognition.

This helps us to understand two curious phrases which Socrates uses to characterize his attitude toward myth. In answer to Phaedrus’ original question—whether he (Socrates) believes the myth of Boreas to be true—Socrates ultimately replies that he will “say goodbye” to allegory and instead “believe what is customary” concerning such things. Just what does this mean? I argue that, in effect, Socrates is suspending judgment regarding the truth-status of traditional myths and embracing a willful agnosticism. Recognizing his own ignorance of such matters, he neither endorses nor banishes traditional myth, but simply turns his attention elsewhere (and so “says

goodbye”). He thus “believes what is customary”, not because custom is right, but because any attempt to improve upon it will immerse him in matters for which he has no time.

Interestingly, however, Plato continues to use myth in his dialogues, including in this very passage. No sooner does he “say goodbye” to myth than does he use a mythical image—that of the monster Typhon—to articulate the very injunction to self-knowledge. This shows us that Plato does not banish myth, and even recognizes that it can have possible philosophical uses. Those uses are heuristic and exhortatory in nature, serving to frame key questions and provoke us to pursue them (and not to provide the answers). I conclude by noting several broader implications. First, Plato clearly remains critical of mythological discourse here, and subordinates it to philosophical discourse. Second—and in spite of the first point—it remains open to the philosopher to use myth, so long as he/she does so in a self-aware way. Third, and finally, the rejection of allegory should apply just as much to the interpretation of Plato’s own myths (such as the palinode) as to traditional myths (such as that of Boreas). The way in which we read Plato should be revised accordingly.

“*De Interpretatione*: Contradictory pairs, exclusion, and bivalence” (Saturday 2:00, Room 11)

Mark Wheeler, *San Diego State University*, wheeler1@mail.sdsu.edu

C.W.A. Whitaker has argued that in "De Interpretatione" Aristotle is concerned primarily with what he calls the Rule of Contradictory Pairs (RCP)--i.e., the rule that, for every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false--and not primarily with either the Principle of Bivalence (PB) or the Principle of the Excluded Middle (PEM). I develop an interpretation of RCP, PB, and PEM according to which Aristotle is concerned equally with all three principles, and indeed must be insofar as he is concerned with any of one of them.

“The Muses’ Faithful Servant: Poetic Inspiration in Archaic Poetry and Philosophy” (Saturday 4:15, Room 9)

William Wians, *Merrimack College*, wwians@mac.com

Scholars often comment on how the archaic poet’s dependence on the Muses raises at least the logical possibility of skepticism. The gods, Hesiod warns, tell us what we know that is true, but they can also tell us lies that seem like the truth. Because the inspiration of the Muses cannot be verified, what is revealed is open to skeptical doubt—what Hussey terms “the bare possibility” of deception. Yet Homer and Hesiod seem untroubled by the possibility of skepticism, even as it is they who raise it. The confidence of the poets even as they emphasize the profound limits of human knowledge raises the crucial question this paper shall address: from what does the poet derive his right—or perhaps we should say privilege—to hear the truth spoken by the Muses, and the right to retell it to us? Hussey asserts that the Muses do not lie to their

faithful servants (“Should the Muses, per impossibile, deceive Homer about the Trojan War. . .”), but that leaves the nature of faithful service still to be determined.

I shall argue that the poet will not be deceived (though characters in the story often are) because he is, in some relevant sense, a ‘faithful servant.’ His service consists in devoting himself to imparting the moral lesson the knowledge of the story entails. Just as events of the remote past or distant future cannot be known without the help of the Muses, so too the moral lesson—humanity’s place in the divinely ordered cosmos—cannot be known without similar help. Besides passages in Homer and Hesiod, I shall consider the rationalized service to a divine ideal found in Xenophanes and Parmenides.

“Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s *Meno*” (Sunday 9:00, Room 3)

William Wians, Merrimack College, wwians@mac.com

Plato’s dialogue *Meno* presents a deceptively simple surface. The dialogue begins with Meno asking Socrates a series of questions about how virtue is acquired. Instead of having him respond directly, Plato has Socrates divert the conversation to the question of what virtue is. But Meno’s character isn’t accustomed to the rigors of Socratic inquiry.

So after a series of characteristic false starts and frustrations, the dialogue ends with its characters unable to define virtue or to supply a persuasive answer as to how it is acquired.

If the dialogue is characteristic of Plato, however, it has as much to do with what it shows the reader about virtue as with what it tells about it. Though the aggressively confident Meno certainly ends unable to define virtue and Plato’s Socrates is often said to do so, I shall argue that Plato is in no doubt as to what virtue is or the means by which virtue is acquired. I shall organize my argument around two key passages and what we find there—and crucially, what we find missing. In them, Plato provides clues to the meaning of the whole, drawing a crucial connection between the perplexity of the dialogue’s characters and the most promising route toward the acquisition of virtue, which is surprisingly neglected over the course of the dialogue. Plato’s art in the *Meno* is that he illustrates essential lessons about virtue not just despite the apparent perplexity of its characters, but by means of it.

“Elenchus and the Method of Hypothesis in Plato’s *Republic* I-IV” (Saturday 4:15, Room 10)

Chad Wiener, Portland State University, wienerc@pdx.edu

Vlastos argues that the philosopher who proceeds via elenchus and the one who proceeds via the method of hypothesis must have (radically) different assumptions. I will argue that this view is false by showing how elenchus and the method of hypothesis work from the same set (or at least some of the same set) of assumptions in *Republic* I-IV to answer a what is question and a what sort question. My argument is constructed on these premises. I will first appeal to the *Meno* where Socrates claims that the person employing the method of hypothesis is in the same epistemic state of knowing neither the

what is nor the what sort as the one refuted by elenchus (86c-87c). Second, nobody at the end of Book I can claim to know what justice is. Third, Book I does leave us with a problem that Glaucon and Adeimantus state again in Book II: is justice better than injustice or not? Finally, Socrates posits two hypotheses (human beings are not self-sufficient and one nature, one job) in his attempt to solve the problem. I interpret this as a use of the method of hypothesis (here, if we are not self-sufficient by nature and each of us does the job suited for our nature, then justice will be better than injustice). This interpretation of the first four books of the *Republic* serves a double purpose. It will help support the view that elenchus and the method of hypothesis complement each other (the method of hypothesis begins where elenchus ends – it enables the inquiry to go forward even when we are in aporia). It will also clarify why the answer concerning what justice is in the middle of Book IV is insufficient: it is grounded on the hypotheses above. That Socrates employs the method of hypothesis to continue the search for justice and resolving the point also gives some meaning to the claim that there is a longer road (435c-d, 504b).

“Virtue and Knowledge in Plato’s *Timaeus*” (Saturday 11:15, Room 4)

John Wolfe, *University of South Florida*, jrwolfe@gmail.com

The relationship between aretē on the one hand, and sophia and epistemē on the other is a central and persistent theme in the writings of Plato. Most notably he often explores the question of whether various virtues can be understood as kinds of knowledge. It should come as no surprise that this theme ought to play out in the *Timaeus* as well. I argue that in this dialogue it is suggested that character virtue is a necessary precondition for one’s being able to apprehend the normative structures which organize the visible cosmos. That is to say, that one must be good in order to be a good physicist because the state of one’s soul determines what sorts of objects it can apprehend as well as the manner in which one apprehends them. Thus Plato is committed to a form of perspectivalism.

In order to support this claim I make use of both the traditionally philosophical aspects of the dialogue, that is to say the words spoken by the characters, but also in the way the characters are described and presented within the fictional structure of the work. This thesis is further supported by reference to the dramatic precursor to the *Timaeus*, namely the *Republic*, as well as the thematically related dialogues *Phaedo* and *Theaetetus*.

“Theory and practice in Aristotle’s *Ethics*” (Saturday 4:15, Room 11)

James Wood, *Boston University*, woodj@bu.edu

This paper explores possible linkages between theoria and practical virtue in Aristotle's *Ethics*. By attending to the practical implications of theoretical thought, the status of beauty as the object of moral action and contemplation alike, and the descriptions of nous and theoria in the NE, Metaphysics, and de Anima, the case is made that practical excellence is promoted and perfected by theoretical excellence.

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“Knowledge and Political Leadership in Al-Farabi’s Philosophical Thought” (Sunday 9:00, Room 8)

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There isn't any notion as uniqueness as political leadership in Islamic Community. Because it is not only necessary in governing the Moslem's affairs in this world but also it is crucial to reach the Happiness the world to come. The Islamic leader by knowing the Happiness could be give guidance Islamic Community and bring Moslem on it. In the other word, being Happiness, Al-farabi's argues, would not be possible without paying the mention on leadership in this context. While taking the Happiness would be concerned to the other world, so it has to be pursuit in this world, as a matter of fact, this world would be farm for fostering the Happiness of afterlife. What is precise to ask that what kind of knowledge is necessary to take that political position and why it is the most characteristic one to being the leader? Receiving to certain knowledge in Alfarabi's view of point would be having two phrases: one that making attempt to learn knowledge through the logical syllogism and second one emanate from active intellect into human agent. Emanation as point of fact is bring something into being two knowledge – based leadership: philosopher who receive knowledge from active intellect by intellectual process and prophet who by different quality take it. Alfarabi made depiction between the leadership and various kinds of the cities. This paper by these analytical instruments is point to going to introducing four paradigmic leaderships in Islamic community.

“Plotinus’ Conception of the Soul in Cross-Cultural Perspective” (Saturday 4:15, Room 8)

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As is well known, Plotinus’ was a major influence on medieval Islamic thought, most directly through the work known as *Theology of Aristotle*. This volume, which reorganizes, summarizes and supplements the material in *Enneads* IV-VI, discusses such central Neoplatonic themes as emanation and the hypostases of Intellect and Soul. Further material on the hypostases is provided in the *Book of Causes*, often attributed to Proclus, and generally acknowledged as being at least based on his work. In both texts, the concept of soul is of central importance, and its influence on the Islamic conception of the soul cannot be ignored. In this paper, I would like to investigate a few of the possible points of contact in early Islamic Neoplatonism.

The first great Islamic philosopher, al-Kindi, was heavily influenced by the Peripatetic conceptualization of soul, but elements of his discussion of this topic in *On First Philosophy*, such as his description of the rational soul’s simplicity, point to more

explicitly Neoplatonic aspects of his thought. A few generations later, al-Farabi adopted an essentially Plotinian cosmology, yet his treatment of the soul draws heavily on Aristotle. One significant difference, however, is the central role given to the imaginative faculty, which plays a central role in both the description of abstract universals in sensible terms and the interpretation of prophetic knowledge. In order to more fully understand al-Farabi's deviation from the Aristotelian model, I will examine passages from the two key Greek Neoplatonic texts mentioned above, with the aim of discovering the extent to which such a conception of the imaginative faculty could have some of its roots in Plotinian thought.

While this investigation can, of necessity, only be cursory, I hope that it will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the extent of the influence of the Plotinian conception of soul on medieval Islamic thought.

“Philoponus’ Account of Nature: The particular universal” (Sunday 11:15, Room 5)
Anna Zhyrkova, *Independent scholar*, anna.zhyrkova@gmail.com

The statement proclaimed by the Council of Chalcedon on the nature of Christ did not clarify all the ontological issues with which Christian theologians had to deal when discussing Jesus, both man and God. Various Christian authors who sought such a clarification in the light of Chalcedonian statements had to reinterpret classical notions of nature and individual, bringing essentially new theories into philosophy. Among those Christian treatments stands out, maybe as a problematic one, Philoponus’ account of nature.

Philoponus developed his view of nature in the *Arbiter*. This work was written with the aim to provide a philosophical grounding to monophysitic theology in the post-Chalcedonian era. Philoponus claimed that Chalcedonian teaching ultimately brings about the negation of real and substantial unity of natures in Christ. This implies that He is in two hypostases. Philoponus drew this conclusion from the premise accepted by the Council itself: no nature exists apart from individuals. Philoponus tried to elucidate this premise through Alexander’s claim (accepted also to a certain extent by the Neoplatonic school) that universals as such either exist in minds or subsist in individuals. Thus, as universals, natures subsist only in individuals. If there is then one individual Christ, there ought to be one nature of Him. But this nature will have to be a compound of Divine and human natures. In order to explain how two natures can become one compound nature of one individual, Philoponus develops an original conception of common and proper natures. Common nature is the common intelligible content of individual subjects. Proper, or specific, nature subsists in individuals, assuming a particular existence in each of them, and differing from natures of all other individual subjects, even from those that fall under the same common nature. Proper nature of a particular individual is different from proper nature of another particular individual of the same kind. Christ has one proper particular nature. This nature is a compound of Divine and human natures proper to Him.

Philoponus’ view of nature is seen by some scholars as a consequence of consistently applying Aristotle’s categories, comprehended through the Porphyrian-

Neoplatonic tradition, to his analysis of key terms in Christology. Other scholars see it as a result of Philoponus' "converting" the commonly accepted Neoplatonic metaphysics to a "radical Aristotelianism" in the mode of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Some scholars even consider Philoponus to be the precursor of Roscelin of Compiègne's kind of nominalism. In my point of view, Philoponus' account was primarily motivated by his theological preconceptions. It is his monophysitic belief that makes him turn from Neoplatonic teaching on universals to the view of Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, as I am going to show, Philoponus' account on proper or specific nature differs significantly both from Neoplatonic and Peripatetic doctrines. I believe that Philoponus decided to create a new conception of nature, which would better suit the needs of Monophysiticism.